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Aviation History
1957
1957 - 1555.PDF
FLIGHT, 25 October 1957 643 No.5 SQUADRON . . . on November 20. The raids were often carried out in con-junction with No. 10 Sqn. In addition the squadron was busy with artillery observation on its own front, and an interestingpoint concerning conditions at the time was that whereas in 1915 —when A.A. guns were thinly sited and inaccurate—shoots wereconducted from 6,000ft, in the latter part of the war, in the interests of accuracy, they had to be done from sometimes aslow as 1,000ft. And by then A.A. guns were thick on the ground. The work was both arduous and dangerous. The year 1918 opened with very bad weather; neverthelessthe day-to-day work of the squadron went on whenever con- ditions were at all possible for flying. In March came the last realthrust by the Germans, by which they recovered all the ground lost in the Somme battle. These were hard and anxious days forthe R.F.C., indeed for the whole British forces; but the German effort eventually weakened and the initiative passed to the Allies.It was during this battle that—on April 1, 1918—the Royal Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air Service amalgamated to formthe Royal Air Force. At this time, No. 5 was at Acq; but on May 25 a move wasmade to Le Hameau and it was at this airfield one night in early August that the Germans bombed the squadron, their attackslasting three hours. Seven airmen were killed and more than a dozen wounded. The sergeants' mess was demolished and acanvas Bessonneau hangar with three R.E.s, inside was destroyed by fire. The squadron, still working over the Canadian Corps, wassoon to witness the beginning of the end of stalemate trench war- fare. The squadron diary is again quoted: "The Battle of Amiensopened at 4.20 a.m. on August 8, 1918, with an artillery bombard- ment of unparalleled intensity, which completely disorganized the'enemy's artillery and took him, as completely, by surprise. A thick mist covered the ground. "Into this mist at 4 a.m. four R.E.8s of No. 5 Squadron climbed,regardless of the adverse conditions, and overcoming the restricted visibility by flying level with the tree-tops. One, piloted byLt. F. C. Russell, was shot down in the enemy support lines. The observer, Lt. L. J. F. Oertling, was killed and Russell takenprisoner. Another was forced to land to ascertain its whereabouts. The two remaining R.E.s stayed over the lines until relievedat 7 a.m. "As the day advanced the sun penetrated and gradually dispersedthe mist, disclosing a scene which few of those who witnessed it and survived would forget in their lifetime. The enemy wasretiring in haste and confusion with British tanks and infantry following closely. On the British side the roads were packed withtroops and transport moving east, while the open country was alive with prisoners moving back to the west." That day an advance of between six and seven miles had beenaccomplished. During the afternoon, the crew of another R.E.8—Lts. Fother-gill and Parlee—lost their lives. Their aircraft was hit by a British shell while they were flying at 500ft. Risks attendant uponflying in the path of our own projectiles were additional hazards which had to be accepted. A more unusual occurrence happened on August 9 when Capt.Goudie and his observer, 2nd Lt. Jamison, saw about 300 German infantry, massed in a sunken road, offering stubborn resistanceto our advancing troops. Machine-gun fire from a low height changed their minds and soon pieces of white cloth were beingwaved as a token of surrender. The R.E.8 stood by until the whole party had been surrounded and marched off. A measure of the squadron's work in this battle is revealed inthese figures. Between August 8 and August 22, under the direc- tion of its pilots over 250 hostile batteries were silenced or com-pletely destroyed, 450 bombs dropped, 400 photographs taken and over 50,000 rounds of machine-gun ammunition fired atground targets. Next came the breaking-through of the Hindenburg line, where13 German divisions were soundly beaten by 10 British, who captured 16,000 men and 200 guns. A new air duty in thisbattle was to fly so low as to make the Germans react and by doing so give away their position. Some of this done by No. 5provided valuable information to the Canadian General Staff. With open warfare No. 5 moved forward, and when the endof the fighting came on November 11 the squadron was at Aulnoy on the outskirts of Valenciennes. Later a move was made to A "25th birthday" formation of Westland Wapitis—Risalpur, 1938. Hangelar, on the Rhine, still with the Canadian Corps; and byMarch 1919 No. 5 was the senior squadron attached to the Army of Occupation, its R.E.8s now replaced by Bristol Fighters. On September 8, 1919, the squadron returned to England andwas stationed at Bicester, as a part of No. 2 Group (Southern Area). Six-and-a-half years after formation, on January 20, 1920,No. 5 was disbanded—but only for a very short while. On February 1, it was re-formed from No. 48 Sqn. at Quetta, India. For the period from 1920 to 1924 there are practically norecords of the squadron's activities. It is known, however, that No. 5 took up permanent quarters at Quetta, operating underNo. 3 (Indian) Wing. The squadron was commanded by S/L. P. C. Maltby, D.S.O., A.F.C. [now A.V-M. (ret.) Sir Paul C.Maltby], and was still flying Bristol Fighters. For its time, the Bristol Fighter was a winner, having a performance equal to manycontemporary single-seat fighters. But in the Indian climate its performance suffered, the top speed varying from 100 to 110 m.p.h.Its ceiling was reduced to 17,000ft. Range was 2 hr except when an extra tank was fitted in the rear seat. Armament compriseda Vickers front gun and a Lewis gun on a Scarff mounting at the rear. Bomb-load was one 112 lb bomb or a 200 B.I.B. (babyincendiary bombs) container, plus eight 20 lb Cooper fragmen- tation bombs. In May 1924, when for the first time the titles ofR.A.F. squadrons officially indicated their duties, the "Fighting Fifth" became No. 5 (Army Co-operation) Sqn. By the time the new squadron designation had been approved,No. 5 had been moved to Dardoni in Waziristan, taking over from No. 31 Squadron, and was operating under No. 1 (Indian) Wing. In addition to its normal work in co-operation with Army unitsthe squadron's duties included fortnightly patrols to Wana and Tanai forts to ensure that they were occupied by khassadars andnot falling into disrepair; demonstrations in formation over tribal areas where trouble was suspected; patrols to help the Armylocate gangs of raiders; ferrying Army and political officers; extensive survey photography and, occasionally, actual operationsagainst recalcitrant tribes. The following rather light-hearted account of such operationsis extracted from a diary written at the time. (In fact flying con- ditions in the mountains, especially in bad weather, were verygrim): — "The tribes of Mahsud and Wazir," the diary relates, "found the strainof good behaviour a bit too much at times. There were definite rules to this game, strictly observed on both sides."First the political agent would summon the tribal leaders to a jirgah at which he would tax them with their sins and pronounce theGovernment penalty—usually a fine of rifles or rupees. This was but the first of several meetings which the culprits utilized for the successivestages of denying responsibility, suggesting that half—or maybe a quarter—of the sum would be more in keeping with their resources,offering so much down and the rest in instalments and, finally, flatly refusing to pay."The P.A. would then issue his ultimatum which usually gave the tribe another week in which to get their caves habitable. The daybefore this expired the squadron would demonstrate over the village and drop leaflets tied to small pieces of rock and containing a reminder thatall women and children should be removed. The fact that nobody could read was immaterial—everybody knew the rules."The 'war* might last anything up to a fortnight before the tribesmen would indicate their willingness to try and raise the necessary, lt wasgenerally accepted that the surrender was not brought about by the bombing—most of which made little impression on the strongly built HAWk&R UART 194-0 UAWK£R AUPAX I 94- 1 CURTISS MOUAiYK 194-1 H-AfYKCR. UUHR I C A N £ 2c,Zd. 194-3
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