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Aviation History
1958
1958 - 0241.PDF
FLIGHTt 21 February 1958 255 Now undergoing C.A.A. inspection and test at Miami International Airport is this modification of the C-46 by L. B. Smith Aircraft Corporation. Known as the Super 46C, the modified aircraft includes Pratt and Whitney R-2800 C-type engines. L B. Smith's first modified C-46 will be delivered to Varig. CIVIL AVIATION D.H.121s FOR B.E.A.: NEARING THE MOMENT OF TRUTH? TT is still not 100 per cent certain that a contract for 24 D.H.121s,-*- with an option on a further 12, will be signed between Airco and B.E.A. The Government announcement in Parliament lastweek contained what appeared to be a possible loophole. The Minister of Transport said: — "The Corporation will open negotiations this week with a new com-pany in which de Havillands, Hunting Aircraft, and Fairey Aviation will participate. Rolls-Royce will develop and manufacture the power plant.The Government will wish to be satisfied that the whole project will be developed and manufactured as a private venture by the companiesconcerned." But there now seems little doubt that the way is clear for deHavilland, with their Hunting, Fairey and Rolls-Royce partners, to get busy with detail design and engineering of the D.H.121.The programme, which calls for deliveries to B.E.A. in the early part of 1964, will be a tight one; six years from the start of detail-design to passenger-service is one year less than the generally accepted time-scale for a new commercial airliner, and the 121programme is already months delayed. The designers of the 121 are not yet ready to talk about theirproject, presumably because they feel aware—as in the early Comet days—of mounting American competition. It is probable also thatde Havilland and Rolls-Royce still have open minds about certain aspects of the design, in particular the details of the triple R.B.141powerplant installation. This perhaps explains why only one view of the aircraft (Flight, February 7) has so far been released. There is, therefore, little to add to what has already been pub-lished, except to clear up one or two misconceptions about the role of this kind of aeroplane. It has always seemed pretty clear(Flight, September 6, 1957) that B.E.A.'s requirement is for a jet aeroplane quite different from any other breed of jet on paper or inprospect. To compare the D.H.121, or the Bristol 200, with the Boeing 720 (a 185,000 1b to 200,000 lb transport) or with thesimilar-sized Convair 880, is to miss the point. No doubt sales of those aeroplanes will overlap into the D.H.121 market, just as theyhave overlapped the DC-8 and Boeing 707 market. But by no stretch of the imagination, or unstretching of their structures andengines, can those aircraft be declared the optimum choice for short-haul routes. Although to think of the 121 as a Viscountreplacement would not be ouite right, such a comparison puts the 121 concept—and its technical difficulties—into perspective. Itwould certainly be more reasonable to compare the 121 with a Viscount than it would with a 720 or an 880. If this is accepted, it follows that the way to start designing ajet for very short-haul work (i.e., not more than 1,000 miles maxi- mum stage length with full payload and reserves) is to keep itsmall and to keep it light. This is not easy if seating for up to 100 passengers is required: but the tenet of short-haul economics, par-ticularly for jets, is large revenue-earning capacity. So everything must be done to keep down weight—hence power, hence fuel,hence costs. If such an aeroplane can be achieved, it shou'd sell, because thecost-curve of no other jet can approach it over the short stages. Sights must first be set on good short-haul economics, because—with the one notable exception of the Caravelle—this is something which no other jet can achieve in competition with turboprops. Having achieved good short-haul economics (and made B.E.A.happy), sights may then be raised to stretch the range up towards medium-haul requirements—if the market exists, and if it can bedone without becoming involved in a different class of aeroplane. Jets are not inherently as flexible as turboprops: an additional 750or 800 miles of range with the same payload might easily result in an aeroplane far removed from the original "small and light"ideas. One cannot, in the classic range-stretching way, just increase wing span to get more L/D and more fuel without severe accumu-lative penalties in weight, power and consumption. There is a strong view (which according to rumours is shared byDouglas) that the big market is for a jet "optimized" for short- hauls. One feels that D.H. know this, and that from their jettransport experience they know just what can and cannot be done in the way of stretching. In other words, it is untrue to say that a jet designed to B.E.A.requirements will not fill the needs of others. The market is in the short ranges. If range can be stretched to meet medium-haulrequirements without spoiling the aeroplane, then this will obviously be done. J. M. R. B.O.A.C IN THE MIDDLE EAST THE current negotiations between B.O.A.C. and Arab Airwaysare a reminder of the Corporation's considerable interests in the Middle East. Over the past decade B.O.A.C. have steadilyexpanded their connections in this region and now appear to have over £lm. invested in seven airlines—Aden Airways, Arab Air-ways, British International Airlines, Cyprus Airways, Gulf Avia- tion, Middle East Airlines and T.H.Y.—and in the Mid-EastAircraft Service Company at Beirut. Aden Airways were the first B.O.A.C. associate in the MiddleEast, having been formed in October 1949 as a wholly owned sub- sidiary to operate a fleet of six DC-3s. The following year a 23 percent share in Cyprus Airways was obtained by buying one half of B.E.A.'s shareholding, and in 1951 a 51 per cent holding in GulfAviation was acquired. This airline had only been founded the previous year and was operating local services in the Persian Gulf.The next company in which B.O.A.C. became interested was Aisb Airways. As fully described in last week's Flight, a 49 per centshare in this Jordan airline was acquired by Aden Airways in 1953. None of these investments compared in magnitude with theCorporation's purchase in 1955 of 48 per cent of the share capital of Middle East Airlines. In 1949 PanAm had received a 36 percent share in M.E.A. in return for three DC-3s. By 1955 M.E.A. wished to acquire four-engined transports but could not reachagreement with PanAm. Under a new contract with B.O.A.C., the Lebanese company was enabled to buy Viscounts. The latestB.O.A.C. agreement also involves Viscounts, a credit for illim having been extended to the Turkish national airline, B.O.A.C.receiving a six per cent share in T.H.Y. B.O.A.C.'s other interests in the Middle East include a 59 percent share in M.A.S.C.O. (the balance being held 30 per cent Hunt- ing-Clan, 5 per cent by M.E.A. and 6 per cent by others). Anothersubsidiary, British International Airlines, operate charter flights in the Persian Gulf and since 1953 have had a management contractwith Kuwait Airways. Defunct management agreements have been negotiated with Iraqi Airways and Eagle Airlines (a predeces-sor of Iranian Airways). Since 1955 all the Corporation's investments in the Middle East(excluding Cyprus Airways, M.A.S.C.O. and T.H.Y.) have been transferred to a single holding company, Associated British Air-lines (Middle East), Ltd., owned 80 per cent by B.O.A.C., 15 per cent by B.E.A. and 5 per cent by Hunting-Clan. A clear pictureof each subsidiary airline's financial condition cannot be obtained now that the various accounts are consolidated, but even when theaccounts were shown separately it was difficult to separate the figures for the subsidiaries from those for the parent Corporation. The main item in B.O.A.C.'s portfolio, M.E.A., has lost heavilyin the last two years. But this has been a period of costly recon- struction, and the immediate prospect is favourable. M.A.S.C.O.has also lost heavily to date, but once firmly established this com- pany should also become a profitable venture. Arab Airways haveshown consistent losses, while the other airlines usually have shown marginal profits.
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