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Aviation History
1958
1958-1- - 0240.PDF
244 FLIGHT, 15 August 1958 Seen over the English coast on a pre delivery test flight is the first of Northeast's nine Vickers Viscount 745Ds. It departed for Boston on August 9, and with two others will be in service this month on the airline's network to New York, Philadelphia, Washington and Montreal. CIVIL AVIATION TOO MANY JETS — THE question which everyone concerned with air transporthas been asking these two years past—"Have the airlinesbought too much equipment?"—has now been answered with some authority. The answer is yes, according to a study* byI.C.A.O.'s Air Transport Committee (Flight, July 4) which is now generally available.The study was commissioned at the I.C.A.O.'s Assembly at Caracas in 1956. It has taken about 18 months to complete, butits conclusions were not unanimously accepted by the I.C.A.O. Council at its Montreal meeting last June. As previously reported,the views of the British and American delegates had to be over- ruled before the study was released. Mr. J. Riddoch of the U.K.considered it was misleading to associate excess capacity with jets, because this was a phenomenon that could have arisen from theover-ordering of any type of aircraft. The U.S. delegate, Mr. Nelson David, opposed publication of the study on the groundsthat it would prejudice the airlines' financing plans. It is thus significant that I.C.A.O., in publishing the study lastweek, stated: "The Council has not adopted or endorsed any conclusion contained in it. . ."The study goes further than its title and terms of reference suggest: while it discusses the economic implications of long-range jets, it also undertakes, in unprecedented detail, the exercise of adding the capacity of existing fleets to the capacity of the newfleets on order, and matching the total against anticipated traffic. The assumptions made here are obviously of fundamental im-portance, and were as follows: — (1) Average block speed 85 per cent of mean cruising speed; (2)Average payload capacity 80 per cent of maximum; (3) Average utiliza- tion eight hours per day for long range jets, seven hours per day formedium jets and turboprops; (4) Present delivery schedules will be achieved; (5) Attrition-rate from accidents, etc., will be two per centper year (disposal of fleets ignored); (6) Load factor of 58.6 per cent; (7) Traffic increase up to 1961 at 15 per cent per year.We hope to summarize the "excess-capacity" conclusions in a * "The Economic Implications of the Introduction into Service ofLong Range Jet Aircraft," prepared by the Air Transport Committee of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, International AviationBuilding, Montreal 3, Canada. future issue; in the meantime, examination of a brief I.C.A.O.summary of these conclusions, received last week from Montreal, suggests that they may differ somewhat from the conclusions of anearly draft of the study. These were summarized recently in Aviation Daily: — 195B 19S9 1960 1941 (millions of ton-miles) Theoretical excess of potential productive capacity over capacity required for 59.4 per cent load factor ... 723 497 2,104 1,611 Maximum capacity that might be sold to non-scheduled operators 172 368 595 855 Theoretical minimum surplus remaining ... '.'.- ^ 551 129 1,509 756 It will be noted that the above conclusions are based on a loadfactor of 59.4 per cent—rather higher than that assumed for the report published now. The original study appears to be moreemphatic in its conclusions about over-ordering; however, the difference between the two versions is likely to lie in the degree,rather than the nature, of their findings. The real meaning of the report is that the world's governmentshave lent the authority of their judgment to support the widely held opinion that the economic consequences of the jet revolutionmay be more serious than the airlines had bargained for. In par- ticular, as the I.C.A.O. study points out, the disposal of pistonfleets will present the biggest problem; according to the original study the non-scheduled carriers might absorb a maximum of lessthan 30 per cent of the scheduled excess by 1960, even if they purchase no brand-new aircraft in the meantime. Of particular significance is the opinion of I.C.A.O. that fare-differentials between jets and propeller aircraft may be necessary. The study says that "Operators might well place a high priceon travel in the pure jets, a medium price on travel in the turbo- props, and a low price on travel in piston-engined aircraft; but theunit operating cost of the three kinds of aircraft will probably not be in this order, at least on long stages." It will be interestingto see whether the published edition of the study includes this observation, which is the first official comment to be made on thefare-differential issue by I.C.A.O. — BUT MORE ARE ORDERED IN the same week that I.C.A.O.'s report was published, AmericanAirlines—as if to say "We don't believe it"—coolly ordered 50 more jets, bringing their orders for new turbine equipment to 110aircraft worth $365m. In an announcement on July 31 (see last week's issue ofFlight) American announced an order for 25 Boeing 720s (which will be designated by American 707-023s) with an option on afurther 25; and 25 Convair 600s—a development of the 880—also with an option on 25.Thus American now has the largest turbine fleet so far ordered— 110 aircraft, as follows: —(1) 25 Boeing 707-123s for long-range use, deliveries of which will start during the next few weeks, to be completed by 1959. (The originalorder was for 30 Boeing 707-123s, but five have now been converted ro 720s). (2) 25 Boeing 720s for medium-range service, deliveries tobegin early in 1960 and to be completed in early 1961. (3) 25 Convair 600s for delivery in 1961-1962. (4) 35 Lockheed Electras, for deliverystarting in 1958 and to be completed in 1960. The distinction between the new Convair 600 and the 880 ismarked; the 600 (foreshadowed in Flight of July 25) was, say Convair, "designed to American's special requirements." It is faster than the 880, having a maximum cruising speed estimatedby Convair as 635 m.p.h., or 20 m.p.h. more than the maximum cruising speed claimed for the 880. This extra speed is apparentlyachieved by area-rule modifications in the form of two tapered projections or bulges protruding from the trailing edge of eachwing; and by considerably increased power—15,000 1b thrust per engine as compared with 11,200 lb of the 880. The 600's power-plants will be the "aft-fan" General Electric CJ-805-21 develop- ment of the G.E. GJ-805-3 as fitted to the 880. Other differences between the 600 and the 880 are greatly in-creased gross weight, 238,200 lb v. 178,500 lb; increased landing weight, 180,000 lb v. 132,800 lb; slightly increased wing area, upby 250 sq ft to 2,250 sq ft (though span remains the same); length up by 10ft to 139ft 5in; fuel capacity increased from 10,700 to15,200 U.S. gal. All in all, the Convair 600 is a considerably larger, faster and heavier 880, with non-stop U.S. transcontinentalcapability. Seating is 90-120. Why American should have ordered two types of medium letremains rather a mystery. The Boeing 720 and the Convair 600 are of comparable capability, having always been closely compet)-
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