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Aviation History
1959
1959 - 0393.PDF
192 FLIGHT, 6 February 1959 EASTERN ROUTES JET . . . of the aircraft, or that they expect people to flock into the ticketoffices without a push. The assistant manager at one point was trying to arrange special commodity rates for locally made razorblades to be air-freighted to the West Indies. He was also, the next day, driving 30 miles to explain to a former customer whohad booked his son's May-term return to school in Europe by a rival prop-driven airliner that he was depriving the boy ofB.O.A.C.'s "junior jet club" badge. A summing-up of the Comet 4's commercial effect onB.O.A.C.'s eastern routes might be as follows: — (1) The Comet 4 appears to be the right sort of capacity for the traffic,because it should permit traffic-growth to be handled—and indeed generated—by higher frequencies on routes which could do with them. (2) It possesses an appeal, no less strongly felt in the East than in theWest, which should be exclusive at least for the summer of 1959, and which—because perhaps the majority of people want a good service first and speed second—should hold its own against 707 and DC-8competition. (3) The new airliner appears to be backed by a well entrenchedforeign establishment with plenty of local savoir faire, and with more local goodwill than in die Raj days of Imperial Airways, upon whoseroutes the present B.O.A.C. services were built. (4) The Comet is no novelty in the East, but its return to the routegives B.O.A.C. a kind of superior caste in parts of die world where such things are no less commercially important than they are elsewhere.It is good business to be able to advertise at the top of the leader page of a paper like The Statesman: B.O.A.C. PROUDLY INTRODUCES THE COMET 4 THROUGH CALCUTTA, FOUR TIMES WEEKLY TO EUROPE AND LONDON, FOUR TIMES WEEKLY TO HONG KONG AND TOKYO FROM APRIL 1.There could, one feels, be more emphasis on the promotional word JET —if only to emphasize die unreality of that rival hoarding inChowringhee Road. Pan 2 will deal with the operational aspects of the Far East Comet 4services, including crew-training, flight-planning, navigation and airfields. SUPERSONIC TRANSPORTS AT THE I.A.S. Finance the Major Timing Consideration: The Sonic Boom New York, January 30 ^UPERSONIC transports, their prospects and problems, were^ the subject for discussion on January 29 at a morning session of the 27th annual meeting of the Institute of AeronauticalSciences in New York. Spokesmen for engine manufacturers and airlines commented on papers delivered by representativesof Convair, Boeing and Douglas dealing with design, operation and market problems of supersonic airliners. A more detailedreview of the papers will be published in subsequent issues. Conyair's engineering vice-president, R. C. Sebold, said thatConvair could start a Mach 2.0 transport programme today, but they felt that the market was too small to justify the effort. Onthe other hand, a Mach 3 or Mach 5 airliner should prove attrac- tive to airline management because it would offer improvedoperating costs, an economic life of 15-20 years, and be available at about the time when airlines would be able toiifford it. Convairstudies showed that a Mach 3 machine would have 12 per cent lower operating cost per seat mile than a subsonic jet if both wereoperated at their design range. Transatlantic flight times of 2-2T hr should appeal to passengers, Mr. Sebold believed. Convairestimate that a Mach 3 transport could be operational in 1970. Basic aircraft design will be strongly influenced by supersonicboom phenomena. Dimitrius Gerdan, engineering director for Allison, pointed out that NASA scientists claim that a Mach 3aircraft at 70,000ft caused an audible boom swath on the ground over 200 miles wide. At altitudes below 30,000ft window damagewas almost assured. In order to avoid damage to ground struc- tures and avoid civilian complaints it would probably be necessaryfor a supersonic transport to climb subsonically to about 35,OOOft before passing Mach 1. Only above this altitude could it accelerateto its design cruising speed. Such compromises in flight path would effect not only operations but design as well. Douglasengineering vice-president E. F. Burton, and Dr. V. V. Holmes, also of Douglas, noted that nearly one-third of the total fuel maybe consumed in climbing to 20-25,000ft. Fuel costs would assume an increasingly larger share ofoperating costs, and flight planning and fuel scheduling would be of even greater importance than they were for subsonic jets.Maynard L. Pennell, Boeing Transport Division chief engineer, said that the possibility of a decompression or engine failurethat could force the transport to lower, less efficient, altitudes than 65-75,000ft, resulted in a wide region of "point of no return."For this reason, considerations of emergencies would be the critical fuel planning requirement. Thermal problems at Mach 3 might require that the fuselagebe jacketed with water for cooling. This concept was viewed unfavourably by Birger Holmer of S.A.S. who felt it would createundue problems for airlines that operated in arctic regions. Convair also suggested that in the interest of structuraleconomy it might be desirable to eliminate passenger windows entirely. Since Mach 3 introduced many unfamiliar problems,Raymond D. Kelley, technical development superintendent for United Air Lines, advised that manufacturers should not overlookthe Mach 2 transport. Whether the supersonic transport cruised at Mach 2 or Mach 3,both General Electric and Pratt and Whitney believed that the necessary engines would be developed with military support, butthat technologically there was no problem. Financial, rather than technological, problems would delay theintroduction of supersonic transports until 1972-75, according to Douglas. Besides having to pay for a large commitment of long-range subsonic jets, the airlines were expected to enter a wave of buying medium-range subsonic jets in 1963-1964 that willfurther postpone plans to buy supersonic equipment. It appeared, therefore, that technology must await the airlines' ability to buy,and that by the time the customer was able to buy, the manu- facturers would be able to deliver Mach 3, rather than Mach 1.5or Mach 2, aircraft. Because the productivity of a Mach 3 transport was nearly fourtimes as great as for a subsonic jet, fewer supersonic aircraft would be required to handle a given amount of traffic, resulting in amarket of relatively few units. Costs for manufacturing facilities and development of a supersonic transport might approach$1 billion (compared with $300 million for the DC-8), or almost $10 million per aircraft for an anticipated market of 100 aircraft.Manufacturing costs might be in the order of $15-20 million each, so the sales price might be a startling $25-30 million. Itwould be necessary for traffic to expand the number of units required, or for the Government to support development, tobring the price down to $20 million each. At this price the supersonic transports, Douglas believed, could be economicallysound airline investments. Utilization of Mach 3 transports was subjected to much debate.While manufacturer operating cost estimates were based on 2,500-3,000 hr annually, airline spokesmen tended to feel thaipractical considerations would reduce this. Pan American's S. B. Kauffman, assistant vice-president engineering, indicatedthat their experience would indicate that utilizations of about 6 hr per day could be expected. Mr. Holmer anticipated that suchhuman factors as reluctance to lose a night's sleep on eastward flights would compromise scheduling and utilization. Boeing,viewing the successful PanAm-National operation of using the same 707s on transatlantic and New York - Miami runs, thoughtthat this approach could be used elsewhere as well to maintain high utilization. Mr. A. O. Baltensweiler, Swissair vice-president,suggested that fare differentials might be necessary to boost night flying and maintain high use. It was M, G. ("Dan") Beard, of American Airlines, whocautioned manufacturers to remember the passenger. Reduction in travel time would not be the only new experience for airtravellers. Steep floor angles during climb, possible use of after- burners, and seeing the world from 60,000ft would be somethinga person had to get accustomed to. These factors plus the prospect of no windows and inconvenient departure and arrival times wereall human problems to be considered. As Dr. V. V. Holmes of Douglas commented, airlines and manu-facturers would approach the supersonic airliner with caution. But M. G. Beard best summed up the prospects for such aircraftwhen he said: "The speed potentials of this vehicle will keep us driving until it is an operating fact." PETER E. VIEMEISTER. Duck-billed platypus: Convair proposal for a Mach 2 to 5 transport
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