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Aviation History
1959
1959 - 0704.PDF
FLIGHT, 13 March 1959 345 their aircraft on the ground at a very large number of widelydispersed airfields. The enemy could not then count on destroy- ing the entire force at a single blow. Assuming that he made theattempt, but left perhaps fifty B-52s airworthy, would this still constitute a retaliatory force? In the opinion of some strategists,it would not. Obviously, America must equip herself with ICBMs to increaseher deterrent power. But with how many? Until several months ago, plans called for the procurement of 30 such missiles by 1960.A total of 70 were to be deployed by 1961, while in 1962 the U.S. was to possess a total ICBM force of 130. These missiles, deployedin nine Atlas and four Titan squadrons of ten missiles each, would not be increased in numbers until 1964, when large num-bers of the greatly simplified Minuteman became available. Some additional missiles have been ordered recently, and inthe first week of January the Defense Department authorized the Air Force to form an additional seven Titan squadrons. But supporters of the theory of infinite deterrence believe thateven 200 missiles would be inadequate. In the early 1960s, they contend, a dangerous "missile gap" will exist between Americaand the Soviet Union. Having an appreciable advantage in ICBMs, the enemy would not be deterred by inferior forces.The only way to avert war, according to some, is to acquire an ICBM/bomber force with a destructive capability greater thanthat of the enemy's combined forces. Sheer weight of numbers is the only way to deter the enemy, these protagonists claim, andthe currently planned U.S. forces are inferior to the 2,000 enemy missiles. Hence they advocate an immediate increase in themissile programme, perhaps to 80 squadrons. But the procuring of a retaliatory force capable of matchingthe destructive power of 2,000 ICBMs would indeed be a costly process. Many Congressmen are unwilling to support the budgetincrease that would be necessary. Do we really need to match the Russians "missile for missile," some ask, or will some lesser forcebe sufficient to deter the enemy? And are we certain that esti- mates of Russian progress are not exaggerated? Both of thesequestions are critically important in the current discussions. General Nathan Twining last autumn stated that "it is erroneousto compare what the Soviets might have in 1962 with what we feel certain we will have in 1962." These are the considerations which led to the suggestion of"finite," or limited, deterrent forces. According to this theory, it is sufficient to maintain a retaliatory force which is not equal tothe enemy's offensive force (and in fact would be incapable of defeating it), but is capable of razing perhaps 20 of his majorcities (in the concept of infinite deterrence, a figure of 100 cities has been quoted as being sufficient). No one other than a lunaticwould dare risk starting a war if he knew that he would lose 20 of his own cities in return; and the lunatic might not bedeterred by any size of retaliatory force, however overwhelming it might be. There is a further reason for not acquiring a force as large asthe aggressor's (this school of thought contends), and that is the practical realization that there will be few worthwhile militarytargets left in the homeland of the enemy once he launches a raid. His missile pads will be empty; his aircraft will have left theiraerodromes. Retaliation raids must be directed against a few large, easily pinpointed cities. A moderate sized force is all thatwould be required for this task. The aggressor, on the other hand, must utilize a much larger striking force. A fair proportionof his weapons must be allotted to the destruction of the poised retaliatory forces. The enemy might have to direct several missilesagainst each of the defender's scattered "hard" missile launching sues and bomber bases. Hence, the aggressor must of necessityemploy more missiles than the defender—unless he is willing to accept severe retaliatory blows. In the aggressor's favour, how-ever, is the fact that all of his missiles can be launched from inexpensive "soft" above-ground sites, while the defender, whois forced to accept the first blow, must bury his missiles in expensive sites below ground. Even "finite" theorists admit that an overwhelming deterrentforce is desirable. They, too, would support such a programme if jt were not so expensive. But it is because enormous funds wouldbe required to accumulate such a force that they suggest reliance on limited deterrent. By over-spending on defence, a countrynught evoke economic ruin, and lose the very freedoms which defences are supposed to protect. The supporters of "infinite" deterrence further argue that anaggressor might coldly calculate that the destruction of 20 of his cities would be worthwhile. Some people even foresee the•Kussians gambling that the U.S. might surrender after receiving the first blow (to avert further destruction) rather than dispatch token" retaliatory forces. This theory, however, is not borne outoy past world history. Opposite, a Boeing B-52G refuels from a KC-735. At right, a Convair Atlas departs from Cape Canaveral. (The B-52 and Atlas represent the principal types of weapon discussed by the author.) Another reason for fayouring infinite deterrence is that if theU.S. held an inferior position the aggressor might not start a war. Instead, he might bite away at small chunks of the free world.Having inferior forces, America would not be in a position to start a "defensive" war. World opinion, too, might be influencedby the fact that Russia held the top hand. Neutral countries might be swayed to the Soviet side.The foregoing arguments make it apparent that in the Cold War the aggressor holds the advantageous position. He knowswhether or not he is going to start a war; the rest of the world remains ignorant of his immediate intentions (albeit not of hisultimate objectives). Every time the aggressor makes a feint the free world assumes a defensive posture, perhaps a much strongerone than is actually required to cope with the situation. Several years ago intelligence reports credited the Russians with a pro-duction programme which was to provide them with an incredible number of high-performance jet bombers. The U.S. then startedmass-producing B-52s to keep pace with the expected threat. Later it became apparent that the quality of the Russian bomberswas inferior to that of the B-52, and that the entire Soviet bomber programme had been severely cut back. But the U.S., becauseof the momentum inherent in the democratic system of doing things, maintained B-52 production at a high level. Too manyB-52s have already been built, some strategists contend. Today Russia again threatens the U.S. with projected construc-tion of great numbers of ICBMs. Is this a feint? The Soviet leaders may fully intend to go through with the plans creditedto them; but then again the same game may be played all over again. To meet the new challenge, the U.S. will probably increaseICBM production. Will the enemy subsequently cut back his own programme for ICBMs to concentrate on some new "space"type of weapon? If history were to repeat itself, he would do so and the U.S. would continue ICBM production beyond that whichwas really necessary. Simultaneously she would initiate pro- grammes to meet the space challenge. Economically, such aprocedure repeated over and over again would be extremely costly. But a game of this type is not without its disadvantages to theaggressor.. There is absolutely no question but that the U.S. (even without counting the obvious support of other free countries)is at present superior to the Soviet Union in overall military strength. Current U.S. development in aircraft and missiles—stimulated by the Russian challenge—would seem to assure this lead in the near future. The peril to the aggressor, therefore,is that one of his "feints" might be misinterpreted, a development which might bring about his ruin.
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