FlightGlobal.com
Home
Premium
Archive
Video
Images
Forum
Atlas
Blogs
Jobs
Shop
RSS
Email Newsletters
You are in:
Home
Aviation History
1959
1959 - 0729.PDF
364 AIR COMMERCE FLIGHT It seems but a short while ago (last spring in fact) that the Australian airlines made their controversial decision to buy Electros. One of the reasons for the choice—namely quick delivery—is here exemplified in the recent initial flight at Lockheed, Burbank, of the first of Ansett- A.N.A.'s two aircraft from meeting together out of working hours and off B.O.A.C. premisesand calling themselves a shop stewards' committee. But no provision is made in the N.J.C. agreements for such a committee, and the Corpora-tion feels therefore that shop stewards should not in future meet as a committee in working hours or on Corporation premises. . . . "Another practice which management has recently decided to bringto an end is the holding of unauthorised mass meetings at the airport. To this end management has posted notices on all notice boards at theairport, reminding all members of the staff that no-one is allowed to absent himself from work without proper permission from his depart-ment or section head. Of course, this is only common form throughout all industry. Indeed, I know of no employer in the country, private ornationalised, who allows mass meetings of his employees in working hours or on his premises." ALTIMETER SETTINGS REVISED AS from April 1 the recommendations of I.C.A.O.'s EuMed**• regional air navigation meeting on altimeter setting pro- cedures for vertical separation are to be adopted throughout theEuropean Mediterranean area, and hence in the United Kingdom. The new procedures are based on the adoption of "flight levels". for en route vertical separation. The pressure to be set on the adjustable millibar scale of the altimeter will be the "standardday" value of 1013.2mb; this is a purely nominal setting not related to the sea level pressure appertaining at any time. In theUnited Kingdom the use of the I.C.A.O. standard pressure setting for determining flight level has been limited to use only at 29,000ftand above, each flight level being denoted by a number (e.g., 290 denotes a cruising flight level of 29,000ft). At the moment, altitude readings used for terrain-clearance andfor separation purposes between 3,000ft and 29,000ft are deter- mined by the value of QNH for the Flight Information Region inwhich the aircraft is operating. This is the forecast sea-level pressure for the middle of the hour in which it is given (a newforecast is broadcast each hour); set on the millibar scale of the altimeter, it will show the height of the aircraft above sea level.A forecast for up to two hours ahead can usually be obtained. In controlled airspaces a pilot who has departed from an airfield,with QFE (the barometric pressure setting of the airfield, which gives an altimeter reading of zero or near-zero) or any other set-ting on his millibar scale, must now change to QNH at 1,500ft. In F.I.R.s he is required to change to QNH at 3,000ft above meansea level. Under the new procedures—regarding which Notam 101/59has recently been published—QNH settings (now the lowest forecast hourly value for each setting region) will still be usedfor terrain-clearance purposes, and in controlled airspace a transi- tion altitude from QNH to flight level will be specified for eachaerodrome. The lower limit of most airways in the U.K. is 3,000ft a.m.s.l., so that the transition level will generally be set above thisheight. In F.I.R.s in the United Kingdom, outside controlled airspace, a common transition altitude of 3,000ft will be adopted. The new procedures, which abolish the necessity of changing QNH setting from region to region, should decrease the chanceof altitude errors in vertical separation and relieve pilots of the necessity for frequent adjustment of their altimeters. In termsof discrepancy from QNH-measured altitude, the variation in height due to adopting a common standard is rarely likely toexceed 800ft in the United Kingdom. DISTRACTED PILOTS TN view of current concern that accidents have been caused by*- the misreading of altimeters, the "environmental conditions" in which a pilot must work and which may contribute to his makingan error are worth careful study. Writing in the February issue of The Log, the official journal of the British Air Line PilotsAssociation, Capt. S. J. L. Key lists some of the factors that might create a situation in which a pilot could misinterpret his instru-ments. He lists among cockpit deficiencies, trivial in themselves but possibly disastrous in total effect: — "(1) Poor control-cabin layout, especially in aircraft designed for two-crew operation. This is particularly important and an endless list of complaints could be compiled about most British aircraft . . . Vital'switchery' has been repositioned in the control cabin, without any consultation with pilots. Imagine the outcry if a pilot invaded the chiefengineer's office and repositioned his telephone in the opposite corner of the room to his table, and his light switch on the floor behind his filingcabinet! "(2) Dependence upon navigational equipment which needs constantmanipulation and attention and which is inefficient when most needed ... "(3) Failure of the operator to provide facilities in the control cabinfor efficient office management. What sort of efficiency could be expected of an administrative office, where the reference books are normally keptin a tattered grip-type bag and those which are needed to be readily available during working hours, stowed in a heap on the floor? Yet thisis precisely what happens in the administrative office of a piece of machinery worth half-a-million pounds, and where the office and themachinery are moving at upwards of 300 m.p.h. "(4) Lack of consideration for crew comfort. This includes poor seatdesign, inefficient heating and ventilation, lack of a place to put down a cup of coffee, etc."(5) The installation of complex flight systems which, while allegedly improving the presentation, have introduced a whole new range of'switchery,' and, at the same time, have created an infinite number of possible errors. The whole design of the system currently in use on twogas turbine aircraft is based on the assumption that the pilot will always be in the mental condition to manipulate the system without error. Thenumber of possible errors, when for some reason the pilot is harassed, is frightening." Capt. Key also pleads for a "scrupulously honest and realisticattitude" among pilots who are reluctant even to admit that they have difficulty interpreting a certain instrument or in using a pieceof equipment. "I do not see why," he adds, "such terms as designer error, engineer error, operator error, management error, etc.,should not be as familiar as the hoary old one of pilot error." Here is the crew of the Aerolineas Argentines Comet 4 LV-PLM which was delivered from Hatfield to Buenos Aires (via Dakar and Recife, 7,075 miles) on March 2. Elapsed time was about 18 hr. from left to right: Stewardess A. Corallo; Steward T. Bone; Steward C. Reissi Capt. S. Lense; Capt. A. Aguirre (co-pilot); Stewardess M. Cresp'- Scheduled Comet 4 services to Santiago are due to begin on April ?J/ services to London (May 19) and New York (May 29) will follow. Seating layout (in a Charles Butler-styled cabin) is 24 first-class, 43 touri$t<:iasi
Sign up to
Flight Digital Magazine
Flight Print Magazine
Airline Business Magazine
E-newsletters
RSS
Events
