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Aviation History
1959
1959 - 0771.PDF
376 FLIGHT, 20 March 1959 AIR COMMERCE The Munich Accident T AST Friday, more than a year after the event, the report* was*-* published of the German inquiry into the accident to B.E.A. Elizabethan G-ALZU at Munich on February 6, 1958, in which22 of the 44 occupants lost their lives. The accident occurred during the third attempt of the aircraft to take off from Munich-Reim Airport for London, two previous attempts having been abandoned due to fluctuations in boost readings. In tracing the causes of the accident, the comprehensive German report deals first with eventualities that could be eliminated. The detailed text is confined to the effect on rolling friction of snow on the runway, the effect of slush on the free running of the wheels and the effects of wing icing on take-off performance. The Elizabethan had landed at Munich after a flight from Belgrade in which it had been subjected to cold-soak at —21 deg C to —25 deg C; during the two hours the aircraft was at Munich ground temperatures were at or a little below freezing and there were moderate to slight falls of snow. By 1600 hr, when -ZU taxied out for the last time, about 1-Jin to 2in of snow had fallen and the runway was covered with a Ain-jin deep layer of slush. Dealing first with the rolling friction on the runway, the com-mission was advised that as a result of the slush take-off distance would have been increased by about 360ft at the most. CaptainJames Thain, the senior pilot, who survived the crash, said that he was satisfied with the condition of the runway. The reportconcluded that "slush on the runway did not increase the rolling friction to such an extent that the accident could be attributed tothis." Nor did the commission believe that the slush effected the freerunning of the wheels, although in a statement appended to the report Capt. Thain attributes the accident to this. On the final take-off, acceleration appeared normal up to the Vi(take-off decision point) speed of 117 kt. "The needle of the A.S.I.," noted Capt. Thain in his account, "was flickering slightly,and when it indicated 117 kt I called 'W and waited for a positive indication of more speed. Capt. Rayment [the pilot-in-chargewho died as a result of injuries sustained in the accident] was adjusting the trim of the aircraft.. . The needle hovered at 117 kt *Civil Aircraft Accident: Report by the Federal Republic of Germanyrelating to the inquiry into the accident to G-ALZU A.S.57 Ambassador (.Elizabethan) on Feb. 6, 1958, at Munich-Rheim Airport, H.M.S.O. 6s. and then dropped 4 or 5 kt, I was conscious of a lack of accelera-tion, the needle dropped further to about 105 kt and hovered at this reading . . ." Consideration is given in the report to snow or slush jammingbetween the wheels and hindering their rotation, but "since not a single indication came to light" the possibility "appeared extremelyremote." In investigating the effects of wing icing, the commission wereinfluenced by evidence that, when the wreckage was examined six hours after the crash, a layer of rough ice, about Am thick, wasfound under the snow on the wings. On a basis of calculation, this deposit could have been formed from the snow that fell whilethe aircraft was standing on the ground. Both pilots were in agreement that nothing need be done aboutthe snow; Capt. Thain said that he saw only melted snow running off the trailing edges of the wings. But, in the words of the report:"The pilots had at no time such a view over the wings as would have permitted them to judge the condition of the upper surfacesof the wing reliably . . ." The snow which fell directly after the aircraft landed might have run off the wings at first and perhapsmelted at the outset, but must very soon have begun to cling. The resultant decrease in maximum lift coefficient and rise inprofile drag is considered by the commission to have been a cause of the accident. But this conclusion was not established with "complete cer-tainty," as it did not explain Capt. Thain's observation regarding the drop in speed. Coupled with skid marks from all four land-ing wheels on the last part of the runway, the drop in speed "would then have the perfectly natural explanation . . . thatCapt. Rayment saw disaster approaching and braked the landing wheels sharply." If this were the case, the report comments, "it is not out of thequestion that a misunderstanding between the two pilots played a part at this juncture, for, whereas Capt. Rayment (probably)applied the brakes, Capt. Thain, in the hope of averting the catastrophe . .. did exactly the opposite ... and pushed the throttlelever forward as far as possible." This does not alter the fact, the commission states in conclusion,that the aircraft would normally have become airborne long before this and the accident would not have occurred if the aircrafthad not iced-up. ROUND-THE-WORLD DOUBTST HE words "Subject to Government Approval" often appear,in extremely small type, at the foot of advertisements announc- ing new air services. Approvals, usually, are a mere formality. But when these words appeared in B.O.A.C.'s recent announce-ment about round-the-world services they signified something more than a formality. In fact, as Flight goes to press, it is not atall certain that the trans-Pacific link in B.O.A.C.'s round-the- world service will receive American approval before the deadlinedate of April 1. The U.S.-U.K. bilateral air agreement, reviewed two yearsago, provides for a B.O.A.C. route-extension from San Francisco to Hong Kong. Therefore, so far as the U.S. State Department isconcerned, B.O.A.C. can operate that route. However, according to American procedure, the C.A.B. first has to grant B.O.A.C.a foreign air carrier permit—and before it does so other airlines can object. One airline, Northwest, which operates from Seattle across theNorth Pacific to Tokyo, has in fact objected to B.O.A.C.'s pro- posed service—on the grounds that it includes Tokyo. North-west's objection is made on a technical point of air-agreement interpretation—namely that Tokyo is not an "intermediate point." The U.S.-U.K. air agreement allows B.O.A.C. to include "inter-mediate points" on the Hong Kong - San Francisco service; and B.O.A.C. are said to have agreed, during the revision of thebilateral, that "intermediate point" means a minor traffic stop. Northwest contend that Tokyo, as the most populous city in theworld, is hardly a minor traffic stop. The airline feels that the B.O.A.C. service will divert its Tokyo-U.S. business. Meanwhile, B.O.A.C. appear to be proceeding as if April 1 will—as advertised—see the opening of their round-the-world service. Turboprop partners for Ansett-A.N.A. are the Viscount 810 and the Electra: the first of each species respectively came off the Vickers and Lockheed lines at about the same time. The Australian airline has ordered four Viscounts and two Electros. The Viscount left Weybridge for Melbourne last week
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