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Aviation History
1959
1959 - 0915.PDF
452 "Strategic Air Command will soon receive limited quantities of a Mach 2 bomber, the B-S8 Hustler" , THE BALANCE OF POWER MEASURING "THE MISSILE GAP" By DON ADAMS HOW strong, in a military sense, is America? Few U.S.citizens seriously doubt the accuracy of recent confidentclaims by various senior officers and government officials presumably having first-hand knowledge. There are, however, some who question whether present U.S.defence policies will assure that the balance of power in the future remains on the more friendly side of the Iron Curtain. Voicingopposition to the Administration's existing defence programme are several prominent Congressmen, and a number of otherwiseimportant persons. Key issues in the discussions are (a) the threat posed by a developing Soviet ICBM capability and (b) the alleged"missile gap" facing America in the early 1960s. The Threat. Recent estimates of Soviet strength have creditedthe U.S.S.R. with a force of 100 ICBMs by 1961. A total of 500, the same source reports, are to be deployed the following year.According to some observers, these figures represent a 3 :1 Soviet advantage in ICBMs in the early sixties. Still greater marginsin favour of the Soviets have been forecast for succeeding years. And it is claimed that the Russians will possess a numericalsuperiority in ICBMs until the U.S. begins large-scale produc- tion of the Minuteman and Polaris ballistic missiles sometimearound 1965. How much of a threat is posed by the Russian ICBM forcehinges on the degree of effectiveness of the missiles. Optimistic estimates of the reliability of an ICBM suggest that two missileswill have to be directed at each target to insure its destruction; but a few weeks ago Secretary of Defense McElroy opined thatit would take four to six ICBM-type missiles to knock out a single target. Assuming his figures to be the more realistic of the two,the Soviet Union may have the ability to destroy upwards of 100 targets by 1962. The words "may have" are used since some highlyplaced sources express considerable doubt that the Russians will have that great a capability in the noted time period. Currently aligned against the Soviet threat—whatever its magni-tude—is the considerable armed mi^ht of America. Backbone of her deterrent force are the 2,000 turbojet bombers of theStrategic Air Command. Added to this force are naval aircraft aboard fifteen attack carriers, and large numbers of strike aircraftin the Tactical Air Command. Shortly, deliveries of production Atlas ICBMs will begin, to befollowed next year by Titan. Already selected as launching sites for these missiles are seven Air Force bases; Warren, Wyoming;Vandenberg, California; Forbes and Schilling, Kansas; Offutt and Lincoln, Nebraska; and Fairchild, Washington. All of these sireswill be equipped with Atlas. The first Titan units are to be de- ployed at Lowry A.F.B., Colorado; Ellsworth A.F.B., SouthDakota; and Mountain Home A.F.B., Idaho. Construction of a number of atomic-powered, Polaris-launchingsubmarines is already under way. And the Strategic Air Command will soon receive limited quantities of a Mach 2 bomber, theB-58 Hustler. By the early sixties, the Hound Dog stand-off missile will be available to increase the effectiveness of manned bombers. Soon afterwards, Minuteman and Polaris will be added to the inventory in substantial numbers. Production of a Mach 3 bomber, the B-70 Valkyrie, is also scheduled for that time period. Are these forces, as now planned, adequate to cope with the expected Russian threat? No, say some critics of the Administration. The Missile Gap. That the Soviet Union may acquire anumerical advantage in ICBMs within the next few years is admitted by many defence officials. There is not as good agree-ment, however, on the consequences of such a situation. Where- as the Administration considers—and one would think quiteproperly so—that the U.S. ICBM force is but a part of an overall defence force, there are those who tend to discount the effective-ness of all weapons except ICBMs. These people would imme- diately accelerate ICBM production to match the Russians"missile for missile." Principal bone of contention among professional and amateurstrategists alike is the role of manned bombers in the next five years. Some believe that S.A.C.'s bombers would be destroyedon the ground before they ever became airborne. Others disagree. It is understood that at the present time the U.S. bomber fleetis dispersed at 43 main S.A.C. bases within the continental United States. It can be assumed that should an aggressor direct a massICBM raid at America a number of missiles would be aimed at the vulnerable bomber bases. On March 8, Secretary McElroystated in a television programme his belief that an attack by 200 ICBMs would not wipe out all of S.A.C.'s bases. But what abouta raid of 500 ICBMs? This number may well be large enough to assure devastation of 43 prime targets. Obviously, if S.A.C. is toremain a potent deterrent force in the sixties, its bombers will have to be aloft at the time the warheads begin exploding. Fifteen minutes has been widely mentioned as the maximumwarning time that could be given of an impending ICBM attack. DEWline radar stations, positioned near the Arctic Circle, wouldgive the warning. Within fifteen minutes, therefore, as many as possible of S.A.C.'s bombers must take off on a retaliatory mission.Approximately 10 per cent to 20 per cent of the Command's fleet are currently on a "ground alert" status, meaning that 200 to 400bombers could be airborne within 15 minutes. Many persons question whether this number is adequate. Of the aircraft thatmanage to become airborne, some will never reach their targets, owing to in-flight malfunctions or losses caused by enemy counter-action. Some bombs will also miss their targets. The number of the aggressor's targets that could be destroyed in an initial S.A.C.retaliatory raid would be fewer than 200. How many aircraft are needed? Between 600 and 700 S.A.C. aircraft is the figure some-times quoted for an "adequate" sized force. According to the Secretary of Defense, the number of aircraft on ground alert willrise to 30 per cent, or about the desired total, by year's end. Additional bombers could be maintained aloft on an "air alert,"but it is an extremely costly process. Representative Flood has been quoted as stating that the cost of keeping S.A.C. on an aira'ert status could run as high as one billion dollars a year [the U.S. billion is 1,000m—Ed.]. Except in times of known emergencies,such as occurred during the Quemoy, Suez and Lebanon crises, the Air Force is not likely to maintain other than a token force onair alert. Critics of the Administration's defence policies generally sup-port the concept of "infinite deterrence," a theory discussed in a recent Flight article (pp. 344-345, March 13). Proponents ofinfinite deterrence, or "counter force strategy," as it is sometimes called, hold that war can be averted only if the U.S. maintainsforces so strong that after accepting the first blow it will still retain overwhelming power. Faced with the prospect of suffering ruinin massive retaliatory raids, potential aggressors would be deterred from starting a war. Currently programmed U.S. missile produc-
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