FlightGlobal.com
Home
Premium
Archive
Video
Images
Forum
Atlas
Blogs
Jobs
Shop
RSS
Email Newsletters
You are in:
Home
Aviation History
1959
1959 - 1236.PDF
1 May 1959 597 What was the Command's future mission, and how could it beaccomplished? The reasoning began with a statement that a U.S. national con-viction was that war was not a primary or acceptable method of settling disputes. The policy of deterrence gave the enemy theinitiative, and so the S.A.C. mission would continue to be the maintenance of instant readiness with the object of deterring waron terms acceptable to the U.S.A. or, if this failed, to ensure national survival. In reality, the argument continued, deterrence was preventionof war through fear of the consequences. The difficulty here was that only Russia knew what she was prepared to accept, for Sovietand U.S. measures of catastrophe and disaster differed greatly, and Russia had already survived disasters of gross magnitude. Itwas impossible to quote a necessary level of deterrence, because there was a changing threat and, over the past 13 years, there hadbeen a narrowing margin for deterrence. Factors in the evolution of the enemy threat were initiative, intercontinental heavy bomberforce, multi-megaton weapons, the medium bomber force, IRBMs and ICBMs. The new dimension of the Soviet threat introduced by ballisticmissiles meant that the warning period would be reduced from hours to approximately 15 minutes by 1960-62, and this extent ofwarning dictated the structure of the S.A.C. force and its cost in dollars, manpower and resources. While 100 per cent of the forcecould be available if the initiative were held, one-third would be available on 15 minutes' warning and, in the event of completesurprise, the force available would depend on the effectiveness of the attack. In the evaluation of the future capability of S.A.C., war gamingexercises formed an important pan. These war games represented the application of mathematical logic to the analysis of air warfareproblems, and comprised a series of simulated battles to test the validity of the prepared plans. The games were used as a manage-ment tool to assist in determining future requirements, not only by S.A.C. but by the U.S.A.F. and external agencies. The Com-mand's war gaming experience included internal games for 1960, 1961, 1962, 1965 and a 1962 repeat; and three full war games peryear—representing the present, the immediate future, and 8-10 years ahead—were scheduled. These games had confirmed that air power was decisive indetermining the outcome of a war; that initiative provided a tre- Controllers of the "deterrent": Gen. Thomas S. Power (left), commander-in-chief of S.A.C., and Lt-Gen. Francis H. Griswold mendous advantage; and that deterrence hinged on the possessionof a secure and effective force. The security of the force involved the dispersal concept already mentioned, and also the "hardening"of key control centres, vital facilities on bomber bases, and missfle sites. Future equipment which would improve the effectivenessof the force included the B-70 bomber, the WS-125 nuclear- powered aircraft which might be used as a flying command post,and the Minuteman ICBM. Another vital requirement was to establish man in the space environment, and it was hoped to dothis in something like the Dyna-Soar vehicle. Complementary manned and unmanned weapon systems would be exploited, withmanned aircraft steadily decreasing as a proportion of the total force. Looking toward the future, therefore, a continued and con-tinuous deterrent effort was needed. The S.A.C. mission would be the same as at present: the enemy threat would rise, however,and so the Command's capability must increase. "We must con- tinue to provide an effective force capable of insuring peace,"Col.^Hoban concluded, "and in Strategic Air Command, gentle- men"-— (the colonel paused briefly)—"Peace is our Profession." This had been the case for Strategic Air Command, a mixture ofpersuasion and blinding by science and jargon; a mixture of fact, doubtful assumption, obvious conclusion and dedicated purpose.The whole dressed up in glossy Madison Avenue fashion and presented, together with complimentary cigarette lighters bearing Yet to enter the service of S.A.C. is the Martin SM-68 Titan ICBM. This round was photographed during its pre-launch check on April 3 at Cape Canaveral, an establishment discussed on the following page the S.A.C. crest, and a Press kit containing 17 "background"releases, 15 photographs, 11 fact sheets and two biographies. So much for the presentation, now to see the control centre. This, it should be emphasized right away, was an impressiveexperience. Completed in January 1957 at a cost of $10m, the centre comprises a three-storey administration building (in frontof which is the shell of an Atlas ICBM) and a three-floor under- ground command post. This command post can be sealed off in anemergency and could become self-sustaining for 30 days—it has an independent water supply, emergency electrical power system,air-conditioning system, complete communications equipment for teletype and voice transmission and emergency rations. We visited first the communications centre of the commandpost. The teleprinter centre has 78 machines and handles approxi- mately 120,000 messages per month; there is in addition a tele-phone centre which includes a special long-distance system to all S.A.C. bases in the U.S.A.; and these are augmented by a S.A.C.commanders' radio-telephone network which provides essential communications between headquarters and some 30 operationalbases all over the world. Calls to and from Guam, Alaska, Thule, Tripoli, various U.S. bases and High Wycombe in England werehandled during our visit to this R/T. net control room, and this system can be extended to contact aircraft while airborne. The most fascinating element of the command post is, of course,the control room—140ft long, 39ft wide and 21ft high, with one wall covered with 20ft high, rail-mounted panels displaying opera-tional maps, weather maps, operational status of aircraft and missiles, deployment charts, training exercise information and theemergency war plan (generally covered by curtains). Facing this wall is a two-decked row of glass-fronted rooms, the upper levelforming a balcony from which the commander-in-chief, Gen. Thomas S. Power, and his staff would command during anemergency or war situation. On the lower level is the room from where the commander-in-chief's orders would be executed, andthe senior controller's desk here carries the famous red telephone (nicknamed the "Hot Line") which can be used to alert the entireS.A.C. combat force within 30 sec. Adjacent to the long control room are the intelligence air roomand the operations plans room. In the former are displayed large maps carrying intelligence information necessary to keep the warplan current, and the latter room is where orders directing attacks against individual targets are written. The trolley rails which carrythe main display maps and panels extend into both these rooms. From the commander-in-chief's balcony we looked across anddown into the control room. Above the wall displays was a row of clocks giving the time "in areas in which S.A.C. has an interest"—i.e., Tokyo, Guam, Alaska, Omaha, Thule, London, Moscow and Omsk—and a red counter-type clock set in action when an opera-tion starts. Closed-circuit colour television cameras are installed in the main command post, the intelligence air room and theglobal weather centre, and are used (with receivers in the offices of the commander-in-chief and key staff members) for dailybriefings. This television is also linked to the North American Defense Command Combat Operations Centre at ColoradoSprings, where a team of five S.A.C. officers would assist in co- ordinating S.A.C. and A.D.C. efforts in the event of war, (Continued overleaf) :• . . , -
Sign up to
Flight Digital Magazine
Flight Print Magazine
Airline Business Magazine
E-newsletters
RSS
Events
