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Aviation History
1959
1959 - 1566.PDF
5 June 1959 America's Defence Debates ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE AT VARIANCE By DON ADAMS (New York) A CCORDING to a recent article in The New York Times, sixt\ great problems—all connected with the defence of the J- -*• United States—are currently being debated within thePentagon. The problems are: (1) the concept of finite or infinite deterrence; (2) the possible assignment of the Navy's Polaris-missile submarines to the Strategic Air Command; (3) the alloca- tion of funds to offensive or defensive purposes; (4) forces forlimited warfare; (5) anti-submarine warfare; and (6) the organiza- tion of the Pentagon and the military services. All are inter-related to a certain extent and each involvesdisputes and some bitter in-fighting among the various branches of service. At stake are not only the roles of the Army, Navy andAir Force in America's future defence programme, but the security of the United States and hence of the entire Free World. Finite or Infinite Deterrence? Two recent Flight articles(March 13 and April 3) have dealt with this question. Still under debate, the problem basically is an argument over what size ofdeterrent force is required to prevent the outbreak of another war. The U.S. Army and Navy generally support the concept offinite deterrence. Holding that America already has an extensive "overkill" capability, they argue that the peace can be maintainedwith a limited deterrent force whose size is determined by the task to be accomplished, and not by the size of the opposingenemy force. The presently contemplated ICBM/bomber force is sufficient for this purpose, the senior Services contend. Further,too much money is being spent for weapons which can be used only in all-out nuclear wars. And- the allocation of additionalfunds to "massive retaliatory" weapons not only increases the overkill capability, but reduces the amount of money availablefor coping with limited wars. Particular criticism has been directed at the Air Force's procurement of the B-70 Valkyrie(Mach 3) bomber. Secretary of the Navy Thomas S. Gates recently called for "the elimination of certain of the very expensive mass-destruction single-purpose weapon systems which have a priority of claims against our national resources." The Air Force, not unexpectedly, heatedly refutes these argu-ments and points to the fact that the policy of infinite deterrence (or counter-force strategy as they term it) has maintained the peacesince the end of World War II. It believes that S.A.C. can and will be as potent a deterrent force in the era of ballistic missilesas it was in the days of the piston-powered B-36 bombers. Proudly pointed out by the Air Force is the fact that the B-36 force wasnever required to drop a single bomb in anger; but because it was available for retaliatory raids, the aggressor dared not attack.The B-36s fulfilled the primary Air Force goal of preventing war. Believing thus that the U.S. must outnumber the Russians inoffensive weapons, the Air Force advocates increases in appro- priations for strategic weapons. Finite deterrence is an unrealisticpolicy, according to S.A.C.'s commander, General Thomas S. Power. He said recently: "Nobody knows what the minimumdeterrent is. If anybody tells you they know what the minimum deterrent is, tell them for me that they are liars." The Polaris Submarines. Long a source of friction betweenthe Navy and Air Force has been the Navy's acquisition of a strategic missile—the Lockheed Polaris. Just as ICBMs wereintended to replace the Air Force's bomber aircraft, the fleet ballistic missile was designed to give the Navy a weapon capableof taking over some of the missions formerly assigned to carrier- based aircraft. That the Navy should possess strategic attacksystems has been debated for many years. Strategic attack is the primary role of S.A.C.; no other service should duplicate thisfunction, the Air Force contends. Although the joint chiefs have generally supported this view, they have in the past tolerated thedevelopment of Army and Navy weapons capable of strategic strikes because such weapons heretofore had alternate capabilitiesfor hitting tactical targets. Hence the development of the Navy's A3D and A3J was justified on the grounds that these aircraftcould be utilized for either strategic or tactical missions. Evolu- tion of the submarine-launched Polaris, however, represents adeviation from the principle that strategic bombardment is the function of S.A.C. Polaris is clearly a strategic weapon which isill-suited to tactical usage. As such it should be under Air Force jurisdiction, S.A.C. argues.* And unless the Polaris submarinesare controlled by the Air Force they probably could not be too efficiently employed in any major war, these same peoplestate. * An anomaly is that while the Air Force claims (with good reason)that all strategic weapons should be under one Command, it is adamant 'n refusing to concede that the Tactical Air Command—whose missionn ground support—should be more closely allied with the Army. In refutation of this argument the Navy contends that thePolaris submarines can also be used in anti-submarine r61es. "Unthinkable" is the answer the Navy gives to the suggestion thatthey relinquish control of their prized weapon system. The Cost of Offence v. Defence. The staggering increase in thecost of offensive weapons has been duplicated in the case of defensive arms. It has been reported that over $20,000 millionhas been spent so far on defence against manned enemy aircraft. Appreciable sums have been spent on ground-based, sea andairborne radar detection units, as well as for manned and un- manned interception systems. Has too much money been devotedto defence? Although earlier estimates had credited the Russians with a piloted bomber force at least as large as S.A.C's inventory,the most recent figures suggest that they possess no more than 150 heavy bombers of the Bear/Bison types. Production of theBear turboprop aircraft has ceased entirely, while deliveries of the Bison have fallen to one per month. Counting the medium-ranged Badger bombers, the Russian force numbers fewer than 1,000 aircraft. Critics of America's heavy emphasis on defencespending point out that the money spent so far averages out to $20 million per Russian aircraft, or considerably in excess of thecost of the Soviet bombers themselves. Both the Army and Navy believe that the Air Force's F-108intercepter will further unbalance defensive spending. This weapon probably should be cancelled; alternatively, the Bomarcmissile should be dropped. Countering these claims, the Air Force suggests cancellation of the Army Hercules anti-aircraft missileand the Navy's Talos, a similar-purpose weapon. Forces for Limited War. Believing that continued over-emphasis on aerial defence and massive retaliation will increase the chances of limited war, the Army, with the support of theMarine Corps and Navy, advocates sweeping increases in appro- priations for limited-war weapons. The Army would like to havemore manpower and improved mobility, both on the surface and in the air. Reactivation of the massive Douglas C-132 troop-carrier project (Flight, February 22, 1957) has been suggested by some as a means of providing the Army with its required airlift.Others have requested permission for the ground service to build a helicopter with a large troop-carrying ability. The Army wouldalso like to acquire its own ground-support aircraft; but under present restrictions they are not authorized to procure aircraftweighing more than 10,000 lb. The Navy would like to see additional appropriations for nuclear-powered super-carriers. The Air Force disagrees with all the above policies. Anti-Submarine Warfare. The Navy's contention that thePolaris system is a really potent weapon has backfired to a certain extent. Criticism has been directed at them by both the Army andAir Force because of what these services claim is too low a priority on anti-submarine warfare—a prime responsibility of the Navy.The Navy is acutely aware of the growing Russian submarine threat and has requested substantial increases in appropriationsfor defence against this undersea force. Some funds have been granted, but apparently these are insufficient. The Air Force hassuggested that the Navy might obtain the needed money by reducing expenditures for carriers and strategic weapon systems. Reorganization of the Services. Often mentioned is the pro-posal to merge all of the Services into a single branch, in one uniform. Duplication of effort could be eliminated with a con-current saving in defence spending. Another suggestion is that the Services be realigned on the basisof missions, radier than on the traditional grounds of "land," "sea" and "air." A possible arrangement would be: a strategic service,which would control all weapons capable of attacking strategic targets (S.A.C. and the Polaris submarines would fall under itsjurisdiction); a tactical service, to be assigned the responsibility of meeting the enemy land forces in face-to-face combat (this forcewould include the Army, Marine Corps, Tactical Air Command and portions of the Navy's carrier fleet); a defensive service, withthe responsibility for defending the continental U.S. from enemy aerial attacks (the Air Defense Command would come within thiscategory, along with the Army's anti-aircraft units and portions of the Navy carrier force); a logistics service (including MATS andthe Navy's transport corps); and ancillary services as required. Some improvement might be effected by reorganizations of theabove kind, but in time overlapping and new controversies might again rise. Debates are probably inevitable; but this is not neces-sarily a bad thing. A fundamental principle of the democratic system of government is that everyone is entitled to his ownopinion; no dire consequences will result if these opinions con- tradict established policies. And, as a result of healthy debates,better solutions can usually be found to any problem.
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