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Aviation History
1959
1959 - 1817.PDF
28 FLIGHT, 14 August 1959 AIR COMMERCE . . . Corporation Revelations ... were created, and so lead to an undesirable diminution in theauthority of the chairmen . . . and in their feeling of respon- sibility." It was this section of the report which received mostprominence in the newspapers. We comment on it in our leading article this week. The Minister's non-statutory, or unofficial,powers are summarized as applying to the following fields: capital investment; the opening of new routes; operation of routes fornational policy reasons; fares and rates; and chartering. Part two of the report notes that the cost of new aircraft andspares is more than 80 per cent of the Corporations' capital invest- ment. As is shown by the evidence (which was being taken whenthe D.H.121 controversy was fresh in everyone's mind), the com- mittee spent some time in discovering how the choice was made.A surprising point here, noted in Government and Treasury statements of policy in the evidence and the appendices, is that"no special weight need be given to export potentialities." In general, "the best aircraft from the Corporations' point of viewwill prove to be the best for export." The responsibilities of the Transport Aircraft RequirementsCommittee are investigated. The T.A.R.C., "as the reservoir of research information, and co-ordinating the views of operators,manufacturers and government departments, can offer valuable advice when a Corporation is contemplating an order for newaircraft. With their wide experience, they should also be able to anticipate the needs of the future." The report says that com-plaints had been made about the "lethargic working of this com- mittee." It is argued by the Ministry of Supply witness that anymember of the T.A.R.C. could have convened a meeting if he had thought that it would have been helpful. But past enthusiasmfor the committee has been "little more than lukewarm." The report draws attention to the important role that it plays. Much evidence was taken on the controversy which led to theorder for the D.H.121, causing a delay estimated by Lord Douglas at six months. B.E.A.'s chairman did not consider the Govern-ment's "interference" in the 121 unjustified, in view of the issues involved ("we are," he said, "playing with the taxpayers' money").So far as B.E.A. were concerned "de Havilland were the best firm to do the job." He furthermore revealed that de Havilland, seek-ing Government finance to start with, were in the end prepared to build the 121 as a private venture alone^-i.e., without Huntingand Fairey and the Airco consortium. It is apparent also that, as recently as March 19 (the last day on which evidence was takenfrom Lord Douglas and Mr. Milward), B.E.A. had no doubts about the size of the D.H.121 (see the note on page 26 of thisissue). Teething Troubles On the score of the Britannia's teething troubles, it is disclosedfor the first time that B.O.A.C. had to scrap about 300 relays in the electrical system at a cost of £25,000 per aircraft, after nearlytwo years of service. The bag tanks "went bad," and there had been an "epidemic" of undercarriage torque-link failures.The Viscount was not without its troubles either: after six years B.E.A. spent about £300,000 putting new main spars into theearly Viscounts. The report considers that the cost of introducing new aircraftinto service falls too heavily on the Corporations and "places them at a disadvantage compared with their foreign competitors." (Anannex to appendix 9, submitted by B.O.A.C, lists pre-operational training and development costs for the Britannia, DC-7C andthe Comet 4. It is a pity that the evidence perpetuates the unworthy fallacy that "American airline operators have the advan-tage of having had development flying done for them by the Services." This is partly true of the Boeing 707, of which theU.S.A.F. ordered Ae KC-135 version. It is not true of the Douglas DC-8, the Convair 880 or the Lockheed Electra. The Corporations' fares policies are reviewed in detail, and the I.A.T.A. machinery is examined. The report says: "Both Cor-porations were emphatic in their support of I.A.T.A.: without it there would be anarchy." One of the best cases for I.A.T.A. wehave read is put forward by Lord Douglas in para. 838. Much of the evidence given by the Corporations on I.A.T.A.is most revealing, and must surely claim the attention of that Association, which imposes severe fines on members who in itsopinion talk too much about what goes on. The report regards as "quite lunatic" the I.A.T.A. unanimity rule—whereby theAmerican transatlantic all-freight airline [Seaboard and Western] once held up agreement on passenger fares. It is disclosed that B.O.A.C. want higher fares for all classesof service, including economy class, which is at present (say B.O.A.C.) being subsidized by tourist class.The committee thinks that I.A.T.A.'s advantages outweigh its disadvantages, and notes that it is the policy of the M.T.C.A. to seethat no action taken by a British airline should weaken I.A.T.A. On relationships with the independents (from whom no evi-dence is taken), the report weighs the strong views of the Cor- porations and observes: "An arbitrary division of traffic betweenB.O.A.C. and the independent companies, based on a definite percentage of traffic [e.g., on the African routes, when economyfares are introduced by B.O.A.C.] will hinder the efforts of B.O.A.C. to improve the efficiency of this service and to expand."Otherwise the report is disappointingly non-committal on this highly contentious topic—the crux of the problem as to the futureexpansion of British air transport. Rotodyne Situation "Disliked" B.E.A.'s helicopter operations are examined, and reference madeto the Rotodyne. The M.o.S. offer of £4 million for development of this aircraft was wholly dependent on B.E.A.'s contract to buythe aircraft—a situation which Lord Douglas "very much dis- liked." The contract ("which," said Lord Douglas on March 19,"will be more complicated to draw up than that for the D.H.121") could not be signed for a year. Of civil air transport in the future, the report notes that bothCorporations feel "disquiet." Lord Douglas says in evidence: "I think that the whole of the airline industry has gone a littlecrazy about jets ... we cannot afford to be out of the race and I am not sure that we have not all got into_ the race in too big away too quickly." Sir Gerard d'Erlanger's similar remarks on this subject have already been recorded. Commenting on the supersonic era, the report says: "It is stillnot clear whether an economic design will be produced for a long time: the indications are that such aircraft may prove very expen-sive to operate." A supersonic race might," concludes the report, "end in the airlines of the world suffering severe financial losseswhich they will be unable to make good without help from their Governments." The report does not conclude with a list of specific recom-mendations. But there are a number of recommendations in the text, the chief of which are summarized below. A The functioning of the Transport Aircraft Requirements Com- mittee should be watched with the greatest care. Its mistakes of the past should not be allowed to recur. • Co-operation between the Corporations and the R.A.F. in com- bining needs could be foreseen earlier. 9 If it is considered right for the Minister to fix fares, his power to do so should be made statutory. • Provision for B.E.A/s losses on social services should cease to be absorbed in their accounts. • If a nationalized industry statutorily required to pay its way is to be used as an instrument of foreign policy it should not be required to bear substantial losses as a result. • A complete review of B.O.A.C'8 policy towards their subsidiaries should urgently be made, and information about their results should be included in all future annual reports. • Faced with the total extent of the Minister's non-statutory powers, the Committee considers it essential . . . that there should be a clear- cut division of responsibility between the chairmen and the Minister, and that when the Minister wishes to override the commercial judgment of a chairman he should do so by a directive, which should be published. BOEING BOGIE BOGY A NUMBER of incidents in July involving undercarriagetroubles and resulting in a series of emergency landings, brought maximum publicity—and a Federal Aviation Agencyinquiry—to the Boeing 707. The most serious incident occurred at Idlewild on July 11,when a PanAm 707-120 taking off for London lost the rear pair of wheels from its starboard bogie. After burning-off fuel for fourhours, the aircraft landed safely, although not before news of the failure had been widely broadcast and Idlewild Airport andits approaches was thronged with thousands of uncontrolled spectators. There were also half-a-dozen occasions when the undercarriagehad to be lowered by gravity and by cranking it down by hand, implying that both the main hydraulic system and its electrically driven back-up had malfunctioned. Subsequent investigationrevealed two sources of trouble: fatigue in the undercarriage bogie beam following—according to Aviation Week—failures inthe bolts which attach a damper to the beam and to the landing gear strut, and pressure rise in the undercarriage hydraulic sys-tem, possibly caused by a choked filter and resulting in pump or seal failure. Recommendations made by the F.A.A. were thatlanding gear beams were to be inspected every 60 hours and replaced if impact dents larger than 0.005in were found, and thatcertain hydraulic pumps should be replaced or be fitted with a by-pass valve. Notwithstanding these troubles with the -120, certification wasawarded to the 707-320 on July 15—exactly five years after the first flight of the 707 prototype.
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