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Aviation History
1959
1959 - 1928.PDF
28 August 1959 dual role, but caused a new round of heart-rending about thefuture of the R.CA.F. as an independent air force. Before the Canadian Government had decided on a replacementfor the manned Avro Arrow, it had decided on a nearly $200 million outlay for Bomarc and SAGE, the first post-Arrowmove to tie Canada's air defence system's weapons to the U.S. defence structure. The dual concern now presented by theLockheed purchase (apart from the criticism of equipping Canadian squadrons in foreign countries which can now look afterthemselves in the air), was on the one hand the next stage in American inter-co-operation, and on the other, much wonder-ment as to how the Canadian Government plans to replace the near-obsolete CF-100's in the country's 12 first-line squadronsat home. This week, Mr. George Pearkes (Canada's World-War-Oneinfantry hero, who dropped the title "general" when he became Conservative Minister of National Defence), was forced toannounce that there would be (a) no more Bomarc sites than those already planned in Canada and (b) no ICBM bases in Canada,which, it was rumoured, had been requested by Mr. Neil McElroy, the U.S. Secretary of Defense. With the Canadian Mid-Canada,Pinetree, and soon the Lockheed intercepter itself tied into the SAGE system, whose planned bases in Northern Quebec andnear North Bay, Ontario, would give further protection, Pearkes assured both worried Canadian nationalists and perhaps evenmore fretful American defence experts, that, for the time being, Canada would be well-protected. The only point he did not makeand the one which concerns Canadians as much as increasing reliance on the Americans, was that Bomarc and SAGE will notbe operational until about mid-1961 and the Lockheeds not until about mid-1963. What Canada does in the interval, is to rely, ofcourse, on NORAD'S structure into which home-based Canadian squadrons with aging CF-100's are tied. As if Pearkes', and indeed all Canada's, dilemmas were notenough, a searing attack against the inadequacy of Canada's Mid- Canada Line was made this month by the former R.C.A.F. officerin complete charge of the Canadian Air Force's radar activities in Avian 2/180 Gyroplane, referred to on page 80 the late 1940's and early 1950's. With the blunt assurance that"I'm so mad I don't care if they hang me from the yardarm for saying this," retired G/C. Charles Limbrick said that he hadalways opposed the construction of an electronic warning line as a detection system only and indicated that Canadian scientists"... rammed it down our throats." The line cannot control today's operations of jet intercepters and anti-aircraft missiles asthe Pinetree chain further south and the DEW (distant early- warning system), further north across Canada can do. Limbrick had suggested a relatively inexpensive line (costingabout $100 millions compared to the $250 millions it finally cost) which would have included eight control radars similar to the oneat the R.C.A.F. air division headquarters at Metz, France, which controls the operations of the twelve squadrons in the division,scattered over four bases. Group Captain Limbrick's complaint was against the fact that no control radars, capable of directingintercepters or anti-aircraft missiles against incoming bombers had been built into the Mid-Canada system. The control functionis handled by Pinetree, the most southerly of the three systems, which is further south and which, under present circumstances,operates too late to defend the nearby Canadian and American industrial complexes. In March of this year, the influentialCanadian magazine Saturday Night published the most scathing attack to date of Mid-Canada Line's wasteful construction. Amongother facts it indicated that the over-run on the Mid-Canada Line which it estimated to be, "... in the neighbourhood of$30 millions . . ." could "pay the total fees and maintenance costs of all four years for 5,000 young Canadians going through univer-sity" or, "buy 2,500 medium cost three-bedroom houses." In a two-part series, documented by letters, memos between govern-ment, air force and civilian contracting officials, the magazine told the story of the "Administrative Muddle of the Mid-CanadaLine." For example, the cost of transportation and construction to 79 DHC-3 Otter of de Havilland making a water drop. This aircraft holds about 180 gal of water get the equipment into the sites and to build homes for the menand for servicing equipment was $149 millions. The cost of the signal and radio gear was about $34,500,000. This means thattransport and construction costs as opposed to equipment costs were in the ratio of 4 to 1. The inability of Canada's government to come up with a firmdefence policy, principally for reasons beyond the control of Ottawa Defence Department bureaucrats, such as the fast-changing pace of world rocketry and the increasing importance of Canada's independence of spirit, was best summed up in a stillunconsummated promise made last summer by Mr. Pearkes him- self : "Next year, we will have to start to get ready for this newera of defence." Canada's Aircraft Companies What, basically, has happened to Canada's three major aircraftmanufacturers in the complex and unhappy shufflings since last year's report? A. V. Roe Canada Ltd. The backwash of the Avro Arrow'sdemise of last February is still affecting Canada's largest single manufacturing empire. The resignation of Crawford Gordon,the company's president, was followed a few weeks later by the resignation of other senior executives. The resignations wereplaced at the decision by Avro's British parent Hawker Siddeley Group, and in particular by its chairman Sir Roy Dobson, torelieve the Canadian subsidiary of all senior executives who were no longer "persona grata" to the Canadian Prime Minister follow-ing the sudden shut-down of Avro's aircraft- and engine-making facilities last February by Mr. Crawford Gordon (within an hourof the decision by Canadian Prime Minister to terminate the Arrow contract). It had always been reported in the Canadianpress that Dief enbaker and Gordon had never been the best of friends and Gordon's arbitrary action, which suddenly put 11,000out of work, had worsened relations. And Sir Roy wanted a try at the Lockheed contract. Since the end of the Arrow, the follow-ing top executives of A. V. Roe's aircraft and aero-engine com- panies have resigned: the president of A. V. Roe Canada Ltd.;the executive vice president of A. V. Roe's aeronautical division; the president and general manager of Avro Aircraft Ltd. (anex R.C.A.F. air vice marshal, always considered an Avro booster even before his resignation for criticizing government air defencepolicy); president of Orenda Engines Ltd.; vice president engineering, Avro Aircraft Ltd.; vice president, engineering,Orenda Engines Ltd.; vice president, sales, Orenda Engines Ltd.; and vice president, industrial relations, A. V. Roe Canada Ltd.Though Mr. Gordon's resignation was put down to "unresolved policy differences with the company" and the rest for reasons notyet revealed, Canada's Defence Production Minister indicated, after announcing the airframe contract to Canadair Ltd., thatGordon's resignation "hadn't made much difference" on his decision. While Avro looks far removed from the relatively healthy posi-tions of either Canadair Ltd. or De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Ltd., the company's non-aeronautical operations (which includeCanada's largest bus and trailer manufacturing outlet and the country's third largest steel mill, Dominion Steel and Coal Co.,also Canada's largest, single coal producer) are in much better shape. Considerable civilian business is coming to both CanadianSteel Improvement Ltd. (originally created to make titanium blades for the Orenda engine) and Orenda Engines Ltd., whichreportedly has $15 millions in business ahead in adaptations of
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