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Aviation History
1959
1959 - 2057.PDF
104 FLIGHT, 4 September 1959 Four Comet 4s are seen here on the assembly line in the D.H. Chester factory. Comet 4Bs for B.E.A. and Olympic are in production at Hatfield. Last week the chairman of B.E.A., Lord Douglas, said that the Corporation's 4Bs (which are being delivered in October two months ahead of schedule) would be put into general service on April I, 1960. An initial service in October or November to Athens might be intro- duced. Comet 4 weight is now approved at 162,000 Ib (see note below) AIR COMMERCE MORE PAYLOAD FURTHER LAST week de Havilland Aircraft announced a substantialincrease in the weight of the Comet 4 and its Comet 4C long-bodied variant. At present certified at 158,000 lb, these air-craft can now be operated at 162,000 lb; and this has been made possible without increasing tare weight.The extra weight can be used to extend range with capacity payload, or it can be used to improve payload on the longer stageswhere, at present, payload is limited by fuel requirements. For example, when used in the first way, the Comet 4's maxi-mum still-air stage length, with first-class capacity payload (60 seats) and reserve fuel, goes up from 3,020 to 3,225 st. miles—anincrease of 200 st. miles. The corresponding range-increase for the Comet 4C (72 first-class) is from 2,620 to 2,820 st. miles. When used to improve fuel-limited payloads on the longerstages, the extra weight could mean that whereas the present Comet 4 with, say, 79 tourist-class seats can fly stages of up to3,380 st. miles carrying less than its capacity payload, the new Comet will be less payload-restricted. Payload will in fact beimproved on any stage between 2,800 and 3,380 st. miles and over much of this bracket the improvement would amount to 2,700 lb.The Comet 4C (92-seat tourist-class) would show to even better advantage; extra payload could be carried on stages of between2,300 and 3,320 st. miles. As in the case of the Comet 4 the maximum additional payload is 2,700 lb. These improvements are achieved without any increase inpower, and the only performance penalty appears to be a small increase in take-off distance amounting to about 6 per cent.Because the Comet's take-^off performance is already outstanding this is not likely to be a significant limitation. DC-8 CERTIFICATED f\NE month ahead of the original target date (see Flight, July 5,*-* 1957) the Douglas DC-8 (P. & W. JT3 engines) was awarded its F.A.A. type certificate on August 31. This was presented toMr. Donald W. Douglas by the F.A.A. administrator, Mr. E. R. Queseda, at a ceremony at Friendship Airport, Washington. The DC-8 made its first flight on May 30, 1958, two monthsbehind schedule. The test programme has thus occupied 15 months instead of the 18 months originally planned—a remark-able achievement for an advanced transport. The first operator, United Air Lines, plans to inaugurate the first DC-8 passengerservices, between New York and San Francisco, on September 18. AEROLINEAS ARGENTINAS ACCIDENT ONE of Aerolineas Argentinas' three Comet 4s was badlydamaged on August 26 when it made a forced landing in bad weather near Asuncion, Paraguay. The aircraft was carrying 54passengers and a crew of 11 on a flight from Buenos Aires to New York via Asuncion. The commander, Capt. S. J. Llense, waskilled and an elderly woman passenger died of shock. The possibility of salvage is being assessed; the wings and noseare reported to be badly damaged. The president of Aerolineas Argentinas, Senor Jose Guiraldes, said that the accident (the causeof which is not yet known) could have been much worse but for the "ruggedness of the Comet and the skill of the pilot." SECOND THOUGHTS RECONSIDERATION of B.E.A.'s 1958-59 report andaccounts, which were reviewed in these columns last week, suggests that the Corporation is not as determined as had beengenerally supposed on extending economy-class service to Europe next year. The pertinent passage in the report reads: — "We had hoped that it would be possible to go over completely to[economy-class service] throughout Europe in 1960. There are, how- ever, clear indications that practical difficulties faced by other airlines—such as converting aircraft not likely to be kept in service for more than a year or so—will make difficult [implementation] of this policy in 1960." Instead, B.E.A. propose to seek agreement at the next I.A.T.A.traffic conference, which begins at Honolulu in 18 days' time, on "substantially lower fares on holiday routes on which traffic islikely to be most responsive to reductions"—a compromise. Not to put too fine an edge on the question, why have B.E.Athus climbed down on their policy—first announced by Lord Douglas at the time of last year's report—to regard 1960 as theyear of economy-class service in Europe? It was then said that B.E.A. had decided to prepare the way for the introduction ofeconomy-class fares, 15 per cent below tourist fares (and replac- ing tourist class) in 1960. For the time being, the chairman thensaid, B.E.A. would "mark time" on fares. One recalls how Lord Douglas's remarks encouraged newspaper headlines like: "B.E.A.Urge Mass Travel At Cut Rates; Cut Fare Airbus Plan," etc. Why does it now appear that B.E.A. have decided to continuemarking time, despite Ministerial support for low fares and the fact that the Corporation's Vanguards will be ready to exploitsuch fares in the 1960 summer season? .B.E.A.'s spokesman on these questions at a recent conference 4as the commercial andsales director, Mr. P. C. F. Lawton. ? Mr. Lawton said that it might not be possible yet to'go overcompletely to economy class; it was unlikely that B.E..A would get "such a big programme through at one conference." Heexpected tourist differentials—34in pitch seating perhaps, and the cutting out of meals on the shorter routes. *TSut," he said, "itwouldn't be right to disrupt the European stage." These remarks, unusually compromising on the eve of theannual fares contest in I.A.T.A., compare with those given in B.E.A.'s evidence last November before the Parliamentary SelectCommittee. The following [977: Mr. Lawton] is relevant: "It was B.E.A's intention at the 1958 I.A.T.A. conference to ...arrange a working group to sit during the year in orde^to bring about a satisfactory state of affairs for the introduction of economy-class services throughout Europe in 1960. We believe it is very much better to go toa conference in 1958 and ask for a working group to be set up ... rather than to go to a conference in 1959, and quite suddenly, out ofthe blue, ask all the airlines to face up to such an important step." The latest development is all the more surprising when it isrecalled that for the first time ever, the Minister of Transport has publicly announced that he will back the Corporations' low-farepolicies in I.A.T.A. to the extent of reviewing their position in I.A.T.A. unless they get their way. In July he said: "It is with the Government's full support that British airlines atI.A.T.A. in September will press very strongly for the adoption of economy class fares throughout the world airline structure. I hope thatI.A.T.A. will agree to these fare reductions. It is the Government's view that we should achieve them in an orderly way through I.A.T.A.But I must make it plain that if our wishes are frustrated in this body we should then have to consider anew what we might do within the areaswhich are still under our own control. . . ." The history of B.E.A.'s low fare policy up to publication of thelatest annual report is thus as follows: August 1958: B.E.A. said that it was preparing the way inI.A.T.A. for economy class service in Europe, about 15 per cent cheaper than tourist class for introduction 1960-61. Until thenthere would be a "mark time" policy. November 1958: B.E.A. described before the Select Committeehow it had raised the subject in I.AT.A in good time, and had achieved the setting up of a working group.June 1959: The Minister of Transport took the unprecedented step of publicly warning I.A.T.A. of possible sanctions if the Cor-porations did not succeed in their advocacy of low fares. August 1959: B.E.A. suggested that their economy-fares policy might not succeed, and that compromises might emerge instead.* # * Is this, in fact, a climb down by B.E.A. and, if so, what is thereason for it? Certainly the answer to the first question can only be in the affirmative—though it must be recorded that B.E.A.have never expected their economy policies to succeed easily. The fact that B.E.A. will not yet go to war in I.A.T.A. (despitethe preliminary Ministerial bombardment) suggests that they see no point in jeopardizing the good relations they enjoy with theirEuropean partners. And now that four of these partners have banded themselves into Air Union it is more than ever necessaryfor B.E.A. to preserve these good relations. It is indeed just con- ceivable that it is Air Union that has contributed to B.E.A.'sdecision to moderate the economy-class campaign. j. M. R.
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