FlightGlobal.com
Home
Premium
Archive
Video
Images
Forum
Atlas
Blogs
Jobs
Shop
RSS
Email Newsletters
You are in:
Home
Aviation History
1960
1960 - 0341.PDF
fLIGHT, 11 March 1960 341 learn as they went along; and they were not helped by the fact that they were 6,000 miles from the factory and a long way from Qpe Canaveral. The RAF training programme began early with a requirement for 1000 officers and men for each complex. The total of 4,000 w the permanent manning and servicing of 20 bases may be compared to 9,529 in the V-bomber force itself, 1,457 in the force committed to NATO and 1,525 in the reconnaissance force. The proportion of non-commissioned officers is higher than for flying formations. With the fourth complex only in its early raees the numbers were: officers, 319; non-commissioned officers, 1,576; others, 1,177. Gp Capt F. A. Willan, die station commander at Fdtwell, said that from the point of view of servic- ing the Thor is more complicated than a Canberra and less com- plicated than a Valiant. The range of spares holdings (on which i computer in California maintains a constant check and initiates automatic re-supply) is comparable with that of die Valiant. All personnel were trained in the United States at courses in the firms mainly responsible for the systems: Douglas, AC Spark Plug, Rocketdyne and General Electric. The start was a little slow because die development of the system was going so fast that the technicians did not have the time to spare for training. But the RAF had sent men of a good technical standard and they quickly gained a reputation for learning quickly. They had been drawn from traditional trades and were able to learn the new techniques. The engine specialists found diat control and starting had more sequences than they had been accustomed to and the test gear needed advanced electrical knowledge. But most other equipment, such as gyros, was found to involve known methods. The standards of accuracy and the tolerances were more exacting dian anything they had experienced, but die mastery of this was largely a question of procedures. Operationally, die RAF has put each complex of 15 Thors under a group captain. Following conventional RAF practices, he has three wing commanders—operations, technical and administra- tion—but it has been found diat the operations and technical staff must co-operate much more closely than in the past. Each base of three missiles is a squadron and has been given an old squadron number plate. The squadron is commanded by a squadron leader, who has five flight lieutenants as Launch Control Officers. At all hours of the day and night, one of these men is in charge of the site and its three missiles. The make-up of the watches (the group of men who fire the missile operationally) is varied from base to base and is being settled from experience. In general, it seems fair to say that the system was lavishly manned in the early days and the numbers are now being cut from experience. As the first Thors were being put into service, there was, as it happened, a con- siderable surplus of NCO aircrew. For this reason and to get die missile well-established in service, a category of Launch Control Console Operators was created to look after die countdown of each missile. This took three men in each flight, 15 in each squadron, and 75 for each complex. In addition, each flight was given diree crew chiefs, who are responsible for the continuing maintenance of each of die missiles. It soon became obvious that the technical men could be trained to take over the count- down^—since if the missile was behaving properly there was nothing to do and if it was not they were needed in any case to put it right. This development coincided with the increased requirements in Transport Command for NCO aircrew and recent squadrons of Thors are being counted down by die crew chiefs. They widi the Launch Control Officer, an American authenti- cation officer, a driver, a cook, a fireman and policemen (with dogs) make up the present watch. But the much larger problem of maintenance must be solved with the right balance between the centre and die sites. Originally, the missiles were to surround a single airfield. Skilled technical people could easily diagnose faults and use die equipment of the RIM building to put them right. With up to 30 miles between RIM building and a site, however, die problem is more complicated. Different methods were tried, and a standard system has now been evolved. In general, the best maintenance people remain at the main depot and go out to die sites with die necessary test equipment when they are needed. This is made much simpler by the extensive monitoring equipment built into the Thors themselves. So far, there has been no occasion when one of the missiles has had to be taken back to die RIM building for servicing. The close co-operation which must exist between operations and technical staffs is built, in a sense, into the missile itself. Test gear is continuously attached and is not disconnected until die Thors leave the launching pad on firing. If everything is in order, the firing itself involves almost no manual work. For some reason diere is a valve on the liquid oxygen tank which must be opened manually, but otherwise the work of a successful countdown is done by the monitoring machinery. The Launch Con- trol Officer sits in die control trailer with three skeleton panels which give the state of the countdown on each of his missiles. The NCO in charge of a particular one has a visual presentation of the state of his missile. It is possible to fire all the missiles at once and they are all controlled from die same trailer. During prac- tice countdowns, a man usually stands at the launching pad to provide a visual check diat the Thor is doing what it should be doing. Through head- phones he checks the operation of some element of the system by listening for certain valves and other parts. For a time there was trouble with die
Sign up to
Flight Digital Magazine
Flight Print Magazine
Airline Business Magazine
E-newsletters
RSS
Events
