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Aviation History
1960
1960 - 0698.PDF
698 FLIGHT, 20 May 1960 New tor Air-India at Santa Cruz, Bombay, is this reinforced concrete hangar for their Boeing 70/ -420s. The consulting engineers were Donovan H. Lee and Partners of London and Sydney. Air-India introduced the Conway-powered 707 to transatlantic service last Saturday AIR COMMERCE .. . ~ . ACCIDENTS AND TECHNICAL EVIDENCE A FEW weeks ago (April 1 issue) there appeared in Flightan article ("After an Accident") by Capt C. C. Jackson. In a detailed reply (April 29 issue), Walter Tye, chief tech- nical officer of the ARB, took the author to task for questioning the reliability of evidence on performance as given by ARB witnesses at Courts of Inquiry, and for the implication that cer- tification techniques were of a freak variety. Not satisfied that the last word has now been said, Capt Jackson has sent us the following rejoinder. "I would certainly agree with Mr Tye," writes Capt Jackson, "thatthe ARB has moved further than anybody towards making test techniques representative of airline flying. This may in the future take care of theproblem of providing accurate data for Courts of Inquiry when dealing with aircraft certificated to the new code. However, the aircraft whoseperformance data I questioned were certificated to pre-1951 BCARs and these were not specific in demanding a net rate of climb on enginefailure at or near take-off weight or an airline technique for measuring landing distance. Moreover, although the latest BCARs provide for anairline technique in measuring landing distance, they permit an option for the old technique, which is well known to have resulted in seriousdamage to aircraft during certification tests—in other words 'freak' techniques. I understand that no manufacturer has yet elected the new'rational' method of measuring landing distance and to that extent, therefore, it would be as well to check even on new British-manufacturedaircraft whenever landing distance or approach speeds might be a factor in the accident. "Incidentally this applies even more so to foreign manufacturedaircraft, some of which are certificated on a devalued assessment of the stall (cutting in dangerously at 1.3 Vs on the approach). And it must beremembered that British Courts of Inquiry will be dealing with foreign as well as British-manufactured aircraft. "But the above are areas where Mr Tye and I are, I hope, likelyto agree and I would say at once that I have the greatest admiration for th; ARB officers who have since 1949 worked towards more rationalr?quirements in the field of sub-sonic performance certification, some- times with litde encouragement from the home industry and, untilrecently, with active opposition from the US. However, that does nothing to prove that much of the evidence on performance apparentlyaccepted by Courts of Inquiry has been of doubtful value. "As this is an important matter. I will give a few instances. In thereport of the inquiry into the accident to Viking G-AIJE at Southall on September 2, 1958, the Commissioner does not state the net Corgross) climb to be expected from a Viking (overloaded at take-off by about 400kg) on losing an engine 15min after take-off; instead, he refersgenerally to evidence of performance from 'a number of experts' (includ- ing, presumably, the ARB) and of a pilot who a few davs earlier flewthe same aircraft and obtained an engine-out climb of 600-700ft/min. But the take-off weight of this aircraft is not stated—except that it was'very lightly loaded.' Now this is poor stuff by any standards. Any twin will climb with one out if it is light enough and the fact that this testhad been taken into account by the Commissioner as substantiating a positive climb confirms my recommendation that Commissioners shouldhave a wide background knowledge of the industry. I have not the transcript of the proceedings before me but I recall that, at the Coroner'sInquest preceding the above Inquiry, Mr Tye gave the engine-out rate of climb as about lOOft/min. This is a derisory figure by pilotingsrandards and in my view should immediately have evoked a cross check. This would have settled one way or the other the uneasiness in mindslike my own which recall the following additional accidents where a Viking lost an engine early after take-off, failed to hold height, crashed,and for which the pilot was blamed. "On August 15, 1954, Viking G-AIXS, returning to Blackbushe afterengine failure, lost height and, failing to stretch the approach enough, crashed short of the runway. Similarly on May 1, 1957, Viking G-AJBO(taking-off a little overloaded) also returned towards Blackbushe after engine failure, failed to hold height and crashed. Now I am aware thatpilot technique was held to be deficient in both of these cases; but would it not have been in the interests of a thorough inquiry to see if theaircraft actually would have held height in any circumstances and to determine whether the associated piloting technique was a reasonable one? In this connection I am reminded of the accident to VikingG-AHPD at Bordeaux on May 8, 1951. This aircraft also lost an engine shortly after take-off, failed to hold height and crashed. On this occasionthe inquiry was conducted by the French authorities. They appear to have accepted that the aircraft would under the circumstances only godownhill: they did not blame the pilot but, with a truly Gallic logic, attributed the accident to the disconnection of the articulated controlrod of the propeller governor. "Referring to the accident to the York at Malta on February 18, 1956,this aircraft was certificated to 68,0001b; it was about 6601b overloaded and the report indicated that the first signs of engine malfunctionwere experienced at or near the unstick point. Shortly after, it experienced engine failure, lost height and crashed; at the inquiry the pilot wasblamed for allowing the aircraft to stall. Now I myself flew the York when its maximum weight was 66,5001b and I would have been a veryworried man on losing an engine near unstick. At 68,6601b I have very much doubt if anybody could cope and, bearing in mind the terrainof Malta, there must have been a strong compulsion to stay in the air as long as possible."All I am asking for is positive information that the above aircraft would, in the circumstances of the above accidents, go uphill and notdown. It makes a difference. I find no adequate reassurance in the reports and I would suggest that future Commissioners dealing withthis type of accident include a profile of calculated net and gross gradients in their analyses (and reports); if fully satisfied with these, select a fleetaircraft of the type in question; put the Court on board up to the appropriate load (if this is an overload, fly at reduced power accord-ingly); and then fail an engine shortly after take-off. After all, this is not asking anything unusual, since Mr Tye himself states in his letterthat the performance of each aircraft is submitted to a regular cross check. "But do not misunderstand my viewpoint here. I am out to get morethorough and better-balanced accident investigations; to do this, one has to be specific. It is no good beating about the bush and generalizing ifwe are bent upon true reform, which would undoubtedly call for legis- lation. I trust, therefore, that my views will not be taken personallyin any quarter. In the Moody and Sankey Hymnal you will find many beautiful hymns by John Newton, whom our forefathers undoubtedlyheld in great respect; but John Newton had part shares in a slaver. I mention this to illustrate how our ideas on ethics change. They changesimilarly in respect of airworthiness. But let us not whitewash the old standards. We should have routed them out before. For not actingpreviously, the pilots will, I feel sure, be willing to accept as much respon- sibility as the airworthiness authorities. Anyway, I will." BRITISH FRIENDSHIP PRODUCTION? Fokker-Fairchild F.27 Friendship orders now in the 160s and about 175,000 hours' route experience to back sales propaganda, Fokker are looking for new customers. With an eye on British independent operators they brought one of the F.27 D-ototypes (PH-NVF) to Gatwick last week for demonstration flights. Although Fokker have not yet been able to announce any UK customers, though emphasizing that at least 35 per cent of the Friendship is British, they have made an approach to the Minister of Aviation to allow licence-production of the aircraft in Britain. This was announced at a luncheon given in Le Touquet on Tues- day last week on one of PH-NVF's demonstration runs. There was nothing very specific about the announcement, beyond the implication that Duncan Sandys had raised no objection; no British firms were mentioned as potential Friendship producers, and the number of those not already in direct competition (Hawker Siddeley with the Avro 748 and Handley Page with Dart Herald), or otherwise reluctant to put a third British contender on the DC-3 replacement market, is severely limited. But the announcement indicates the way Fokker are thinking; and their attitude towards European co-operation in aircraft production is one to which Mr Sandys would presumably subscribe.
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