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Aviation History
1960
1960 - 0792.PDF
800 FLIGHT, 10 June 1960 Is Australia's Aircraft Industry Doomed? TODAY'S BLEAK OUTLOOK UNLESS—as now seems unlikely—the Australian Govern-ment orders its new supersonic fighters in numbers suffi-cient to make local production a feasible project, the Australian aircraft industry as we now know it is doomed. The RAAF is now making it plain to the politicians that it doesnot like the idea of being tied to local production. But this is not a new development. The last Chief of Air Staff who was abso-lutely for the local industry was Air Marshal Sir George Jones (1942-50). He had good reason. The Allied committee whichallocated aircraft to various theatres of war so starved the RAAF that it is an historical fact that but for local production of Beau-forts, Beaufighters, Boomerangs, Tiger Moths, Wackett Trainers and Wirraways the RAAF would have been grounded in 1940-44.The Empire Air Training Scheme would have been seriously ham- pered without Australian participation. This created a tremendous impression on the RAAF of thepost-war years and the production of Mustangs, Lincolns, Vam- pires, Canberras and Avon-Sabres was a direct result. Duringthe war aircraft could be produced on a basis competitive with overseas costs—Wasp engines were actually built in Australia atsome 70 per cent of the American production cost. In 1940-45 the local industry delivered 3,500 aircraft and 2,850 engines to theRAAF, including 700 Beauforts, 329 Beaufighters (35 more were made after the war), 200 Wackett Trainers, 250 Boomerangs, 620Wirraways and 1,035 Tiger Moths. By 1948 the Mosquito deliv- eries had totalled 228. The post-war RAAF of the 1940s and early1950s literally flew with Australian-built aircraft—Mustangs, Lincolns, Vampires—and the replacements were local Avon-Sabres, Canberras. Some heart-searching was needed before the ail-AmericanLockheed Neptune P2V-5s were ordered; it was carefully ex- plained that the order was too small to suit local production. Evenwhen the Lockheed C-130s were ordered there was a good deal of discussion in trade union circles about the "surrender of theindustry." Delayed Delivery Today's RAAF leaders are not so enthusiastic about the localindustry, partly because of the time taken to get the Avon-Sabre into service, partly because of the fact that orders are so designedthat the factory concerned will get the maximum period of pro- duction. The factory wants the smallest possible delivery rate, inorder to extend the order as far as possible. In the case of the Avon-Sabre, the RAAF chafed under the slow delivery, whichmade the aircraft obsolete by the time a full wing was operation- ally equipped. Today the industry is in a frankly hazy state. CommonwealthAircraft Corporation is down to absolute bedrock, beyond which it must close down. It is producing the last of the Avon-Sabres ofthe supplementary order given to CAC under RAAF protest several years ago. The RAAF did not need the extra aircraft; theorder was simply made as a political gesture, to save the Corpora- tion going out of business. If CAC does not get an order withinthe next year, it must close down. The RAAF mission going abroad (as this article is written) toevaluate supersonic fighters has Ian Fleming, a veteran of the industry (though now Controller of Aircraft and Guided WeaponsSupply in the Department of Supply) to advise on the production aspect of the various types. Now, however, it is generally understood in Australia that theintention is to place a much smaller order for fighters than was originally thought likely. The RAAF simply cannot afford toorder four squadrons of supersonic fighters and follow this quickly with a supersonic-bomber order. The result will probably bean order for two squadrons (under 50 aircraft) of fighters and one of bombers. This is not a practical proposition for localproduction. There is a strong feeling in the RAAF—as there has been forsome years—that operational capability has been crippled since the war by the necessity (basically political) of maintaining a localindustry. The pressures come from the industry itself, the trade unions, and bitter memories of war years of aircraft scarcity.The Service has always had to wait for delivery of aircraft from local factories, not because the industry could not make the air-craft quickly, but because slow delivery kept the industry in business. Further—and here conditions have changed since the "Even when the Lockheed C-130s were ordered there was a good deal of discussion about 'the surrender of the industry.'" One of these aircraft is seen over Sydney Harbour war era mentioned above—the RAAF feels it has had to subsidizethe industry at its own expense. The Royal Australian Navy always refused to buy its aircraft locally. The Air Force alonebought local aircraft, at two or more times the imported cost. It feels it could be twice as strong if it did not have that dreadfuleconomic drag. The possibility of the Government itself sub- sidizing the industry outside the Air Defence Vote is not politic-ally feasible. The RAAF simply goes on subsidizing the industry out of its £50,000,000 a year total vote. There is no question of producing a bomber. The GovernmentAircraft Factory is now completely devoted to the Jindivik and other enterprises of that sort. The only types which might be pro-duced in Australia are fighters and trainers. All attempts to inter- est the airlines in local aircraft have failed—the de HavillandDrover three-engined feeder bush airliner was sold to TAA and Government Departments because the Government said it hadto be. All three fighter types under serious consideration could be pro-produced locally. All three companies under consideration—Das- sault, Northrop and Lockheed—have told the Government theyare keen on Australian production, partly because they realize there would probably be a larger order for local production thanfor imports. In the trainer field, de Havilland Aircraft Pty Ltd are just com-pleting an order for 62 Vampire Trainers. They will then have only overhauls and maintenance to do. Under Wg Cdr RolloKingsford Smith, who has recently been appointed manager of the aviation division and a director of the company, they haveextended their interests to representation. They are vigorously pushing the Beech series and they are deep in the sales and evenproduction of aluminium boats. Their jet-engined boat has great promise. The only aircraft order which could be given to the Australiande Havilland company is for the jet primary trainer. The RAAF do not, however, regard this requirement as a priority. I under-stand it is now unlikely that they will order such a trainer for several years. The money simply is not there. As de Havillandhave the Provost representation, they were naturally interested. It should be remembered, by the way, that the DH Australiancompany is specifically left out of the British rationalization agree- ment. Whatever happens in the UK, the Australian firm remainsindependent as a local organization. So at the moment of writing it seems there is no hope for theAustralian aircraft manufacturing industry to maintain its former status unless the jet fighter is ordered from CAC. Without that,CAC will pass out of existence; de Havilland will remain, develop- ing other interests and representations. The Government AircraftFactory is tied to the Supply Department. CAC has never liked going outside its own field. It made busesfor some years and after the war it had a magnificent prefab house project which was killed by the building-trade unions in the late1940s under the Labour Government. It is not friendly to light aircraft although four small firms are going into small-scale pro-duction here with such machines. I remember Sir Lawrence Wackett telling me many years ago he hated light aircraft, for theamateur pilot sooner or later "had to kill himself." CAC, which is a non-profit-making enterprise backed byAustralia's industrial giants, may soon vanish. After all, it was formed 22 years ago to meet an urgent need. If that need has dis-appeared, then there is no reason for CAC. ., ,., . STANLEY BROGDEN
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