FlightGlobal.com
Home
Premium
Archive
Video
Images
Forum
Atlas
Blogs
Jobs
Shop
RSS
Email Newsletters
You are in:
Home
Aviation History
1960
1960 - 0914.PDF
22 FLIGHT, 1 July I960 U-2 Echoes and US Budgets BY DON ADAMS THE recent downing of an American U-2—either by Sovietaction or, as is more widely supposed in the US, by anuntimely mechanical failure—has stimulated anew the "battleof the budget." The President's balanced budget concept had been subjected to criticism when it first appeared some time ago;and Premier Kruschev's verbal counterblasts have caused oppo- sition to a balanced budget to be voiced in many quarters. SenatorHenry Jackson, for a long time critical of the Administration, has called for an immediate rise in defence appropriations ofbetween 2,000 and 3,000 million dollars. Heeding this and other demands, many newspapers have openedcampaigns for greater defence preparedness. Even the carefully conservative New York Times in a May 30 (American MemorialDay) editorial suggested that "a re-examination of the defence budget in light of recent events seems clearly to be in order."Any re-analysis which may take place will probably consider the following relevant points. The U-2s So much has already been written about theseunusual aeroplanes that one need only preface the succeeding paragraphs with the observation that the U-2 is evidently able tomaintain level flight at altitudes well above that achievable by any other contemporary aircraft. Just how high the U-2 reallycan fly is the subject of much public speculation. US radio reports have quoted a Lockheed spokesman as having privately advisedthat the operational altitude is close to 100,000ft. According to some reports, U-2s have made no fewer than 150sorties into Russian territory. Allegedly, they have photographed every square inch of land behind the Iron Curtain in the pastfour years. Several reasons are cited for the flights. The first was to obtain up-to-date information on Russian aircraft and troopmovements, and to discover hidden military installations such as aerodromes and ICBM launch pads. Another purpose was toassess Russian anti-aircraft defences. Of particular interest were radar sites and fighter interception practices. These "justifications"were widely known, but a further type of mission which may have escaped general notice is that of ordinary geodetic mapmaking. In America one can easily purchase directly from the Government the most accurate of maps of the Continental US.However, with the Soviet fetish regarding secrecy, there is little available data concerning the Russian land masses. The onlyaccurate information available to the West had been derived from aerial reconnaissance photographs taken by German aircraft dur-ing the last war. But what the Germans didn't photograph was most of Russia beyond Moscow, and these vast areas have remaineda mystery to the West. The question was not so much as to whether a certain air base existed, but as to exactly where it waslocated. According to some reports many industrial complexes and airfields could not be pinpointed closer than several miles.Certainly a better knowledge of target location was required if ICBMs were to be at all effective in any future conflict. The May 1 Flight It appears likely that "the" U-2 flightwas made for the purpose of getting a photograph of the Russians' big booster on the launch pad. Everyone had been aware thatthe Soviets had planned a spectacular space shot to coincide with the Summit meeting. Subsequent to the meeting, of course, Russiadid make such a firing (Flight, May 20). The Soviet rocket must hence have been on the pad on May 1 and the CIA must haveviewed this as a good opportunity to catch a further glimpse of the vehicle. Paradoxically, therefore, the pre-summit flight was pos-sibly occasioned by Russian propaganda efforts. And it is interest- ing to speculate that if the Soviet Union hadn't planned to impressthe world with their "summit shot" the U-2 incident might not have occurred. Effects of the Reconnaissance Data The Administration'spast policies of holding down defence spending well below the level advocated by some can now be viewed in the light of theU-2 incident. In Flight for March 13, 1959, it was noted that the US had programmed large-scale production of the B-52 in theearly nineteen-fifties because, among other reasons, the Russians had given substantial outward indications that they would build ahuge bomber fleet. They didn't; but, because of inadequate intel- ligence, America engaged in a "numbers race" in heavy bomberaircraft. The Russians have continually alleged that the B-52s (maintained, as many of them arc, on an air alert status) are athreat to peace; but it is well to remember that the B-52 fleet was constructed to meet a threat of unknown proportions. Interest in the numbers game has now shifted to ICBMs. Andthere are many in America who would match projected Russian missile numbers with equal numbers of US missiles. Strangely(or perhaps not so strangely, in the light of the U-2 affair) the Administration has strongly resisted the pleas to follow past prac- tices and engage in a race. Apparently the U-2 flights had given,rise to serious doubt about projected Russian ICBM inventories. Hence the U-2 flights may have actually served to hold downdefence spending. The anomaly here is that the Russians have urged this very point in their disarmament talks. When intel-ligence data was lacking the US responded by countering perhaps the worst of suspected Soviet threats. But through the recon-naissance flights America saw fit to hold down defence spending. The policy of "Open Skies," as advocated some years ago byPresident Eisenhower, may therefore have already been proven to be a most effective step towards real reductions in arms. Increasing the Budget Why, then, should America nowincrease her defence budget? If US aircraft have roamed Russian skies for years it is likely that existing American ICBM productionis attuned to what they may know to be Soviet strength. Some of the reasoning behind the demands for extra spending is difficultto comprehend. A particular case has been made out for renewing emphasison the B-70 programme. General Thomas D. White, Air Force Chief of Staff, testified recently before Congress: "I think recentevents prove the ease of penetration." This is unequivocally true [Are we sure?—Ed.], but there never had been any question aboutthe B-70's ability to penetrate the most modern of defences. The main justification for that machine had been that only mannedaircraft were able to strike Russian targets, the locations of which were imprecisely known some years ago. But since the U-2s hadprovided much-needed target location data the need for the B-70 was reduced. ICBMs could now be relied upon to level militarytargets at a far lower cost than could B-70s. Nevertheless, the prevailing mood in America seems to favouran increase in defence preparedness. Perhaps a 10 per cent increase will be forthcoming. The B-70 will likely be favoured by someadditional funds and ICBM production may be raised. Speeding up the Minuteman programme might be a logical step. AdditionalPolaris submarines may be bought, and the nuclear-powered air- craft is now being funded. The U-2 and History No amount of words can justify theincredibly ridiculous manner in which the U-2 story was first revealed to the world. Handling of the affair was regrettablybungled. But future generations may look upon this odd aircraft witha fresh perspective. Here was a vehicle—device, a method—which gave a nation the knowledge it needed to assure itself that itwould not suffer the disastrous consequences of a surprise nuclear- age attack. And despite what the rest of the world believed theUS—-although she, too, would have liked to believe otherwise —felt that a threat to peace did exist. Without a guarantee againstbeing attacked, which was the case before the U-2s, armament appeared to be the only recourse. The Soviet Union necessarily-armed itself to counter real American strength. Misinformation breeds distrust, which in turn caters for an arms race with itsever-increasing frictions. The U-2 flights are probably ended. Some reports have men-tioned that a successor to the type was being built at the time of the Summit but had since been cancelled. If any new aircraftwere being built it would appear logical to cancel them. Current events preclude their use. Satellite Reconnaissance Whereas aircraft flights over anothercountry are accepted to be a breach of sovereignty, satellites of both great Powers have been orbiting over one another's lands forsome years. The American Tiros vehicle mounts a camera system for weather observations, though the optical resolutionpossible with the system seems far too poor to be of any military significance. But a precedent has been established. It will beinteresting to see what attitude the UN adopts with regard to national boundaries in outer space. Will they condemn the usageof reconnaissance satellites such as America's Samos/Midas vehicles? It is hard to understand that they would. If by derivingintelligence data which will allow a reduction in armaments these vehicles can bring us an inch closer to peace, then their use shouldbe condoned. A point here might be that cries will be raised to outlaw such satellites on the premise that they could containnuclear weapons. Surely this objection could be eliminated by the simple expedient of placing neutral observers at all launchingsites (just as the Russians could have ascertained that the U-2s did not carry weapons by the simple means of having observersat U-2 airfields; this point, of course, was part of the original open skies plan). How much better it would be to look up and see a foreignsatellite—with or without cameras—rather than a hostile bomber or ICBM.
Sign up to
Flight Digital Magazine
Flight Print Magazine
Airline Business Magazine
E-newsletters
RSS
Events
