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Aviation History
1960
1960 - 1467.PDF
FLJGI-:r, 26 August 1960 . US Election-year Policies 305 DEFtNCE IS THE ISSUE BY DON ADAMS (New York) EARLY in November unprecedented numbers of Americansv ill go to the polls to cast their votes for a new president.The two primary candidates for America's highest officeof ourse, Vice-President Nixon and Senator Kennedy. The uestion of which of these men will guide America's fortunesduring the next four years has already become a subject of bsorbing interest in the US, if not throughout the entire world.Public-opinion surveys have failed to credit either nominee with decisive lead, and there is evidence that many people have notvet established their individual preferences. Realizing this situa- tion, both men are already campaigning mightily to gain theuncommitted votes. A key, if not "the" feature, of both the Republican and Democratic platforms is a pledge to increasethe US's defensive strength. The Democrats allege that, under the present Administration, America has lost her once pre-eminentposition as the world's strongest nation. While decrying these statements as being sheer campaign oratory—and at the sametime cautioning that such reckless haranguing may mislead one of the unfriendly powers into committing some foolhardy actionpredicated on US weakness—the Republicans themselves have called for renewed emphasis on defence preparedness. TheAdministration announced in early August that more money would be spent during the 1961 Fiscal year (which began onJuly 1) than had been originally planned. This move unquestion- ably was prompted by an awareness that this year is an electionvear. And significantly greater sums of money will be appropriated for defence in next year's budget. The two contending partiesin the election have voiced different opinions as to exactly how much more money should be spent, but it would appear that,irrespective of who becomes president, vast changes will be made in America's defence posture. Budgetary increases of as muchas $3,000 million (to $43,000 million) have been discussed for the Fiscal '62 defence budget. Pentagon Looks Ahead Anticipating increased funding, Pentagon planners are alreadyweighing the needs of various programmes. Below are discussed some of the more notable revisions even now being contemplated. Although there are many who doubt the existence (now or inthe future) of any appreciable Soviet numerical superiority in ICBMs a majority of the US military and civilian population nowfavour an expansion of America's ballistic missile inventory. Several justifications are given for such action. Intelligenceactivities had some time ago concluded that Russia could acquire an ICBM lead in the early 1960s if she chose to divert a substantialproportion of her uncommitted resources to this specific field. Whether or not the Soviets have realized a numerical lead isunknown by the general public; but the fact that the Russians might have a lead in ICBMs looms large in the minds of manypeople. And with prevailing world conditions, most Americans appear united in the demand that the US have real strength tocounter real or potential Russian arms. Accordingly, it is expected that all major US strategic missileprogrammes will be accelerated, some to a greater degree than others. The Polaris project (Flight, July 29) will unquestionablyreceive significantly increased funding. Recent successes with actual launches from a submerged submarine should speed opera-tional deployment of the weapon. Earlier troubles have apparently been corrected and the programme is now well ahead of its originaldevelopment schedule. Concurrent with an increase in numbers or missiles, additional submarines are to be constructed. The™en' recently announced plans to raise the level of submarine building to five submarines per year, instead of the present figureor three. The Navy has urged even further acceleration of the construction plan and would like to see Polaris submarines builton a one-per-month schedule. This rate would be maintained until 45 submarines were commissioned. Many neutral observersreel that any new Administration will lend a sympathetic ear to *uct? a Proposal. Perhaps as much as $9,000 million will be spent Th. s Programme before it is completed some years hence.n i rat^er extraordinary recent successes of the Atlas missile Arl ?°.llkcly re5»lt in increased funding for the weapon. The«uas, being a liquid-fuelled missile, is a nuisance to launch and, ing a thin-skinned missile, is vulnerable to nearby nuclearaetonations. But the Atlas works, and it works remarkably well. ofthpTraCy 1S a11 but Phenomenal. On the other hand, the illsis slA Ua" proSramme have been reported many times. Progress morp • WlLft only occasi°nal successes. Many prefer to see a fewT\ cuiccessrul firings before expanding Titan production. thes \?rSt pe Canaveral launches of the Minuteman ICBM,wiia-propellant, second-generation missile are expected before the end of the year. The Air Force hopes for, and probably willobtain, sufficient funds to facilitate early deployment of this prized weapon system. Even the most pessimistic of the "missile gap"alarmists concede that when Minuteman becomes operational the US will have superiority in the ICBM field. Progress in theprogramme is reported to be good—so good in fact that many of the Air Force planners are already discussing the requirementsfor ICBM systems beyond the Minuteman. For one reason or another, it appears that the US may ultimatelybe forced to withdraw her strategic (but not tactical) delivery systems from their overseas bases. Whether or not this will occuris problematical, but it would seem that military planners are aware of this possibility. Hence it is logical that emphasis willbe placed on extended-range variants of the ballistic missile systems. The Atlas has been fired over ranges considerably inexcess of its design value of 5,500 miles. It would therefore not be at all surprising if a production long-range Atlas were evolved.Similar plans may also be in order for the Titan and Minuteman. An 8,000-mile-range vehicle would enable any part of Russia tobe reached from the US heartland (and vice versa), thus eliminating the need for reliance on overseas bases. Often discussed has beenthe Navy plans for a growth version of Polaris with a 2,500-mile range. The present 1,250-mile-range Polaris is able to strike onlythe outer fringes of the Soviet lands, since the launching sub- marines must lay several hundred miles off-shore for their ownprotection from enemy countermeasures. The longer-range Polaris, therefore, would have much greater freedom in the selection oftargets. Other strategic systems likely to be favoured with increasedappropriations are the B-52/Hound Dog and the B-52/Sky Bolt weapons. Development of these weapons will further lessen theneed for primary reliance on overseas bases. The Sky Bolt, in particular, seems to be the kind of weapon which should bespeeded to operational use. Ever since the public first became aware of the B-70 Valkyrie(M3) bomber programme, the projected successor to the B-52 bomber has been subjected to much criticism. Some monthsago the Administration drastically cut back the project on the simple premise that this enormously expensive aircraft—somesources quote over $100 million per copy when all costs are included—was not worth the money. Ballistic missiles certainlywould be operational in quantity by 1965, the earliest date at which the aircraft might become operational, according to somenewspapers; and the missiles could destroy enemy targets at a far smaller cost-per-target-destroyed than could the B-70. USAF Defends the B-70 The Air Force, necessarily, has hotly contested these argumentsand have defended the B-70 on the basis that evolvement of the aircraft—even if it cost $10,000 million (total programme costs)—would require that the Soviets spend upwards of four times the B-70's cost to develop a weapon system capable of destroying theValkyrie. That this contention may not be a sound one has been suggested by some; even the Air Force is aware of its argumentivenature, and have added the further assertion that the B-70 will prove useful as a prototype for a M3 transport. A further justifica-tion—which is somewhat difficult to understand—is the Air Force argument that the B-70 would be both a deterrent to, and a usefulweapon for, small wars. One very simple, but perhaps unstated, reason for building theB-70 is that the Air Force has always built bigger and better bombers! Such an explanation may sound unduly harsh, butmilitary people are frequently dogmatic in their approach to some problems, particularly when the debate centres on "their" field.An interesting parallel is the case of the Navy battleships. The Navy steadfastly defended the ships' existence for many years—and built bigger and better battleships—until the war proved that they were not needed. Even today the Navy talks about biggerand better carriers, when it would appear that submarines may eventually replace surface ships as the primary striking force.Be that as it may, the Air Force expects to, and undoubtedly will be able to, realize almost full reinstatement of the B-70.Perhaps some of the former lavishness will be curtailed, but Air Force persistence is wearing down the opposition. Few nowdoubt that the programme will be accelerated well beyond its present level.Also likely to be favoured with additional funds is the MATS group. A jet airlift capability is being urged and will receive somesupport. The maintenance of an airborne alert should be possible with Congress fully in agreement that SAC should be kept air-borne while the missile gap is being closed. The Army should
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