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Aviation History
1960
1960 - 1475.PDF
' / •',,\<i'~i'""- '• 3i -* FLIGHT, 26 August 1960 m Left, general arrangement (for dimensions see below) and sketches showing 15-seat passenger version and accommodation for one car (Vauxhall Victor estate car) 68 m.p.h. at touchdown; and scheduled take-off safety speed is82 m.p.h. Almost the entire aircraft is covered with a sandwich comprisinga thin corrugated sheet and thin flat sheet bonded together in very large units with Redux. For example, a wing skin from root totip is a single unit. Shorts consider that operators will prefer "an aeroplane ofproven safe life which can fly for a given time without major structural overhaul or replacements, rather than a 'fail-safe' aero-plane in which the first sign of a fatigue crack may mean primary structural replacements." This has, they say, prompted the designof a safe-life aeroplane, demonstrated as such, based on the fail- safe philosophy.The flight deck is designed primarily for one-man operation and has generous transparencies. A second seat is provided andthere is dual control if required. The flying controls are entirely conventional; the electrical system is a 28V d.c. split busbarcircuit, each busbar being fed by one engine-driven generator and one battery. Transistorized inverters provide the small amountof a.c. that is needed. The fuel system comprises a single 150gal glass-cloth fuel tank on top of, and outside, the fuselage. Forde-icing the leading edges of the wing and tail unit are fitted with stainless steel sintered distributors with fluid sufficient fortwo hours' continuous maximum operation. Comprehensive navi- gation and communications equipment is also provided for. SHORT SC.7 SKYVAN Powerplant: Two Continental GTS IO-520 six cylinder superchargedand geared piston engines of 390 h.p. each with direct fuel injection driving three bladed, constant speed, fully feathering Hartzell propellers. Dimensions: Span, 64ft lin; length, 38ft 11 in; height, 13ft 10.3in; wing area, 373 sq ft. Weights: Max design take-off, 8,6001b (stressed for 9,0001b); weight less fuel and payload, 5,3301b; structure, 2,6971b. Payload Accommodation: Main hold volume, 680 cu ft; main holdlength, 16ft; main hold height and width, 6Jft; main hold floor area, 104 sq ft. Fuel Capacity: 150 Imp gal. Performance: Scheduled cruising speed, 166 m.p.h. EAS; range withmax 3,0001b payload and "average" fuel allowances, 115 st miles VFR, 70 miles IFR; range with max fuel (150gal) with 2,2001b payload,710 miles VFR, 500 miles IFR. EUROPE'S FOREMOST AIRLINE? TWO factors dominated the affairs of Air France in 1959: the•*• first was the advent of the Caravelle; the other was the devaluation of the French franc in December 1958. Although the report is quick to refer to the airline's profit, it isonly fair to point out that this was only achieved after provision of substantial State subsidies. These amounted to Fr 3,000 million(£2m) in 1959, being equivalent to three per cent of total com- mercial revenue. The picture here is that losses appear to bemade on all routes other than those to North Africa and to sub- Saharan Africa and Madagascar. The overall results show expensesequivalent to £79 million, against which total revenues were only £77 million (operating revenues amounted to £67 million). The reason why Air France should persistently lose money isnot clear from the report and accounts. Aircraft utilization rates are, as shown below, unusually good. Labour productivity ishigh; although an annual output of 22,000 c.t.m. per employee is low by North American standards, it is rather better than theaverage for British and other Continental airlines. Also the utilization of funds is remarkably good, Air France being one ofthe few leading European carriers which is able to turn its capital over 1^ times in a year. The general appearance of the balancesheet is healthy, with the value of assets standing low in relation to revenues and current assets being substantially larger thancurrent liabilities. Load factors are good and revenue rates are about average. Yet Air France somehow manages to return anaverage cost level as high as 42 pence per c.t.m., a level exceeded in jourope only by BEA (see page 309). The main nigger intne cost woodpile appears to be that despite above-average labour productivity, salaries and wages are unduly high. A lesser itemis the relatively high charge for obsolescence. However, this T -S a P^ent fiscal policy which is resulting in the airline'sbeing fully depreciated this year and in their L.1649s f fuljy depreciated by the end of 1961. As for the Boeing 707s™ -j the Caravelles, the airline is setting depreciation periods of "p-it and seven years respectively, in each case to a residual valueof ten per cent. That the revenue and expenditure figures show increases of theorder of a fifth over a period when the business expanded by less than a tenth is indicative of the dramatic effect of devaluation onthe Air France economy. Arrival of the Caravelles (which flew 5,700 hours during 1959 at an average daily utilization of 4i hours)and higher utilization rates on other aircraft fleets raised capacity by seven per cent to 450 million ton-miles. The utilization ratesachieved by Air France on their long-haul routes call for special comment: the ten L.1649s and the 22 L.1049s averaged 3,244 and3,350 hours respectively in 1959. By comparison, their short-haul utilization is less impressive, even by short haul standards. Traffic rose by eight per cent to bring the overall load-factorfrom 66 to 67 per cent. The bright star here was a 17 per cent increase in Air France's European traffic, this expansion beingdirectly attributable to the sales success of the Caravelle. Of the European routes, Paris - London is far and away the most impor-tant, accounting for about one-quarter of the airline's entire European traffic. The report gives an interesting regional break-down of Air France passenger traffic. This shows that the total business is divided almost exactly equally into long-haul operationon the one hand and into short- and medium-haul on the other. Of the long-haul traffic, the Atlantic routes account for half, thebalance moving on the routes to Asia, West Africa, Equatorial Africa and Madagascar. Of the short- and medium-haul traffic,the routes between metropolitan France and North Africa account for about half, the remainder comprising the domestic and inter-national services on the Continent. An interesting feature of the rapid growth of the international European routes is that last yearAir France came very close to overtaking BEA on its short- and medium-haul network (i.e., domestic plus European plusMediterranean). Recent Air Research Bureau statistics suggest that Air France might well by now have replaced BEA as"Europe's foremost airline." Perhaps this development will allow Air France to drop its absurd claim to be "the world's largestairline"—particularly if United and Capital merge to create an organization three times the size of the French national carrier.
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