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Aviation History
1961
1961 - 0155.PDF
FLIGHT, 3 February 1961 155 Crr transport in the twenties (see letter in Col 2): this photograph turn "Flight" tor September 9, 1926, shows an Essex aboard a Remington-Burnelli RB-2, which carried it on a US sales tour orrespondence Tiie Editor of "Flight" is not necessarily in agreement with the viewsexpressed by correspondents in these columns. Names and addresses of alters, not for publication in detail, must in all cases accompany letters. The Slush Bogy \TOUR article The Slush Bogy (January 20), in which you referi to the latest Civil Aviation Circular dealing with slush, com- ments that the publication is in time for the slush season; but manyof us who have been following the Munich accident more closely are wondering why no mention is made of the slush season beforethat, or, indeed, the one before that. In the Munich disaster of February 1958, a full account of theeffect of taking-off in slush was available right from the very beginning. The pilot was able to describe how the aircraft suffereda deceleration during the take-off run and never achieved sufficient speed to become airborne as a result of running into slush; but noone except the British Air Line Pilots Association was prepared to accept the evidence. The German authorities dismissed the ideathat slush could have caused the aircraft to behave in this way without even investigating the possibility, and wrote in theirreport, "All experience goes to show, however, that it may be assumed that take-offs can be made with nosewheel aircraft with-out danger up to a slush depth of at least 5cm" (2in). At the time of the publication of the German report in thiscountry, both BEA and the Ministry were in possession of infor- mation about slush drag; yet despite this they did nothing toinvestigate the evidence but were content to accept the German report and even use it as an instrument for disciplinary measures. The position now is more clearly defined. The Minister, inrecognizing the hazards of slush and in publishing limits for the Ambassador, discloses that this aspect has not been properlyinvestigated by the German authorities. Surely then the time has come for the Minister to take some positive action to right thiswrong by asking the German authorities to reopen their inquiry? Warfield, Berks J. THAIN Captain, G-ALZU "Y"OUR reference in Flight of January 20 to the Ministry of•I Aviation's Information Circular dealing with the effects of snow, slush and water on the take-off performance of aircraftprompts us to comment once again on the accident to G-ALZU at Munich on February 6, 1958. This Information Circular will be welcomed by all pilots, as itgoes some way towards clearing up doubts concerning operations from runways covered with snow or water and also will help tonarrow down the number of conflicting opinions which have arisen during the past three years. However, the circular not only refersto the Elizabethan rype aircraft but also to limiting depths of slush or water for a number of aircraft types. The average limitingdepth appears to be lin. When the German Commission of Inquiry into the accident toG-ALZU published its report it made the following assumption: — "All experience goes to show, however, that it may be assumed thattake-offs can be made with nose-wheel aircraft without danger up to a slush depth of at least 5 cm." The Fay Commission made it plain that the criticisms madeby the Association of the German report were justified. The German Inquiry implied an assumption that drag caused by slushdecreased with the speed of the aeroplane. The Fay Commission pointed out that as a result of research initiated, partly at leastas a result of the Munich accident, the drag caused by slush increases with speed; probably as the square of the speed. At thetime of the Fay Commission the Association submitted that con- clusions should never have been attempted until research hadbeen done. For this and other reasons the Association has pressed for a reopening of the Inquiry or a review of the available evidenceby a body fully qualified to determine the true cause of the accident. Mow we have the results of a Ministry of Aviation investigationiii'o the general problem and these results conflict with the original German assumptions, therefore, we are saying that aK'rious error of judgment has been made in this case, which error needs to be rectified. The Association has been accused of "irresponsible" conduct'f. insisting on a proper investigation and in being so unwilling rt accept the original findings of the German Commission ofI. juiry. If what we have been trying to do is "irresponsible" then we feel justified in carrying on in such an "irresponsible"manner, as our efforts and those of Captain J. Thain (who is directly involved in this matter) have helped to highlight whatwas until 1958 a hidden hazard to die safety of aviation. Hayes, Middx D. FOLLOWS,General Secretary, British Air Line Pilots Association Fuel Duel T>ERHAPS you will allow me to add (through the medium ofA your correspondence columns) another and as yet unmentioned aspect to the current kerosine-JP.4 controversy.Referring to BCARs, Section D, Issue 2, one finds an interesting recommendation which is based upon emergency alighting condi-tions. This states in so many words, that when possible fuel tanks should not be located within the fuselage or the wing centre-section where it passes through the fuselage. Although written as a recommendation there is much evidenceto show that this is in fact a more mandatory note. A quick search through details of the types shows that not one piston-engined airliner produced in this country since the war has carried tanks in that region. What is more, it appears that some similarly worded and equallyenforced statement appears in the corresponding American pub- lication. For with the exception of the Lockheed 1649 noAmerican piston-engined transports have fuselage or wing-centre- section tanks. This almost universal design feature has been reversed in thecase of jet airliners. With the sole exception of the Caravelle they all rely on centre-section tanks for sufficient range. It can only beassumed that the authorities found this feature acceptable through an appreciation of the safer qualities of the fuel used, i.e., kerosine.In view of this, and bearing in mind their past recommendations concerning piston-engined aircraft, it would appear logical thatthese authorities could, and perhaps should, invalidate the air- worthiness certificates of jet airliners operating with petxol/JP.4in their systems. Barnet, Herts R. A. COLE [The D.H. Trident—the initial version at least—does not have centre-section tankage.—Ed.] ROUND ONE of the 'fuel duel" has ended in stalemate, withthe JP.4 proponents asserting that wide-cut distillate actually improves engine mechanical reliability. Turbojet fuel systems relymainly on fuel lubrication. Various makes of turbojets have certain fuel system components restricted to reduced overhaullife when operated on JP.4, this reduction being proportionate to the JP.4/kerosine running ratio. These restrictions resultedfrom increased mechanical wear encountered because of the inferior lubricating qualities of JP.4. The degree of reliability imparted by the respective fuels isbest considered in the light of the fact that some types of fuel- lubricated fuel pumps may be restricted, when operated on JP.4,to 50 per cent of the life permitted with kerosine. The inferior lubricating qualities of JP.4 must affect the ulti-mate obtainable reliability (and synonymous safety) of any fuel- lubricated mechanism on the engine. Glasgow S2 NEIL MCKAY Airborne Cars WHILE looking through a copy of Popular Flying for April1932, I came across a delightful and interesting photograph showing an Austin 7 sports car being loaded into a Junkers G.31of Guinea Airways. A cumbersome derrick was lowering the car vertically through an aperture in the fuselage above the centre-section and the caption described it as the first motor to be used in the goldfields of Wau. This is certainly the earliest picture I have seen of a motorvehicle being transported by air although I believe that this was not the first occasion. I am told that a car was first carried in anaircraft round about 1927 in America, the aircraft probably being the Remington-Burnelli RB-2 of 1924 which was one of the pre-decessors of the later "flying wing" aircraft bearing the name of Burnelli. 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