FlightGlobal.com
Home
Premium
Archive
Video
Images
Forum
Atlas
Blogs
Jobs
Shop
RSS
Email Newsletters
You are in:
Home
Aviation History
1961
1961 - 0204.PDF
204 FLIGHT, 17 February 1961 Missiles and Space flight . . . Si(9 .si ItOO I —^ —, —I 1 '—' ' I s H.T KE 3» H 1 ^^"^-LIQUID HYO >^ 3" STACE 7\ *OSENE STAGE \ ROGCN \ \ i • s. i JOO SOO IOOQ 2OOO SOOO 300O IOOOO CIRCULAR HT. (NMILES) Fig 6. The effect of the introduction of a liquid hydro- gen third stage for equatorial, circular orbits Further Improvements in Payload With uprating of the BlueStreak engine to a total sea-level thrust of 300,0001b, improve- ments in pay load of 2501b (low circular orbit) and 1501b (highcircular orbit) would be obtained. In addition, the higher thrust would remove the restrictions on stage layouts caused by theconfined impact areas in a polar launch, so that the equatorial- launch payload gains mentioned above would be obtained alsoin polar firings. The figures so far quoted do not take into account the thrust increase which would be expected in the second stageif an extension skirt surrounding the engines were adopted. This thrust augmenter should give increases in payload of 1001b and501b respectively for the two orbits mentioned. Thus nominal payloads of 2,5501b and 7501b could be placed in the 300-mileand 5,000-mile equatorial circles respectively. A further possibility which has been examined is the replace-ment of the HTP/kerosine engine in the third stage by a liquid- hydrogen/liquid oxygen system. This development would involvea longer time-scale: the benefits which it would offer are indicated in Fig 6. This step would increase the two nominal payloads inthe two orbits already considered to 3,1501b and 1,4501b. Guidance Inertial guidance was rejected in favour of radarguidance on the grounds of weight. It was proposed to track and guide the first and second stages by using the existing range-safetyradars installed at Woomera. These radars would feed the existing safety computer to which would be added equipment to enable itto perform the necessary guidance computations. The appropriate commands would then be transmitted to the vehicle. The long powered trajectory would require a down-range stationto track the third stage (see Fig 3). This station could use either a pencil-beam radar similar to that installed at Woomera or aradio interferometer system. The latter might offer advantages, particularly in the acquisition of the vehicle as it appeared overthe horizon. Guidance into a high circular orbit would probably require a further tracking station. Satellite Test Vehicles The final three development firings inthe initial launch vehicle programme should all be capable of placing a satellite in orbit. These firings would carry satellite testvehicles, for the primary purpose of establishing the ability of the three-stage vehicle to inject a payload into orbit in a satisfactorymanner. These satellites would be used to study such questions as environmental conditions affecting the satellite during thepowered flight of the launch vehicle, problems of separation of the satellite from the third stage, and residual motion impartedto the satellite on separation. As a secondary bonus the satellites could be used for a varietyof purposes once in orbit. They might carry scientific instruments for space research or for the investigation of aspects of satellitetechnology. The latter might include questions of the behaviour of satellite stabilization and reference systems, power supplies,data storage and recovery systems, and the problems of heat balance in orbit. The choice of particular experiments in thesefields would depend on the purposes for which the launching vehicle was subsequently to be exploited. Development Programme The overall development programmeenvisaged is shown in Fig 2 on page 202. This illustrates the approximate time-scale for the major manufacturing and testingactivities essential to the firing of ten vehicles, with launch-vehicie development complete by the end of 1965. There would be aparallel series of ground-launched tests of the French second stage, and flight experience with the third stage would be obtainedin flights F3-F5. The first vehicle capable of launching a payload into orbit would be F6. Not included in the outline programme illustrated is the largeamount of supporting work, such as engine development, struc- tural testing, F3 autopilot development (which demands anadequate structural dummy for vibration testing one year before the F3 firing date) and ground facilities. Lead times between completion of manufacture and firing fromWoomera have been assumed as eight months for the first stage and six months for the upper stages, using sea transport in the formercase and air transport for the latter. Following manufacture and factory check-out, the trials programme in Europe would com-prise essential extensive acceptance tests for vehicle stages, includ- ing static firings. Further checks of vehicle stages, including furtherstatic firings, would be made at Woomera together with checks of the complete vehicle system during the final preparation forlaunching. The division of costs between the three rocket stages and otheritems, on the basis of the £70m programme, is as follows: — Item First stage (British) Second stage (French) Third stage Satellite test vehicles Miscellaneous Percentage of Total Approximate sum 55 £38.5m 18 £12.6m 9 £6.3m 10 £7.0m 8 £5.6m As reported last week, the proposed approximate contributionsfrom individual countries, on the same basis, is: — Britain... France... West Germany Italy ... Spain ... Sweden £23,333,000 £14,399,000 £13,244,000 £6,846,000 £2,063,000 £2,033,000 Belgium Netherlands Switzerland Denmark Austria Norway £1,993,000 £1,850,000 £1,582,000 £957,000 £927,000 £773,000 During discussions of these costs at Strasbourg, Britain pointedout that, because of the work already carried out in the United Kingdom and the facilities and equipment available there, othercountries could not be asked to undertake work connected with the first stage. The 55 per cent of the budget which was directedtowards Blue Streak had been allocated to work already so far advanced that it could not, for reasons of economy, be transferredto another country. It was stated that Britain and France, in draw- ing up the proposed budget, had endeavoured to transfer as muchwork as possible—including for example all transport arrange- ments—to other countries. To divide the work differently mightlengthen the time required and so increase the expense. Belgian and Norwegian delegates suggested that it would beprofitable if engineers and scientists from countries other than France and Britain could work as members of the French andBritish teams. The representatives of France and Britain agreed that this was desirable, and promised that their respective Govern-ments would appeal to industry to co-operate in this. Norway inquired also what proportion of the total effort envis-aged was development work, and was told: first stage, 10-15 per cent (although the total from the beginning of the Blue Streakprogramme was 60-70 per cent); second stage, 60 per cent (includ- ing manufacture of prototype); third stage, 60-70 per cent; satellitetest vehicles, 60-70 per cent or slightly more. Answering a question from Denmark, Britain said that nocountry had been proposed for work on the third stage. The only wish was that it should be undertaken by a country or groupof countries other than France. If there were several countries they might all be represented by some body which would chooseits own location and operate under a central authority. Mention was made at the conference of a "European telecom-munications satellite organization" which, it was considered, might be a customer for the launch vehicles which the Strasbourg-pro-posed organization could produce and sell. Another customer might be the European Space Research Organization (ESRO),whose concern would be scientific satellites. Close; co-operation between all three bodies was essential. It was suggested that the proposed launch-vehicle organizationshould have a powerful and independent executive body, as was the case with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. GenRobert Aubiniere of France said that the organization as envis- aged was very close to the NATO system, where decisions weretaken by a standing group. The Council supplied general instruc- tions, drew up the budget, and allocated tasks, while the executivegroup was responsible for concluding contracts in accordance with general terms of reference, although its authority and independencewere complete.
Sign up to
Flight Digital Magazine
Flight Print Magazine
Airline Business Magazine
E-newsletters
RSS
Events
