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Aviation History
1961
1961 - 0337.PDF
FLIGHT, 16 March 1961 345 The Space Race . . . further point that the Russian ships which were at that time dis-patched to the Pacific would have been entirely superfluous unless an attempt was to have been made to recover the payload fromorbit. Prof Sedov's two goals were most likely part of the intent of the mission, but it must be sincerely doubted that they were thegoals. Other reports hint at two earlier manned flight attempts, these supposedly having taken place in 1960. As long as the Russianshave the ability to orbit a man and remain so secretive, every heavy object that they launch will bring speculations that the payloadwas manned. One of the anomalies of the Russian position—irrespective ofwhether or not they have tried to orbit a man (or men)—is that, although a reliable booster can get one into orbit, considerablydifferent skills are required to accomplish something once one is there. Most impartial observers concede that the Soviets arebehind America in the production of highly precise, miniaturized airborne electronics (the Russians are good at heavy electronics,however, such as ground-based radars). The problem is compli- cated by the ferocious vibrations that the big booster must impartto satellites during the boost phase. One might therefore imagine that Russia has difficulties in producing specialized satelliteinstrumentation and in deriving information from payloads. This would appear to be the case. Significant data derived fromSoviet satellites is almost non-existent. Furthermore, it would appear that, in terms of actual research, the Russians have donerelatively little considering the resources available. The Russians may, of course, simply be withholding the informa-tion, but this would seem pointless. The suspicion here is that they have not acquired much meaningful data; and this opinion will notbe changed until some evidence of the existence of the data is made known. A point to bear in mind is that each of the Russian firingscould have been made without much data having been accumulated from prior launches. Given a substantial payload capability—which the big booster provides—one could make each satellite sufficiently conservative (i.e. overdesigned) in all areas to take intoaccount the worst of expected conditions. Future Russian Plans Some speculation on future Soviet efforts is interesting. Thusfar the Soviets have concentrated on a small number of flights, each one carefully chosen for its propaganda impact. In the futurewe may expect to see further maximum exploitation of the ICBM engine, again for propaganda purposes. Additional manned Earthorbiters will probably be attempted this year. There is a particular urgency for the Russians to orbit a man as soon as possible. Theyonce had a lead of over two years over the USA in this endeavour; now they have about one-half of that time. The world is condi-tioned to the fact that the Soviets will be first in space, and should they not be the first to orbit a man they will suffer a propagandablow of considerable proportions. Several more lunar shots will probably also be attempted. Wemight expect that they will make a controlled hard landing on the Moon in the near future. If the previous guesses at the state ofSoviet electronic capabilities are correct, it may be just within the Russians' capability to make a soft landing on the Moon withineighteen months; I should find it astounding, however, if they had the ability to return a payload from the Moon to the Earth'ssurface within the next three years. A launch at Mars is a distinct possibility, particularly if there is a lag in the manned-satelliteprogramme. A Mars programme would serve to divert public attention away from American manned sub-orbital flights, shouldthey occur before a successful Russian manned satellite firing. We might also expect to see increased attention on the part ofthe Russians to the scientific aspects of space. The Russians will enjoy a continuing and substantial boosteradvantage over the United States for several more years. They will therefore be able to perform a variety of missions completelybeyond the physical capabilities of America. However, the Russians must be faced with a long-range problem of how to maintain theirpopular advantage over the USA. With the present American lead in airborne electronics the United States would far outstrip theSoviets if both had boosters of comparable size. To keep in the forefront, the Russians must do one of two things. Either theymust build a still larger booster, at least of Nova size, or they must make a determined effort to close the "electronics gap." If Russia's failing is overconcentration on a single theme—useof the big booster for propaganda-style missions—America's fault is diversification. In the USA there exist projects to cover justabout every plausible space mission and, indeed, some that are totally implausible. In the hectic days following the historicannouncement that the Soviet Union had orbited her first satellite, there was nationwide concern over the question of how Americamight quickly excel the Russians in what immediately became the prestige-dominated space race. Countless dollars were spent on avariety of hastily conceived programmes. A separate civilian space agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, wasestablished to supersede the old NACA organization. Its mission was to direct America's peaceful space efforts. Its budget growing from a meagre S 145.5m in 1959 (Fiscal Year)to S401m in 1960 and S770m in 1961, the NASA is expected to spend approximately S965m in Fiscal 1962. The Space Administra-tion therefore already ranks in seventh place amongst America's biggest-spending agencies (behind veteran's benefits and farm sub-sidies, among others), and even the most conservative estimators of NASA's future needs foresee annual budgets in excess of $2,000mwithin a few years. The enormity of these sums is even now causing concern amongsome leading American citizens. Dr Dubridge, president of the California Institute of Technology and a physicist of internationalrepute, has been quoted as stating that the race to put a man in space was "a useless weight-lifting contest" that might squanderthe nation's resources at a time when world prestige could be best gained through "important and useful enterprises." But aside fromthe questionable benefits of a man-in-space project, there is the broader question of whether space exploration per se holds forthmore promise for man than does other scientific work. Is space exploration, for example, potentially more beneficial to mankindthan the study of the oceans that girdle the Earth? Has America Caught Up? Since America's initial drive was directed at catching up withRussia in the space field, it is interesting to examine two basic questions which are now being asked in the United States. Havewe caught up? Will we forge ahead in the future? A fair estimate of the situation would be to credit the Russians with a presentsignificant lead in big boosters, and a considerable advantage in the propaganda aspects of their work. As for America, most impartialobservers—or, at least, those intimately associated with the aero- space field—concede that the USA has a measurable lead in airborneelectronics and data-acquisition. The argument as to which nation's position is the stronger isendless (as well as being pointless). The common man would more than likely argue that Russia is far out ahead, while members ofthe scientific community would take an opposite viewpoint. But, since the common public far outnumber the scientific community,it can be logically argued that Russia is leading the race. This conclusion has disturbed a large segment of the Americanpeople. As noted earlier, the public has supported substantial expenditures for space, and it is frankly disappointed that Americahas not so far outstripped the Soviets in space accomplishments. The anomaly in America's position is that, although large sums ofmoney have been allocated to win the space race, virtually all of the money has been spent on purely scientific missions. Evidently many hold the attitude that, although it might beworthwhile to spend S1,000m a year to gain a propaganda advan- tage, it might not be worthwhile to spend the same sum on science.This feeling is inherent in the popular move to establish the Air Force as the predominant space agency. The Air Force is keenlyaware of the propaganda aspects of space and has captured the public's imagination with a host of unscientific but newsworthyschemes. The public eats up such flamboyance as that displayed by the Air Force when its representatives talk of underground lunarbases, etc. It would appear that, if America really wanted to beat the Soviets in headlines, she need only turn over NASA's budget to theAir Force. Science would suffer, but the public might be mollified. Booster Reliability As for the future, America seems to be developing ever-more-complex payloads for stretched versions of the boosters which have proved troublesome thus far, and for the new large Saturn booster.One is tempted to conclude that unless the Agena, Centaur and Saturn vehicles turn out to be more reliable than their predecessors,the USA will still be running in second place several year; from now. A worthwhile suggestion here would be to proceed with allhaste to develop very large solid-fuelled engines for first-stage propulsion. It must be obvious from the preceding discussion that the pos-session of a reliable booster is the key to success in space. If one can at all refrain from developing a new booster, this actionshould be followed; boosters are an endless source of frustration. I personally would go out and beg, borrow or steal a boosterbefore developing a new one. A thought comes to mind here. Would it not be possible to use for space exploration one or moreof the Thor boosters now stationed in England, or the Jupiter missiles to be installed elsewhere in Europe? RAF crews, forexample, have already fired several Thors, and launching sites are already operational. It would seem that one or two of the IRBMscould be sacrificed for space work without any real reduction in deterrent strength. In any event, the Thors will one day soonbecome militarily obsolete, but they may still be adequate for space use. Perhaps some plans could be made for their eventualuse. It might be the quickest way for Europe to get into space.
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