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Aviation History
1961
1961 - 0521.PDF
r, 20 ^/v/7 1961 HE LONG VIEW . .. -sentially be reckoned with in the "as is" configuration, and no, versal of control sensing should be expected of him. fn closing, the authors discussed the question of approach speedsa~.d landing distances: "From current jet operations we know that ii"is possible to make consistently good landings with a threshold•need of 1.3Vs on a reasonably calm day if the approach is good v'ith final sink, before flare-out, of not more than 7OO-8OOft/sec.Oii the other hand, there is ample evidence that when the wind is misty, when there is a marked wind gradient with height close to theeround, or when a high sink is involved, a 1.3Vs threshold speed is not sufficient to consistently prevent hard landings and under-shoots." Two remedies for this situation were feasible. The first was to increase the threshold speed above the 1.3Vs value. Such 529 a speed would, of course, have concurrent detrimental effects onground roll-out. Another suggestion was to re-define stall speed to reflect a practical minimum level-flight speed. The speakers sug-gested that Vs be defined to be the minimum theoretical speed at which the aircraft could be flown steadily in level flight without thelift effects of the engines. Ground roll distances, once touchdown had been effected, hadbeen shown in practice to be 15 to 20 per cent in excess of certi- fication distances. It was accordingly recommended that the CARlanding-field length should be no less than the ground roll stopping distance without wheel brakes. Additionally, the proposed newregulation should take into account that touchdown would occur 1,000ft from the approach end of the runway. "In any event, acriterion of this sort would place more design emphasis on the stopping capability on poor runway conditions. This, in our opinion,is the missing link in the current design goals." DON ADAMS SERVICE HELICOPTERS: AUSTRALIAN ARGUMENTS A TEXTBOOK case of how aircraft sales can really getfouled up is now in full bloom (to mix the metaphoras roughly as the events in the story) in Australia. Last year the Federal Cabinet announced it would withdrawthe active Australian carrier, HMAS Melbourne, from service in 1963. as it would be too costly to re-equip her with such modernfighters as the Etendard IV. (This was the first time a French air- craft had been considered for either of the Australian flying ser-vices.) The Cabinet later announced that Melbourne would be retained as a helicopter carrier. At that time the Royal AustralianNavy had about £A4,500,OO0 to spend and required about 30 machines. Needing them in some hurry and having very littlemoney, the RAN decided in principle on the Westland Gnome- Whirlwind. There is no question that this decision was takenwithin the Navy. The Department of Defence, however, was keen that the RoyalAustralian Air Force, which had a small requirement for a heli- copter to perform rescue duties, should order the same basicaircraft as the Navy. The RAAF refused to consider the Whirl- wind, which was in general not the type required. While this was going on, the RAN had done its sums again, todiscover it had more money, largely from the schemes knocked back by Cabinet, and could actually risk an investment of £7m.The RAAF and RAN then came to a quick agreement on the Bell Iroquois. Bell is a big name in Australia. Ansett-ANA and Heli-copter Utilities, two of the three main chopper operators, have small fleets of Bell 47s, while the Army had selected (and the RAAFbought for it) 11 Bell Rangers, which are now in the delivery stage. The RAAF and Army unit is now under training at AmberleyRAAF Base, near Brisbane. The RAAF decided on eight Iroquois and the RAN on 28. The decision was taken and everybody alongthe line from Canberra to Washington was alerted for the project. Bell had the order all but in its hand. A press release was ready inCanberra. Into this set-up jumped Admiral James A. Thomas, vice-presi-dent plans and programs of Kaman Aircraft Corporation. He arrived at Canberra with Mr Frank H. Horn, assistant field servicemanager. They went straight to the Defence Minister, Mr Townley, and (the story goes) to all intents and purposes told him that toorder Bells without proper consideration of the Kaman Huskie was an outrage against humanity and economics. The Iroquoiswas promptly suspended. At the same time the local Westland agents, de Havilland Australia, weighed in with a completeproject for an all-weather version of the Wessex, which they say could cost very little more than the Iroquois or the Huskie. As at writing, the situation is that Defence are looking at thewhole project again and will probably decide to send a small mission abroad before any decision is taken. The RAN is attractedby the Huskie's toughness and performance, but the Mickey Finn deftly planted in the mixture by Admiral Thomas was a proposalto have the Huskies assembled in Australia. This was clever. The Kaman organization is double, parts from one factory being takento a second for assembly. To bring the parts direct to Australia and assemble them would cost very little, as the helicopters wouldneed in any case to be partly disassembled in the USA for ship- ment and then reassembled by the RAAF. Kaman have beententatively dealing here with Fairey and Bristol, both of whom have small plants at Bankstown. Bristol has been looking after RANSycamores and various Bristol Freighters, while Fairey have been looking after the RAN's Gannets. Either firm would regard theHuskie proposal as a godsend, particularly as there would be a nrst-class follow-up for parts and maintenance. As Kaman pro-pose some 26 Huskies for the RAN and eight for the RAAF, this is a nice prospect. The RAAF, however, sticks by its liking for theIroquois, but is not adamant against the Huskie. The trouble is 'hat those RAN and RAAF pilots who have briefly flown theHuskie did not like it. For that matter they did like the Bell. Moreover, Kaman isn't even a name in Australia. One pilot hadactually asked Admiral Thomas in Connecticut some months previously whether they had delivered any helicopters of any typeto any Service anywhere. Kaman were upset. So, as of now, the RAN likes the Iroquois, is deeply impressedby the Wessex (all-weather and size), and finds it difficult to argue against the attractions of local assembly of the Huskie. Finally, Iunderstand the Wessex could be assembled locally at the de Havil- land plant at Bankstown and that a proposal on these lines has beensubmitted. But pity Bell's local agent, Frank Sharpe. Now, just to make things clearer than the mixed metaphor at thestart of this story, the Minister for the Navy (Senator Gorton) referred in a recent speech to the possibility that the old carrierHMAS Sydney, which has been on reserve for some years, might be reactivated as an assault helicopter carrier. This one has everybodyguessing. If right, it would obviously double the chopper require- ment, for the 30 or so designed for the RAN would serve for acarrier squadron and a shore-training squadron at Nowra, NSW. And the helicopter needed would have to have a double capability.This would put the Wessex well up into the picture, for size would then have a great bearing on the decision. Until this idea wasconjured up, Australian naval requirements were for anti-submarine roles only. The whole RAN exists actually for an anti-submarinetask—nothing else. It is there to protect the sea-lanes, working with the RAAF. Until now there has been no question of giving theArmy assault capability via the Navy. Behind all this, the Australian Army is sitting with a quizzicallook on its face. The Army's helicopter requirements are simply ignored. Like the armies of Britain and America it needs severalsizes of helicopter. It his a small type by virtue of the RAAF order of Bell 47 Rangers, but its urgent need is a large type to giveassault capability. It wants a few Boeing-Vertol 107s or Sikorsky S-61s, but it has no hope in the world of persuading the RAAF toagree to this. The Army cannot order aircraft and it in any case cannot operate any above 4,0001b all-up weight. The RAAF doesnot want a big chopper, and the Army cannot argue this. The funny thing is that the RAN really wants a big helicopter too—it isvery keen on the Boeing-Vertol 107. But it has too little money to order more than just a few, which would leave many RAN pilotson the beach without a feather to fly. The RAAF will not buy a big chopper for which it has no requirement, but is willing to havemore Hercules C-130s, of which it now has 12. The Army says it wants an aircraft which can operate off unprepared surfaces withoutdamaging those surfaces. In actual fact, the Army wants something which is uncannily like the Rotodyne, provided some ferry rangecould be built into the design. In Australia we don't even know whether it will ever go into production. If it does, somebody oughtto contact our Army (but only with the assurance that somebody else is buying it too; we don't like orphan aircraft out here). I am led to understand that the reference to HMAS Sydney wasmerely a political kiteflying attempt and that this is not serious politics unless the South-East Asia kettle really starts boiling. Wewould then find an assault carrier a most attractive unit of the Australian Defence Forces. Should the Navy really be consideringthis, and if it has a chance in committee then the Army would certainly give its vote in favour at the Defence Committee meetings,for the Army is so hungry for airlift it will vote for anybody who will help. The Westland people ought to get behind this projectwith a big push. If the Navy wants this it should make some quick proposal, for Vice-Admiral Sir Roy Dowling, present chairman onthe Defence Chiefs of Staff Committee, retires in a few weeks in favour of Air Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger. Instead of havingtwo admirals on the committee, the Navy will have one, while the RAAF has two air marshals. I won't go as far as saying ourDefence chiefs are biased: but human nature is human nature,only- more so under a uniform. STANLEY BROGDEN
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