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Aviation History
1961
1961 - 0717.PDF
fllGHl 25 May 1961 727 Supersonic Symposium IATA EXAMINES THE PROBLEMS HERE, from an observer at last month's IATA supersonic symposiumin Montreal, is a summary of the five days of technical discussion. Some comments on the lessons to be learned from the meeting appear in the Airrrnnmerce section of this issue of "Flight." 0NLY two fundamental problems could prove to be so greatthat there will never be a supersonic airliner; but these two_ might stop the whole project cold in a way that financingdifficulties and the need for international co-operation never could. One is the problem of sonic boom, and it seemed likely from theweek-long Supersonic Symposium which was the main part of IATA'S 14th Technical Conference in Montreal that the worldmay know the answer in about a year. It became clear at the symposium—which attracted 650 engineers from 137 companies andorganizations, including governments—that no one is yet certain whether the noise can be kept to something the world will tolerate.Part of the difficulty is that no one knows how much the world will tolerate; and everyone is afraid to do anything very directabout finding out, because they foresee the danger that the public may take a very firm line. If the noise cannot be kept tolerable—and there was general agree-ment at the symposium with one airline's statement that it must be within the realm that the public will "willingly accept"—it seemsthere will never be a supersonic airliner, no matter whether it is the long-range Mach 2 aeroplane favoured by the British, the long-range Mach 3 the Americans are working on in early design- studies, or the short-range Mach 2 Super Caravelle which theFrench believe offers them a future in the field. The other problem which may prove unmanageable is cosmicradiation at the altitudes involved—60,000ft to 80,000ft—and on this no one at the symposium was able to provide a firm answer.It was just agreed that the public is never going to get into airliners and fly at those altitudes unless it is safe, and that fear of radiationmay be almost as serious a problem as radiation itself. A related problem of secondary radiation, from particles, seems much lesslimiting. These are not the worst altitudes for that particular problem, apparently, and they are almost wholly related to atomictesting, still at an uncertain halt. Economics in Mind These problems came up early in the symposium, almost immedi-ately after warnings from delegates that the engineers and tech- nicians must keep firmly in mind the problem of economics. R. V.Carleton, a Braniff International Airways vice-president, and chair- man of the technical conference, warned that supersonic airlinerscould be a means of going bankrupt at supersonic speeds; and Canadian Transport Minister Leon Balcer probably spoke formore governments than his own when he warned against expecting administrations to undertake another round of heavy spending onsupporting services such as the subsonic jets involved. Sir William Hildred, director-general of IATA, and Walter Binaghi, presidentof the 1CAO council, struck somewhat similar notes. The chair- man of the symposium, J. T. Dyment of Trans Canada Air Lines,probably summed up the engineering reaction neatly at the final session, when he said of these warnings: "We don't really needthem. We are convinced we will have a supersonic transport, but we are smart enough to know we don't want one before we are ready for it." What followed the economic warnings and the recognition thatthe sonic boom and radiation problems could possibly be too much 'o overcome, was a very thorough discussion of the research anddevelopment problems involved and the many implications the OT would have for the airlines using it, from flying the machine toPassenger handling. In general, the mass of research and develop- ment problems reviewed by the meeting was matched by a convic-tion on. the part of manufacturers that they can be overcome; and MS was true from the question of aerodynamic heating to that ofme fuels "the beast" will use. (When subsonic jets were being Qeveloped, it used to be common in North America to talk about "a new breed of cat." This newest one seems already well on the way° being labelled "the beast.") Equally generally, it was accepted [nat the SST must be designed within certain parameters, and these In the centre, R .V. Carleton (Braniff), chairman of the conference and chairman of IATA'S Technical Committee. Others, left to right, are: ft. D. Kelly (United), chairman of a special working group on aircraft design within the symposium; J. T. Dyment (TCA), symposium chairman; ft. £. Fisher (PanAm), chairman of a working group on ground handling; and R. R. Shaw (Qantas), chairman of a working group on operations tended to be a little more orthodox as the airlines stated them thanwhen they were being suggested by manufacturers. For example, the manufacturers seemed to be thinking about somewhat higherapproach and landing speeds than the operators felt like accepting. Again, the men who make electronic equipment seemed to havea higher opinion of its probable reliability ten years from now than the men who would use it; and this led to some differences ofopinion on how far it would be possible to accept automation. The airline view was that it would require a complete pilot "over-ride" capability and good monitoring, and this in turn drew a manufacturer's assurance that he did not propose to build an aero-plane which a human being could not fly. The delegates went into the five-day symposium talking generallyof an SST around 1970. When they emerged from the last of the five 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. sessions, they were talking more frequently of1970-75. The intervening five days certainly produced nothing to increase the fears of airline managements that they may be con-fronted with an SST before the subsonic jets have paid off the bond issues that bought them. Nothing that occurred put the SSTfirmly into the more distant future; but the discussions did not make it seem more imminent, and they suggested a little moreelasticity when talking about time. People who asked why anyone should pay for the heavy develop-ment costs—which apparently remain at about the same stratos- pheric level at which they have been tentatively pegged for thelast year or so—received in essence the answer that they were asking the question in the wrong place. The engineers were notprepared to accept an answer to that as part of their function, although they conceded that no airline or manufacturer can paythe price. The responsibility the members of the symposium accepted in the cost field was that the SST must be able to fly in competitionwith the economics of whatever other jets are in operation when it appears. The most extreme view of the improvement that can beexpected in the operating costs of the jets in the next ten years— 50 per cent—was left without support. It was generally assumedthatthed.o.c. of the jets will comedown, but on a much more modest scale than that, and one manufacturer pointed out that they arealready in an advanced stage of their development. The conference ended with a summary of the projects underserious consideration. There are three of them:— (1) A short-range SST of Mach 2 to 2.25, put forward by the French withthe qualification that if the sonic boom problem cannot be solved there will be no supersonic airliner of any range. If it can, it was argued,there will be public demand for an SST in the short to intermediate range—900 to 1,500 miles—and it will be a useful complement to along-range SST. Its supporters accept the Mach 2 regime as involving fewer development problems, and after finding from their studies thaton these ranges a Mach 3 aircraft never produced more than a 15- minute improvement in block time. The machine would be smallenough to avoid runway problems; and since it would not cruise above 60,000ft it would encounter no radiation problems, should they proveto exist on a serious scale above that level. It was shown that ten years ago it was argued that the subsonic jets would be restricted to theAtlantic, but that Caravelles are in widespread use today. The SST would be known as the Super Caravelle. (2) A Mach 2 to 2.2 aircraft with long range, put forward by the British,who argued that it had been shown throughout the symposium that no important differences existed in the technical data on which variousmanufacturers were basing their studies. From this starting point, it was suggested that an aluminium-titanium combination would besatisfactory for Mach 2 plus, while a steel-titanium combination would be dictated by Mach 3 and upwards, although fuel problems mightlimit the latter project to Mach 2.75. The Mach 2 exponents based their case on the argument that itinvolved a "reasonable degree of novelty" for a practical transport. Modest development work on metals would be required and skintemperatures would be below fuel-ignition points. Fuels and non-metal
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