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Aviation History
1961
1961 - 0847.PDF
"*.* A. •""•*" I -' LIGHT, 22 Jwne J961 859 NATO AIR ORGANIZATION AAFCE's Problems and Potentialities BY HUMPHREY WYNN Nike/Hercules installation—part of NATO air defence—manned by a Belgian Air Force unit AT the entrance to the Camp Guynemer headquarters of Allied. Air Forces Central Europe, near Fontainebleau, stand sevenL flagpoles. Six are in a circle and bear the flags of the United Kingdom, United States, Belgium, Holland, Germany andCanada. In the centre of the circle flies the French flag, in deference to the country on whose territory the headquarters are situated; butthere is a certain gentle irony in this, because of all the participating nations France is at present the least NATO-inclined. She has refusedto have USAF nuclear-armed aircraft on her soil; she insists on being responsible for most of her own air defence. Yet it is on these veryfactors that the success of AAFCE as an organization depends: co-ordinated air defence for Central Europe, maintenance of anuclear deterrent. In this context, it is significant that only recently, in a USAF re-organization, command of nuclear-armed fighterunits based in the United Kingdom was transferred from the Third Air Force in the UK to the Seventeenth Air Force, whose head-quarters are at Ramstein, Germany. Yet French personnel are still serving at AAFCE headquartersand France has not withdrawn her hospitality from NATO form- ations at Fontainebleau and Versailles, names redolent with pastimperial glories; and it is differing national points of view that AAFCE aims to reconcile in its day-to-day activities, its organizationand forward planning. Recently Air Chief Marshal the Earl of Bandon took over com-mand from Air Chief Marshal Sir Harry Broadhurst, when the latter left the RAF for a post in industry; and it was to seek LordBandon's views on AAFCE, its present problems and its future role, that the writer recently visited Fontainebleau. Nobody who meets "Paddy" Bandon (as he is affectionatelyknown in the RAF) can fail to be exhilarated by the experience: a quick talker, he takes continuous nervous puffs at a cigarette;when he laughs, it is a hearty guffaw which partakes of his whole personality and blows away any possible idea of pomposity. Youneed to reassure yourself of authority by looking at the broad rank stripe and three narrow stripes on Lord Bandon's arm: but thelaughter is a healthy antidote to any ponderousness in discussing strategic questions. On the wall behind Lord Bandon's head is a world map, areminder to the visitor of NATO's global perspective and a fitting background to the Commander's previous appointment, as C-in-CFar East Air Force. This brought him into contact with NATO's Pacific equivalent, SEATO, the South-East Asia Treaty Organiz-ation; so on the score of working with other nationalities he brings plenty of experience to his present post, and can also see Europeanproblems in the context of facing the other great Communist power, China. Further, Lord Bandon knows the West German situationat first hand, having commanded RAF Germany and the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force before going to the Far East in 1957. He hasclose personal friendships with Air Marshal John Grandy, his suc- cessor at 2nd ATAF; with Gen Frederic H. Smith who commands4th ATAF; and with Gen Sir James Cassels, C-in-C Northern Army Group and British Army of the Rhine. Widespread Command As commander of the largest of the three NATO air organizations—the others have headquarters at Oslo (Allied Air Forces Northern Europe) and Naples (Allied Air Forces Southern Europe)—LordBandon heads a command of widespread area, with problems of size complicated by the politically sensitive location of headquartersand the largely theoretical approach to war problems. But he believes that if put to the test, the organization would work; onreturn from the Far East, he finds it stronger than it was when he left Germany, though problems still exist. This strengthening is due in the main to three factors: addition of missiles to the West European defensive armour; co-ordination ofair defence, so that both surface-to-air missiles and manned air- craft are under a unified control; and an increased West Germancontribution to the NATO armed forces. Since Lord Bandon has been away from Europe the installationof Nike/Ajax (Nike/Hercules) sites has been steadily proceeding, so that the intercepter forces are now being backed by missiles.This might be a dubious advantage were control of the missiles in hands other than those controlling the fighter aircraft; but the Nikebattalions are under 2nd ATAF/4th ATAF control; and most of the Central European area is under a unified air defence. The areaexcluded is most of France, which insists on sovereign rights in this sphere; and herein lies one of Lord Bandon's problems, calling forthe exercise of diplomatic powers. But he is optimistic that, in a few years, the French may be putting their DAT (Defense Aeriennedu Territoire) under SACEur as RAF Fighter Command has recently been. At least, while General de Gaulle remains in power, anyAAFCE commander knows that he will have a stable government with which to deal. Questions of Finance As far as Germany is concerned, the problems are of a differentcalibre. Again, so long as Dr Adenauer remains in power, the likeli- hood of any change in attitude towards the Western alliance issmall; but the future is problematical. West Germany has rapidly grown in strength; her air force is equipping with Lockheed F-104Starfighters and with surface-to-air missiles. Upon her co-operation, from so centralised a location, depends the effectiveness ofWestern defence. With the smaller nations in AAFCE, the Netherlands and Bel-gium, there are fewer big problems; but there are questions of finance and representation, the latter being worked out on the basisof national contribution. Money is always easier to come by for national rather than international causes: as Lord Bandon puts it,it isn't so much the amount of money that goes out, but to whom it goes. Contributions to AAFCE, especially from less wealthycountries, have to be handled carefully. Similarly a good deal of tact and judgement is required in making appointments to head-quarters : these are all approved (or disapproved) by the Commander, and often the balance has to be weighed between political andmilitary considerations. The important thing is not to offend any national susceptibilities. Lord Bandon's biggest overall problem is one which can onlybe answered if hostilities should occur: whether a conflict could be localized; and how use of the deterrent could be graded. He believesthat there is much less chance of localizing a conflict in Europe than there is in, say, a Far Eastern theatre. In Europe, it would be a casenot of deciding whether to use the deterrent, but what form of deterrent to use. This may seem a dreadful prospect; but from theCommander's point of view it is the only realistic one. Working-out the details of policies is not part of the Commander'sduty. He has a staff on which all seven national air forces are represented, its responsibilities divided according to the mainfacets of AAFCE policy: air defence, operations, logistics—each with their sub-divisions into related departments. At the head ofthis staff (the total is about 1,000, some 300 officers and 700 o.r.s.) is the Chief of Staff, Air Marshal D. G. Morris. It is perhapssignificant that Air Marshal Morris, as Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Air Defence) from September 1957 until February 1959,was one of the three officers appointed by the RAF to implement the new defence policy under which missiles were introduced into thearmament of Fighter Command. Before that appointment he had been Senior Air Staff Officer at 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, (Concluded at foot of page 863)
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