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Aviation History
1961
1961 - 1001.PDF
FLIGHT, 20 July 1961 101 losing money; (3) Granting of the applications would mean more than the division of British effort—it might lead to a reduction in the total share of the traffic carried by British airlines: domestic routes were just beginning to break even and interference with BEA's plans would impede their further healthy development; (4) A dangerous situation would result from slowing down or restricting BEA's growth. Asked to comment on the problem of fares. Mr Milward said that it was "hellish dark and certainly smelled of cheese." Mr Wyatt of BLiA thought that fares should go up and Mr Laker of BUA wanted to bring them down. BEA's revenue rate per mile was 6.4d; BOACs. on longer stages, with fewer landings and proportionally less ground handling, 6.2d; BEA's average rate for domestic routes was 5.3d— including 4d on domestic trunk routes; and the rate in America, with all the advantages of favourable operating conditions, was 5.Id per mile. Concluding, Mr Milward said that it was an unfortunate British habit to dig up young and tender plants to examine their roots; he could almost hear the Gardiner's fork digging around BEA's routes. Beginning his cross-examination of Mr Milward, Mr Gerald Gardi- ner, counsel for BUA. said that Mr Milward had made an eloquent and moving speech against the Act. Did he think the Act was a mistake? Mr Milward replied that it was for the Board to decide how the Act should be applied, but his case was thai all the applications should be turned down. He did not agree that the Board would not be properly applying the Act if BEA retained its monopoly. Asked to estimate the average percentage of fifth freedom traffic on European routes, Mr Milward said this would be about eight per cent. Mr Gardiner asked whether Mr Milward would agree that the UK generated seven-eighths of the traffic to the Continent. Mr Milward did not agree; he said that the highest percentages generated by the UK were 61-67 per cent—depending on the season—to Switzerland, about 79 per cent to Cologne and about 72 per cent of the summer traffic to Milan. The overall average would be about 60 per cent British-generated and 40 per cent generated elsewhere. With reference to a BEA chart showing the estimated diversion of traffic if the applications were all granted. Mr Gardiner asked for con- firmation that this was based on 80-seater aircraft (BUA's One-Elevens would be only 65-seaters) and on the assumption that all traffic carried by the independents would be diverted from BEA, no new traffic being generated by the independents. Mr Milward agreed that the chart was based on these assumptions and pointed out that BUA would not be using BAC One-Elevens initially but Viscounts and Britannias. The capacities of these two aircraft might average 80 seats. Referring to the effects of bilateral agreements, Mr Gardiner sug- gested that it would be reasonable to argue that all British passengers to Madeira should be carried by British airlines and Mr Milward said he was all in favour of a general loosening of bilateral agreements, but these were made by governments. When Mr Gardiner continued to develop this line of questioning, referring to pooling, Mr Milward said he felt he ought not to talk about pools; he would say. however, that he did not like pools but bilateral agreements made them necessary. BEA's Competition Mr Milward was next cross-examined by Mr Ashton Hill, for Cunard Eagle. Questioned about competition on European routes and sug- gestions that the only real competition came from fifth freedom opera- tors, Mr Milward agreed that the only competition on the Malta route came from the low-frequency services of Skyways, but said that the general competition in Europe was keen although it might be insignificant on certain routes. Mr Ashton Hill suggested that reserve aircraft might be utilized to deal with peak traffic and Mr Milward agreed, provided that there were reserves available. He agreed that the lack of available capacity on the Cunard Eagle route serving Pisa was due to frequency and capacity restrictions. When Mr Ashton Hill referred to certain figures for passengers carried and capacities quoted in document BEA.l. and congratulated BEA on apparently achieving load factors of more than 100 percent—pre- sumably by carrying passengers in the wings—Mr Milward said that, much as BEA might like to do so, they were not allowed by the ARB to carry passengers in this way; he regretted that the figures seemed to have been transposed. With reference to Mr Milward's remarks about digging around the roots of BEA. Mr Ashton Hill said that Cunard Eagle were only asking for a little pruning to be done. Mr Milward replied that some trees should not be pruned. Mr Ashton Hill suggested that BEA statistics for the year 1958-5*J showed major traffic increases on the routes serving holiday resorts, that the BEA chart of percentages of total passenger traffic between the UK and the Continent carried by BEA, foreign operators and the inde- pendents included, in the case of the latter, vehicle ferry and inclusive tour charters; the proportion of passengers carried by the independents on scheduled services was, said Mr Ashton Hill, only 12 per cent. Mr Ashton Hill also asked Mr Milward whether BEA.13 "(the chart showing BEA's estimate of the diversion of revenue if the applications were approved in full) was based on operation of 80-seater aircraft at the full frequency, and Mr Milward said that it was. Finally. Mr Milward was asked which he would prefer—a small diversion of traffic on a large number of routes, or the complete handing over of certain routes lo the independents? The chairman likened this question to asking u man condemned to death whether he would rather be hanged or shot. Next to cross-examine Mr Milward was Mr Porter, of Tradair, who suggested that ITX flights had so far had no effect on bilateral agree- ments, and Mr Milward agreed with this. Mr Porter also referred to Mr Milward's remarks about lowering of fares and asked whether, if the ITX applications of Tradair were approved, this would not mean that the traffic was being carried at the lowest fares available, and Mr Mil- ward agreed with this also. Questions From The Board Questions from the Board to Mr Milward followed. He agreed that BEA maintained that they would be able to rill the full future demand allowing for growth of traffic at 10-15 percent per annum. A member of the Board suggested that Mr Milward's objection to all the applications was inconsistent with the complimentary remarks he had made about Tradair. Mr Milward replied that he objected less toTradau's applica- tions than to the remainder. The next witness for BEA was Sir George Cribbett, who gave evidence on the effects of bilateral agreements. Mr Marking first established his witness's status as an expert on such matters by questions about his former appointment as Deputy Secretary to the Ministry of Civil Aviation from 1946 to 1956 and his past and continuing associations with civil aviation, including deputy chairmanship of BOAC, and then asked him to comment on the principles and background governing the approach to bilateral agreements. Sir George Cribbett thought it inevitable that any introduction of a second British carrier on a route would be met by a stipulation that the first carrier's capacity be reduced. Any attempt to introduce a second British carrier into a number of countries at the same time would lead to concerted opposition. Sir George outlined the history of bilateral agreements and said that the principle of one route, one carrier, had been a cardinal principle of policy in the post-war years. All European bilateral agreements had been negotiated, like those with France, Greece and Portugal, on the basis of the assumption that there would be only one British carrier. The change to the policy of "fair and equal opportunity" had made little difference in foreign countries, where this was regarded as being synonymous with "equal capacity." Sir George cited Italy and France as examples of countries where operation by two British carriers had caused unfavourable reactions. There had been difficulty in arranging traffic rights for both BEA and BOAC unless BEA were prepared to reduce their capacity in proportion to that offered by BOAC. In Italy there were consequent restrictions which unfavourably affected BEA. Asked about the right of the national carrier to transport its own nationals, as had been suggested by counsel for BUA, Sir George said that this proposal had been raised at the Chicago conference of 1944 and had been overwhelmingly rejected. Briefly cross-examined by counsel for BUA, Sir George maintained that any conditions specified in existing bilateral agreements would not be changed as a result of the Act of 1960. To a suggestion that the agreements might be re-negotiated, he said that this was a matter for H.M. Government to decide. Cross-examined briefly by Mr Ashton Hill, Sir George agreed that he could speak with authority on Ministry affairs only up to 1956; but he was not ignorant about what had happened since. Re-examined by Mr Marking, Sir George said he did not rate very highly the possibility of re-negotiating bilaterals on terms more favourable to the UK. [To be continued.] The first of five Convair 880-Ms to be delivered to Japan Air Lines has now been accepted and is being used to train JAL pilots at San Diego before flying to Tokyo- Two more will be delivered this month and two next spring; services are planned to begin on October I ffl
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