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Aviation History
1961
1961 - 1062.PDF
164 FLIGHT, 3 August 1961 AIR COMMERCE This London Gatwick scene will not actually be authentic until September 1964, when deliveries often BAC One-Elevens to British United Airways are due to begin, by that time BUA will have in use a big new main- tenance building here, primarily for VClOs, four of which have been provisionally ordered by BUA .-•"'" ATLB PUBLIC MEETING 21 (Continued) MR Gardiner of BUA next questioned Mr Brooks of BEA about theestimated operating cost of BAC One-Elevens. He suggestedthat in practice Vikings, Viscounts and Vanguards had borneout the manufacturers' forecasts and that this was a reason for believing that the manufacturers' figures for the BAC One-Eleven would proveaccurate. Witness said that BEA had had considerable experience of Vickers products, of which the corporation had been the first operators,and did not agree with the suggestion. On the subject of diversion of traffic, counsel for BUA asked whetherBEA's estimate (BEA 63) was based on the assumption that (1) BUA would generate no new traffic; (2) all BUA traffic would be divertedfrom BEA; (3) BUA would start operating in 1962-63. Witness agreed. Counsel also asked whether witness would say that BUA—at a loadfactor of 60 per cent—were asking for 8.5 per cent of BEA's planned passenger-miles. Witness agreed, provided BUA did not use aircraftof more than 65-seat capacity. Counsel then suggested that the fourth erroneous basis of BEA'sfigures was the use of a 60 per cent load factor. He referred to Mr Marking's quotation from Mr Laker's letter to Flight and read the finalparagraph of the letter. These made it clear that BUA expected to start at a much lower load factor and build up their traffic. Mr Gardinersuggested that Mr Marking's quotation of only a part of the letter had been misleading. Mr Marking, re-examining, suggested that the Board might care toread Flight's editorial comment on Mr Laker's letter. Counsel for BUA remarked that the Board had already had the opinions of PresidentEisenhower quoted; he did not know how editorial comments could be evidence. The Chairman thought they could look at Flight. This ended the evidence for BEA's objection, and the Chairmaninvited BOAC to speak to their objection. The BOAC representative, Mr Davis, said that he would make a general submission in objecting,but BOAC would not appear in the individual cases. BOAC objected, firstly, because the applications would be prejudicial to BOAC'straffic rights, which were governed by bilateral agreements. If the applications were granted these agreements would probably have to bere-negotiated. In the course of these re-negotiations BOAC might be required to decrease their capa-city to European destinations. In addition, European govern-ments might seek additional rights to operate to North Amer-ica through London. The Swiss, at present permit-ted to operate only through Manchester and Prestwick, wereseeking rights at London. The Italians were claiming the rightto operate increased frequencies through London. One Europeancountry was already seeking to justify its claim to rights inSingapore on the basis of the number of inclusive tour flightsoperated to its own territory by British independent companies.Bilateral considerations were at present preventing BOAC fromserving Athens and Nicosia; ser- vices through Lisbon, Barcelonaand Rome were severely restric- ted; licences for services termin-ating in Paris and Frankfurt— which permitted through services Derby Airways recently carried their one-mi//ionth passenger— the youngest member of the Tuohy family, seen here at Dublin Airport with (at top of steps) Wg Cdr H. A. Roxburgh, managing director of the airline LAST FRIDAY saw the end of the international-route hearings in theAir Transport Licensing Board's marathon Meeting 21. The parties summed up the arguments and objections of 15 hard-fought days, andhave since turned their attention to the final domestic-routes phase of the case. This report—our sixth—brings the international-route pro-ceedings towards their conclusion. A note on page 169 briefly reports the subsequent proceedings up to the time this issue went to press. between North America and Europe—were not being fully used.The same arguments applied to BOAC's objection on the grounds of "wasteful duplication and material diversion." Tables supportingthe BOAC objection on these grounds had been submitted to the Board and the parties to the applications. These tables gave details of BOAC straffic on the routes affected by the applications, including the numbers of unused sector seats. The unused capacity on the various routesamounted to the equivalent of three services per week with 60-seat Viscounts between London and Frankfurt; two per week London -Dilsseldorf-London; three per week London - Zurich - London: almost two per week London - Geneva - London. On the servicesthrough Rome, increasing restrictions on London - Rome - London traffic being imposed by the Italian Government would probably meanthat capacity equivalent to 20 Viscount services per week would be unused this year, but the frequency of the BOAC flights through Romehad to be maintained to deal with the considerable volume of fifth- freedom traffic for points on the services to Africa, the Middle East,the Far East and Australia. BOAC had been unable to obtain traffic rights London - Barcelona and their unused capacity amounted to almostone full Viscount weekly. The Portuguese Government restricted BOAC's frequency to Lisbon, but 4.400 seats had been unused lastyear. BEA Sum Up Their Objections Mr Marking was invited by the Board to make his final speech forBEA's general objections. BEA maintained that granting of the applications would result in wasteful duplication of BEA's servicesand material diversion of traffic from them. BEA accepted the implica-' tion of the Board's decision in the Cunard Eagle Atlantic case thatdiversion was not a bar to the granting of a licence if there were com- pensating advantages, but in the present case there were none. Nogreater share of the total capacity on European routes would be provided by British carriers. Such a result would be precluded by thebilateral agreements. It had been suggested that these could be re-negoti- ated on terms more favourable to Britain: this was not BEA's view.There had been an inference behind some of the evidence submitted that the Ministry of Aviation had been inept in the negotiation of theseagreements. BEA thought that this suggestion was unfounded. The negotiators had done their best and had succeeded as well as waspossible. No country, including the United States, had done better. All bilateral agreements contained basically the same provisions andBEA did not think that re-negotiation could achieve any better terms. The Board must deal with the situation as it existed, not as the applicantswould like it to exist. On the domestic routes, there was insufficient traffic to justify asecond carrier. What compensating advantages would there be? It was BEA's contention that there would be none. No applicant hadsuggested that he could do better than BEA, or that the public would get better service. He submitted that the Board, in the interests ofBritish civil aviation, should reject all the applications. Counsel for BUA, Mr Gardiner, then made his final speech on thegeneral case for the applications by BUA. The subject of inter- governmental agreements had not been introduced by the applicants.He suggested that they were not a matter for submissions to the Board; the Board could, if they wished, consult with the Minister on the subject.The Minister might, perhaps, be urged to try to make a better deal for the British operators. Mr Gardiner quoted that section of the Actunder which the Minister could direct the Board to refuse any applica- tion which, in the opinion of the Minister, would involve the negotiationwith the government of some other country of rights which it would be inexpedient to seek. The Minister had given no such direction.All the arguments that BEA had so far produced were based on the erroneous assumptions that all traffic carried by BU A would be divertedfrom BEA; that no new traffic would be created; and that BUA. would
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