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Aviation History
1961
1961 - 1690.PDF
794 FLIGHT, 23 November 1961 Four Convair 240s are operated by North Japan Airlines of Hokkaido, who operate domestic services which include Tokyo, where this picture was taken AIR COMMERCE SUPERSONIC ENTENTE ? A LTHOUGH no official comment is forthcoming, it is believed ^V that a Guardian report last week, to the effect that Sud- Aviation will assume design leadership of a joint Anglo-French supersonic airliner project, is substantially correct. The air corres- pondent of the newspaper says that the British design for a six- engined long-haul M2.2 airliner "is now almost certain to be dropped" and that two versions of the four-engined Sud design will be developed instead. According to the report, design leader- ship will go to Sud under M Pierre Sartre. It appears certain that no actual decision has yet been taken by Mr Peter Thorneycroft, Minister of Aviation. Any such decision would obviously be a political one, paving the way for a cementing of a close technical working association that has existed between BAC and Sud for some considerable time past. While both the British and the French obviously recognize the advantages of a joint supersonic airliner programme, the most delicate of all the issues involved—and one which may well require a solution on a political level—is the matter of design leadership. If The Guardian report proves to be correct, French design leadership of an Anglo- French supersonic airliner will represent a major change in British policy. As the newspaper puts it: "the British Government has been anxious to improve its European image; and Mr Thorneycroft has found an apparently happy political and economic solution in proposing that his two expensive children, space and super- sonic airliners, should be the first offspring of the intended marriage." Discussions between the French and British Governments and manufacturers are at an early stage, and any joint project would still be very much concerned with "feasibility." Both BAC and Sud have been working on feasibility studies for their respective govern- ments for the past year or so. Both studies have in common the M2.2 design parameter; but whereas the French design (typified by the Super Caravelle project, of which a model was shown at the Paris Salon last May) is a four-engined machine for medium ranges, the British design (which began as the Bristol 198 under Dr Russell, and which has become the BAC-198) is a six-engined project for North Atlantic operations. It seems logical to attempt to apply one basic airframe and propulsion system to both requirements. It is likely that a joint project will be British-powered, either by Bristol Siddeley—with an advanced Olympus—or by Rolls- Royce. If the Bristol Siddeley engines are chosen, the propulsion system would move forward as a joint SNECMA/Bristol Siddeley effort, for the two firms have been partners since sleeve-valve days. A vast amount of basic research and airframe development work has been done in both countries, and it is believed that a great deal of information has already been exchanged on a technical level. There appears to be no doubt in either the French or British industry that, notwithstanding the declared American intention to proceed with a Mach 3 airliner, Mach 2.2 is the logical and technically correct first step towards supersonic air transport. Obviously, the immense cost of a supersonic airliner programme —anything between £100m-£200m for the production of a proto- type—would be shared by the two countries. LORD DOUGLAS ON EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORTr N the Royal Aeronautical Society's lecture theatre on Wednesday of last week, Lord Douglas of Kirtle- side, chairman of BEA, examined at length The Progress of European Air Transport 1946-61: with Particular Reference to BEA. The occasion was the seventeenth British Common- wealth Lecture and Lord Douglas used it, as he said, "to take a few steps back and get a broader view of the develop- ments of the post-war years." The following is a summary of his paper. Europe [said Lord Douglas] has a prolific network of air services. Perhaps too prolific. The route network is now over 200,000 miles, but the backbone of the system is a network of 20 routes which, in 1960, carried one-third of all international air traffic in Europe. Two points stand out: over-water journeys still remain a very high proportion of total European air travel and the UK market is of major importance in the European pattern. European traffic, which has increased by 800 per cent over the past 13 iyears. has grown much [more than the world average of 475 per cent and very much more than the US domestic air traffic growth of 400 per cent. BEA's traffic, said Lord Douglas, had increased even more rapidly than the European average. BEA holds predominant position in Europe; the other point to note is the rapid growth of traffic of Lufthansa and Alitalia in the past five years. It is this change in the balance of airline power in Europe which caused so much trouble in the Air Union and earlier Europair negotiations. Two essential characteristics are short length of haul (average 425 miles by ARB members in 1960) and the degree of seasonal variation compared with that of domestic services in the United States and Australia. European air traffic's favourable rate of expansion compared with other parts of the world can be explained by (1) reductions in the level of air fares, both in absolute terms and in relation to other prices (particularly surface fares); (2) increases in national income and its distribution; (3) improvements in the quality of air travel. Increase in leisure time, acceptance of air travel, population growth and an increasing trend towards living in cities, also affect the growth of air traffic. The first three of these factors are the most important. Air fares in Europe have shown a steady downward trend in the past ten years. Relative to purchasing power and the prices of other goods and services, European airlines have reduced fares by 25 per cent in the past eight years. The difference in fare levels between the US and Europe is much less than is often suggested. And whereas the average level of air fares in the US has remained more or less at a constant level for the past few years, the European trend remains strongly downwards. Fare reductions, said the lecturer, have been the most important influence on air traffic growth in Europe. The second factor has been the increase in incomes during this same period. More people would have been able to afford air travel even if air fares had not been reduced. As incomes increase, each group of consumers tends to have a larger percentage of income over and above the essential amounts which they are obliged to spend on food, housing, clothes, and fixed commitments. It is apparent that there is a clear pre- ference for more travel as this "discretionary" income increases. The effect of these two aspects of income and expenditure distri- bution is that the demand for travel increases more rapidly than total national income. The third factor which explains the rate of European air traffic growth is the improvements in the quality of air services; comfort, speed, frequency, regularity, punctuality, convenience, efficiency and safety. Improvements in the quality of European air transport have brought about a total transformation of air services in the post-war years. Although there has been a revolutionary improvement in the operational nature of European air services in the past ten years, intra-European air services as a whole are not yet financially self- sufficient. Of the nine main airlines, six had unprofitable European operations, one broke even and only two—BEA was one of them— made profits in I960. The average position was revenue fell four per cent short of expenditure. It was his view, said Lord Douglas, that the primary reason for this state of affairs is the low load factor at which many European routes are operated. BEA's ability to operate profitably has not been due to a higher revenue rate (which was, in fact, four per cent below the European average); its better financial results are partly explained by its 7£ per cent lower than average unit cost level. But even more important is the fact that BEA's load factor of 68.4 per cent was eight points higher than the European average in 1960. Low load factors are the key to the financial problems of European operations. The three airlines shown in Fig. 2 as having the worst financial results were also the three which had the lowest load factors. [Continued on page 795
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