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Aviation History
1961
1961 - 1778.PDF
New VCIO pictures from Weybridge: (Left) two representative Rolls-Royce Conways mounted on one side of the first aircraft; note the hoist winches at the top. In the foreground can be seen the Godfrey cabin blower. Above, with fin erected, is the main structural-test specimen A BRITISH INDEPENDENT'S 880 'THE third airline to place a "one-off" order for the Convair 1 880—Cathay Pacific Airways of Hong Kong—will take delivery of its Model 22M next March. Civil Air Transport and Alaska have also ordered one 880 apiece. Cathay Pacific ("a British airline with British pilots") will put its 880 into scheduled service in April, and will operate Hong Kong- Taipei - Osaka -Tokyo, and also Hong Kong to Djakarta via Bangkok and Singapore. Mr J. T. Gething, CPA's engineering director, and Capt K. W. Steele, operations manager, have been at San Diego arranging 880 delivery date and the crew training programme. Seven captains, five first officers and six flight engineers are to have 880 conversions. Cathay Pacific has already been up against Convair 880 competi- tion from Japan Air Lines on routes to Tokyo and Singapore, and from Civil Air Transport on the Bangkok-Hong Kong sector. The fleet consists of two Electras, one DC-6B, one DC-6 and one DC-4; the two latter are to be sold next year. FRANCE'S INCURABLE EPICUREAN MORE than any other major airline. Air France is a personifica-tion of prestige in present-day air transport. This is evidentfrom the very opening paragraph of the popular version of the Air France report for 1960: "The company . . . must be presentwherever French wings uphold the fame of a now glorious past and keep pace with other international airlines, outstripping themif possible." Like the fastidious gentleman who is depicted peering critically at his wineglass—Chateau Lafite Rothschild '47?—while on an Air France Epicurean flight, only the best is good enough, whatever the price. It is this attitude which might well account for the airline'scontinuing losses. Although the Air France accounts talk glibly about profits being satisfactory—and indeed a profit is quoted ofnearly 3m new francs in 1960—this is only after the receipt of substantial State subsidy. In 1960 this subsidy amounted to NF55m (£4m), almost double the 1959 figure, as against commercial revenues of NF 1,254m (£92m). The arrangement of the accountsmakes it impossible to pinpoint the reason for this loss, except to establish that the cost of remunerating 22,852 personnel imposeda severe burden on the airline's economy. Although the accounts are notoriously impenetrable, nothingcould be more candid than Air France's two reports; the one for the man in the street, the other for the directors on the Board.Together these two reports provide a picture of Air France that is commendably comprehensive and, as airline reports go, of unrivalledelegance. Both reports stress that the introduction of Boeings was the high-light of 1960. The putting into operation of 17 of these aircraft was accompanied by a build-up of the Caravelle fleet from nineaircraft to 24. A further three Boeings and nine Caravelles re- mained to be delivered in 1961 and 1962. Purchases beyond this,according to the report, will depend on current studies which speci- fically include the later versions of Caravelle, the Boeing 735freighter and the VC10. Few other airlines have swallowed such a large dose of jet capa-city without suffering a grievous fall in load factor. In the case of Air France, the load factor remained constant at 66 per cent. Anadmirable readiness to dispose of unwanted equipment, usually to the affiliated companies in Africa or Indo-China, has undoubtedlyhelped in this respect. Another factor was the growing strength of the French economy in 1960. This, together with political stability,gave the airline a solid traffic base. The dependence of Air France on conditions on its home front is shown by the fact that 29 percent of its commercial revenue originated in Metropolitan France. (By comparison, sales in America and the rest of Europe accountedfor 21 and 16 per cent of revenue respectively.) Finally, the air- line has always been given firm government backing in securinghigh load factors. On many European routes this has been done by controlling the foreign airlines' capacity. Thus, the UK-Francebilateral air agreement specifies economic load factors, and it is believed that the French insist on these being set at a high level.Similarly, on the African routes, co-ordination of schedules with UAT and TAI has allowed capacity to be kept in line with trafficrequirements. The brief facts behind this sustained load factor was a 16 percent increase in capacity to 531m c.t.m., accompanied by a rise in traffic to 349m l.t.m. The European and Mediterranean networksaccounted for the largest share of this traffic—39 per cent—fol- lowed by the Atlantic and sub-Saharan long-haul routes (26 and16 per cent respectively). This traffic growth was sufficient to re- tain Air France's position as Europe's largest air carrier in 1960.However, the rapid growth of BOAC capacity (largely unfilled) resulted in that carrier taking over from Air France as Europe'slargest operator. Perhaps it was this development which led the airline to drop from its latest reports the old legend about beingthe World's Biggest Airline. ANSETT/EAST-WEST IMBROGLIO A POLITICAL controversy was touched offat the end of Octoberr\ when Mr D. M. Shand, chairman of East-West Airlines, pub- licly accused the Australian Minister of Civil Aviation, Senator Pal-tridge, of having told him to give further consideration to an Ansett takeover bid. A similar Ansett offer last year had beenemphatically rejected, and East-West's board, by a legal change in their articles, took steps to ensure that any Ansett takeover offercould not be considered, let alone accepted. East-West, although profitable, would find it hard to survivewithout its Federal subsidy. Probably its chief competitor, the Ansett subsidiary Airlines of New South Wales (formerly ButlerAir Transport), although likewise subsidized, makes a bigger profit and could survive without a subsidy. Mr Ansett has claimed that theFederal Government would gain by streamlining the intra-state services in New South Wales operated by Airlines of NSW andEast-West; and the NSW State Government accordingly appointed Mr J. Borthwick, formerly a TAA executive, to make a survey ofthe State's airline system. Mr Shand's allegations were made at just about the time this report was due to be tabled in the NSWLegislative Assembly, and this resulted in a political uproar—not onlv because of an approaching Federal election, but also becauseof the Bill to maintain the two-airline policy recently put through the Australian House. This bill would make it very difficult for anyLabour government to nationalize all Australian domestic airlines. On October 26 Mr Heffron, the Premier of New South Wales,whose Labour Government had always unfavourably regarded Ansett's take-over of Butler in 1958, carried out the route-rationali-zation recommended in the Borthwick report. This meant thai Airlines of NSW had to hand over, within 24 days, the lucrativeSydney - Narrabri - Moree route, and four more by December 17 Sydney - Scone, Sydney - Kempsey, Sydney - Forster and Sydney -Coffs Harbour. The Sydney - Dubbo and Sydney - Casino route- were to be handed over at an unspecified future date, and in retunEast-West was to give Airlines of NSW by December 17 severai routes of an entirely different nature economically, from Sydneyto Cowra, Condobolin, West Wyalong and Temora. This route
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