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Aviation History
1962
1962 - 0151.PDF
fl 10HT International, 25 January 1962 Letters The Editor of "Flight International" is not necessarily in agreement with the views expressed by correspondents in these columns. Names and addresses oj writers, not for publication in detail, must in all cases accompany letters. 151 Parachutes In Sailplanes SIR,—From time to time misguided economists suggest that it is a waste of money to wear parachutes in sailplanes. The caption above the photograph of Oleg Antonov ("Straight and Level," January 4) leads to the conclusion that Roger Bacon has re-started a subtle 'no parachutes in sailplanes campaign." Why? Stockport, Cheshire w. NEUMARRC [The conclusion is Mr Neumark's. No such implication was intended—Ed.l Rearward-facing Seats SIR,—Having got myself involved in this correspondence, may I try to rescue myself from Dick Abel's letter of Jan uary 4 by saying what I think without trying to be flippant ? Point one, I had nothing to do with the statements originally presented by Roger Bacon, which I know to be wrong, and the correction written by Mr Hardingham, which I know to be inarguable. Secondly, I am absolutely sure that rearward-facing seats are safer for people involved in crashes than forward-facing seats; but passengers sitting aft-facing can still be hurt by, for instance, whiplash effect on their heads and necks when the seat structure springs back as the deceleration ceases—- or, perhaps, by rolling sideways off their back-rest if heavy side load is added to the load forcing them against the back rest. Further, I think shoulder harness, either forward- or aft- facing, would enable people to survive the sort of crashes where aircraft (current types) partly break up, but retain sections intact. However, I also think it extremely unlikely that aircraft seats will be fitted with shoulder harness for a long time to come, but they may arrive before the general adoption of rearward-facing seats, which are just not liked by those who dictate airline policy on such matters, and are probably uncomfortable to sit in during highly angled take-offs. Lastly, as a side-issue, the design strength of aircraft floors and the strength of all the under-frame of seats is not much affected under BCAR by the direction in which the seat faces, because the height of the occupant's e.g. is taken to be the same in both cases. I am not sure that the above prove* anything, but I think it is all very interesting. Sandhurst. Berks j. CUTLER Veteran DC-2s SIR,—I was interested to read Mr Dennis Powell's informative letter regarding the veteran DC-2s operated by Phoenix Airlines in 1952 (Flight International, January 4). I enclose a photograph [reproduced herewith—Ed] of one of these two aircraft, ZS-DFX, taken at Wadi Seidna, near Khartoum, in May 1952, which may be of interest. Windsor. Berks D. A. REGAN One of the DC-2% of Phoenix Airlines (see letter above) Automatic Landing Systems SIR,—Roger Bacon's remarks in the December 28 issue of Flight concerning pilots' reluctance to use automatic couplers call for some reply from the automatic pilot manufacturers. Firstly, let us say that the picture is nowhere near as black as Roger Bacon would have us believe. His criticisms might have applied some two or three years ago and undoubtedly there are still some pilots who feel the same way, but generally he is reflecting the opinion of yesterday's airline. We agree that there is some difficulty in obtaining maxi mum use of couplers, but the problem is being overcome. There is no doubt that modern approach couplers are capable of a superior performance to that of the earlier versions, although no one would claim that they now meet every requirement and improvements are continuously being developed in the light of later knowledge and experi ence. A great deal of progress has been made in recent years by both BOAC and BEA in encouraging the use of automatic approach couplers. The leading American airlines are including successful automatic approaches in their acceptance checks after overhaul and several European airlines are actively engaged in improved training programmes. One airline is known to have stipulated that all airfield approaches should be automatic where the facilities and the oppor tunities exist. All these arrangements are attacking in different ways the fundamental problem, which is one of crew training and associated confidence, and the airlines are well aware of this. On the other hand, flying training is very expensive both in direct cost and in loss of revenue earning power by all those involved—including, of course, the aircraft. Consequently the amount of time allocated in the air for automatic pilot training has been necessarily small compared with that given to all the other features of an aircraft, and experience was that one or two coupled approaches were all that a pilot might be shown before his training was over. In this respect, no amount of simulated coupled approaches is of any use. With this background the line pilot would be loathe to put his faith in mysterious black boxes which may or may not do what he would do in similar circumstances on an approach. Psychologically, however tired or pre-occupied he may be at the end of a flight, he feels he would rather put in that extra bit of effort and know what he had to contend with than trust in something unknown. The first point is, therefore, that without training, giving confidence, the pilot would rather not use the automatics and he is never likely to get confidence if the matter is left at that. The situation, before the above airline efforts were intro duced, was very difficult. Because couplers were not used, their behaviour was not reported on after each flight, and they therefore did not get serviced regularly. On the odd occasion when they were used the chances were that they would not function correctly and this only added impetus to the vicious circle. Pilots still do not have demonstrated to them the effects of failures of the autopilot or coupler, and being uncertain of the extent to which the automatics can upset the approach they are once again disinclined to add to their worries at this critical time. This is basically the fear of the unknown, and the pilots cannot be blamed for employing the devil they know rather than the devil they don't! In this connection I would like to recall an experience some years ago. I was engaged in an airborne exercise in con junction with the ARB and some line pilots, the purpose of
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