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Aviation History
1962
1962 - 0489.PDF
FLIGHT International, 29 March 1962 487 Letters The Editor of "Flight International" is not necessarily in agreement with the views expressed by correspondents in these columns. Names and addresses of writers, not for publication in detail, must in all cases accompany letters. Kerosine or JP.4? SIR,—I read with considerable interest your article entitled "Kerosine or JP.4?" which appeared in the issue of Flight International dated March 8. The article states that the first major British onslaught against the use of JP.4 came from Mr J. E. Walker in April 1952, and whilst his classic paper on the subject can probably be regarded as the first major public exposition, a very important earlier move had been made behind the scenes. This was no less than the presentation by the British delega tion to the ICAO airworthiness division meeting, held in Montreal during March 1951, of a working paper proposing that the use of low-volatility (kerosine-type) fuels should be made mandatory for gas-turbine-powered civil aircraft. The working paper was produced by the Air Registration Board and accepted by the Society of British Aircraft Con structors prior to its inclusion on the agenda for the ICAO conference. As chairman of the ARB, Lord Brabazon was undoubtedly aware of this activity. I was personally associated with the wording of this paper and I attended the ICAO conference as a member of the British delegation. I vividly recall how the paper was talked out of court, largely by the American Civil Aeronautics Administration delegation. Mr Dave Posner, who was a very able member of the CAA team, made reference to the fact that there was some evidence that high-flying thin- winged aircraft appeared to be rather prone to lightning strikes which might perforate the fuel tanks, and that in such circumstances a low-volatility kerosme-type fuel might conceivably be more dangerous than high-volatility gasoline or JP.4 type fuels. Because of the possibility that the problem raised by Mr Posner might later be confirmed to be a real one the conference agreed to defer consideration of the subject. In the early days of gas turbine engine development in the United Kingdom, kerosine-type fuels were employed because of their immediate and local availability in suitable quantities. Since the bulk of the gas turbine development was for this reason carried out on kerosine-type fuels it was only natural that a preference for their use developed on this side of the Atlantic, and originally this preference had nothing to do with the safety aspect. It is also a fact that as a result of intense competition amongst the oil companies in the days of oil lamps a consistently very high quality of domestic kerosine became standard in the UK. In the 1950s, United States domestic kerosine tended to be of less consistent quality, and to have a significantly higher specific gravity because of a Federal tax which had to be avoided. (This tax was based on a distillation characteristic and to avoid it somewhat "heavy" fuels had to be produced.) An im portant result was that many of the American kerosines would not meet the —40°F (-40°C) freezing-point of the then current British kerosine specification, and in any case a —40° freezing-point is marginal or unacceptable for long- range aircraft having fuel tanks integral with the wings. (As a result of this a now current British aviation kerosine specification calls for -58°F [-50°C] freezing-point.) For the above reasons, I believe, there was a feeling in the United States that the only readily available and economic ally practical fuels were of the high-volatility JP.4 type having the unnecessarily low gasoline (petrol) freezing-point of —76°F (—60°C). A military specification did exist in the United States for a'kerosine fuel (JP.l), but since the speci fication called for" a"" —76°F freezing-point the fuel was virtually impossible to make on an economic basis, and because the turbine engine fuel bill may be around 50 per cent of the direct operating costs of an airline, it is not sur prising that price is such an important factor and tends to dictate the type of fuel used. It will be interesting to read the conclusions of the Govern ment's report on fuel and safety and in the event of the report coming out strongly in favour of kerosine-type fuels it will be even more interesting to see what is done about it. If it should be decided that the use of kerosine-type fuels should be made mandatory on the humanitarian grounds that crash victims would have a greater chance of survival it would appear logical to prohibit the use of spark-ignition piston engines with their attendant "dangerous" fuel. I am afraid it is now too late to consider the possibility of developing compression-ignition piston engines capable of running on existing safer fuels, or to develop "safety" fuels for spark- ignition engines. Fortunately the supersonic transport, when it comes, will almost inevitably have to employ low-volatility (safer) fuels for reasons not connected with fire risks. I should add that the views I have expressed in this letter are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the company with which I am associated, or of any company I have been associated with in the past. Bristol c. MORRIS Chief Airworthiness Engineer, Bristol Siddeley Engines Ltd [The report to which Mr Morris refers—and which had not appeared when his letter was written—was reviewed in the Air Commerce pages of last week's issue. It does "come out strongly in favour of kerosine-type fuels."—Ed.] Selling: Abroad SIR,—Successfully selling in the world market, as we do, an aircraft which incorporates a substantial proportion of British equipment, and most of this high-cost items, we are naturally sensitive to the figure the British aircraft industry cuts abroad. For this reason, Mr May's two-part article, "The Utmost Sale," was avidly read here; you were justified in calling it "some singularly enterprising research." We would endorse the remarks of some of the Western Hemisphere airlines, as quoted by your contributor, concerning British ancillary equipment makers and their after-sales service. Some are exemplary—others are shocking. In the second part of the article Mr May remarks that the small size of the British home market means that overseas airlines play a large part in proving British airliners and therefore catch the snags. Imagine, then, our position, which is even worse. The Dutch civil market for Friendships has absorbed precisely four of the 125 Fokker-built Friendships sold, and these were way down the production run. The Friendship has been proven entirely in the hands of foreign operators. There is, as Mr May says, little to be done about such a situation—except, perhaps, to build a thoroughly good, snag-free aeroplane. Amsterdam N.V. KONINKLIJKE NEDERLANDSE VLIEGTUIGENFABRIEK FOKKER Robert R. Rodwell, Press Officer SIR,—I read with considerable interest, as one intimately concerned with a number of the products mentioned, the article by Mr May, "The Utmost Sale" in the issue of Flight International for March 8, and look forward to the second instalment [since published, in the March 15 issue— Ed]. The editorial comment that the article "is printed to provoke thought and argument" encourages me to query the assertion (page 358) that "Secondly, the industry must have more and better production engineers; and this it soon will have as more graduates in Dip Tech, HND, etc, reach the end of their courses." Although I make no comment, either for or against, on the truth of the first part of this statement, I feel that Mr May nas failed to mention, or perhaps even to realize, other
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