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Aviation History
1962
1962 - 0891.PDF
889 'LIGHT International, 7 June 1962 Lord Douglas, chairman of BEA, made his first flight in a de Havilland Trident at Hatfield on May 28. Also on board was Capt A. S. Johnson, flight manager designate ofBEA's Trident fleet, seen in the picture (right) talking to Mr John Cunningham, de Havilland director and chief test pilot AIR COM MERCE. Liverpool is not Manchester — AND FORT WORTH IS NOT DALLAS TO the traveller, one of the most intriguing myths from the BEA Bumper Book of Airline Folklore is that Lwrpool and Manchester are the same place. Seme 26 air miles separate the two airports; but normally the driving time is over an hour, because of the canal and river crossings involved. Though the ATLB has never actually pronounced judgement on this BEA submission, it may be significant that the Lord on - Liverpool service is subject to a frustrating frequency restriction, whilst none is now applied to the Manchester and Newcastle routes. On the evidence actually brought before it, the Board may well have been able to reach a logical decision. But the amount of intuition needed to do so contrasts sharply with the analytical approach of the CAB in the analagous "Fort Worth Investigation." The airports serving the neighbouring towns of Dallas and Fort Worth are but 12 miles apart. From "downtown" Fort Worth, the approximate limousine time to Anion Carter field is 40 minutes, against 55 minutes to Dallas' Love field. Nevertheless, following the pattern of so many CAB proceedings, the City and Chamber of Commerce of Fort Worth requested the Board "to determine the adequacy of air service provided to Fort Worth through its airport at Amon Carter field" as distinct from service via Love field. An examiner held a prehearing conference, at which the geo graphical boundaries and other problems were defined; but more important, four special fact-finding surveys were initiated. Their object was to segregate the passengers at both airports by true city of origin or destination. The work was divided amongst the prin cipal parties as follows:— (1) The airlines analysed their reservation cards at both cities for a 30-day pericd. (2) The City and Chamber of Commerce of Dallas organized a "ramp survey" of arriving and departing passengers. The interviewing was carried out by an independent marketing research firm. (3) The Fort Worth Chamber of Ccmmerce conducted a survey of the business travel of 397 firms, including the 50 largest users of air transport. (4) Convair's Fort Worth division reported on the air travel of 21,254 passengers from its own staff, suppliers and customers during a nine-month pericd. It emerged that though 79 per cent of the traffic originated in Dallas, the routine CAB traffic surveys had understated the traffic from Fort Worth by 38 per cent. The examiner then made a meticulous analysis of the true traffic flow from Fort Worth to the 26 most frequent destinations, using the statistical data from the surveys. The Board's Bureau of Air Operations furnished him with a flight-by-flight analysis of load factors, broken down by sectors where relevant. He found that most of the complaints of inadequate service were not supported by the facts; but that some carrier's services to New York, Washington DC, New Orleans, and Midland (Texas) were inadequate—this last finding in spite of the fact that total traffic to Midland was only about 20 passengers per day each way. Reviewing the proceedings a year later, after Fort Worth and the carriers had appealed against some of the examiner's findings, the Board was able to study data on some of the services which had been improved, presumably as a result of the first report. This further data satisfied the Board that all services were now adequate. How ever, "in the public interest," the Board retained jurisdiction in the proceeding, in case the carriers were suspected to be providing inadequate service at any time in the future. Two themes run throughout the case. Firstly, the professionalism of the investigation and report. American airlines are not permitted to shroud their activities in a smokescreen of vague oratory; they must produce facts and figures, thus narrowing the field of intuition and guesswork. Who will argue that this is a wrong approach? Above all, the American CAB acts throughout as guardian of "the public convenience and necessity," So far, our own Board has seen itself rather as a referee in a series of economic debates between the airlines, though it has a clear duty under section 2(2)d of the act to consider in particular "the existing or potential need for any air transport service proposed." Who better to give evidence on this vital point than the civic authorities and chambers of commerce of our cities? Yet with the exception of a strong submission from the City of Liverpool and pleas from the citizens of Ayt, Chester and Dundee, the voice of the customer has been scarcely heard. Can our Board really find correct solutions to these complex prob lems without hearing, as a matter of routine, evidence of the cus tomer's real needs, as opposed to statistics angled to fit in with the airlines' economic problems ? A. B. C. Body JET LANDING RULES EASED FOR many years American FAA regulations have required pro peller-driven aircraft to have "landing minima" of 200ft and half a mile. In other words, if cloud base and forward visibility at destination are less than, respectively, 200ft and half a mile, an instrument approach or talk-down must not be attempted. Clearly, the higher (or more restrictive) the minima the greater is the amount of fuel required for possible diversion. Hitherto, US operators of jet airliners, which tend to be economic ally more sensitive to fuel allowances than propeller aircraft, have O
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