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Aviation History
1962
1962 - 1261.PDF
FLIGHT International, 26 July 1962 117 AIR CO E R C E The Pyrenees Accident PUBLISHED last week by the Ministry of Aviation, the report* of the French inquiry into the Derby Aviation DC-3 accident in the Pyrenees last October concludes that the accident was caused by "a navigational error, the origin of which it has not been possible to determine for lack of sufficient evidence." The aircraft was on an inclusive-tour charter-flight from London (Gatwick) to Perpignan where it was expected at 0112hr on Octo ber 7. At about OlOOhr the aircraft struck the side of the Canigou Massif at a height of some 7,500ft. The two pilots, stewardess and 31 passengers were killed. British representatives on the commis sion, which was led by M. Bellonte (head of the French Accidents Investigation Bureau) were Messrs V. G. S. Casley and J. H. Lett of the MoA Accident Investigation Branch, and Fit Lt S. W. Tarl- ton, RAF Institute of Pathology and Tropical Medicine. The report speaks of "very good co-operation" with the British investigators. The report states that the aircraft was flying at a height "below the safety altitude obtained from the correct application to the Toulouse - Perpignan route of the general instructions contained in the operations manual of Derby Aviation." The charts that may have been on board the aircraft, says the report, could have led to the calculation, on account of lack of uniformity in the heights presented, of differing safety altitudes. "It is not possible, however," * Civil Aircraft Accident, Report of Accident to Dakota G-AMSW near Mount Canigou, Pyrenees, on October 7, 1961. CAP.M9. London, HM Stationery Office, 1962. Price 6s 6d. This*sketch from the French report into the Derby Aviation DC-3 accident last October indicates the possible routes to Perpignan from Limoges fLG'(UMOGES) \ \ I BOUNOARr OF BORDEAUX Fl ' FOu"(TOULOUSE) C S"(CARC AS SONNE) \ FOP"(P£RPIONAH) 4- PLACE OF THE ACCIDENT says the report, "to establish what charts were effectively used by the crew; in fact the airline has not fixed the type of chart to be used by the pilot for the purpose of applying the formula specified in the operations manual." The report also observes that the flight plan was not completed in accordance with French regulations, which are based on ICAO recommendations: the Gatwick flight plan specified only the point of departure, the route beacon at Dunsfold, and the point of destination. According to French regulations it is mandatory to indicate the points at which airways are crossed and in addition the points at which Flight Information Region boundaries are crossed, and if necessary certain radio fixes ought also to be indicated, The report notes that, "as opposed to the British regulations, the French regulations require the filing of a flight plan when the flight is to be made in Instrument Flight Rules." There was no particular meteorological phenomenon of excep tional intensity, though the weather was very cloudy. The one met. factor which could have affected the flight appears to have been the WNW direction of the wind on the second half of the route (from Limoges to Perpignan) giving a tail wind instead of the fore cast wind from starboard, causing port drift. The route chosen by the pilot was Limoges - Toulouse - Perpig nan. When it had passed Toulouse the aircraft went on a heading with the intention of flying directly to Perpignan without flying over Carcassonne. It is probable that the crew relied on dead reckoning rather than radio compass. If the crew calculated the course by using the forecast wind (240°/25kt), which would have given a drift to port of 10°, and if the actual wind was in fact 290°/ 25kt (therefore causing no drift), then the course would have become the effective track (137° true). If parallel lines are drawn through Toulouse and through the place of the accident on a bearing of 137° they are found to be about 8.5km apart. In consequence, in order to intercept the track leading to the place of the accident, the minimum error in relation to a position over Toulouse would have been a passage by the aircraft of about 6.5km to the west of Tou louse followed by the assumption of a heading (137° true) 75sec later. Although this reconstruction, says the report, seems to offer a perfectly acceptable solution in the absence of evidence to the contrary, including precise information of the kind which could be provided by a flight recorder, the commission cannot consider it as definitive. The captain of the aircraft, Capt Michael E. Higgins, had 5,624hr and had made two landings at Perpignan during the previous six months, though after following the direct route Limoges - Perpignan. The co-pilot, 1st Offr Rex Hailstone (2,267hr) had made five land ings at Perpignan in the previous six months, though on routes not via Toulouse. [Leading article in this issue.] British United] Air |Ferries is the name, due to be announced yesterday, July 25, under which Channel Air Bridge and Silver City will henceforth trade. Individual names are likely to remain in^use^until the end of the year. Chairman of the new integrated vehicle-ferry company is Mr Myles Wyatt; managing director, Mr F. A. Laker; and^general manager, Mr Douglas Whybrow. France and Air Union French participation in Air Union was not, as expected, approved at a cabinet meeting of the French Govern ment on July 13. The question has been referred to the Transport Ministry for "further study."
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