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Aviation History
1962
1962 - 1496.PDF
272 FLIGHT International, 23 August 1%2 "IF YOU WERE MINISTER..." decision is made by the manufacturer alone. In the allocation of government contracts the Minister has a big say in deciding where the work shall go, and he has, as contenders for the work, the five groups, his own company in Northern Ireland, and for research and development contracts his Government Establishments like the RAE. But what about decisions on the bigger things—the supersonic transport for example ? When it comes to deciding how we shall use our resources as a nation as between, say, the supersonic or a whole range of other candidates for money—the VTOL, STOL, new flaps and so on—have we the right machinery for deciding that ? This is surely the responsibility of the Minister. For civil trans port he has an advisory body, the TAR.C. Unfortunately the manu facturing and exporting interests of industry are not represented on it. The decision as to whether we should or should not now start a supersonic aircraft is a difficult choice to make, both for us and the Americans. If we were to embark on that at the expense of VTO, STOL, automatic blind landing, other aids to navigation, higher lift devices—things to improve safety—then in my opinion we should be making a mistake. We are not spending enough money on these other things even now. We know we lead the world with our automatic blind landing system, but we shall have to spend more money much faster if we are to stay in front. We know very clearly what we have to do. We have been operating experimentally for a long time. But we now have to apply what we have learned to a modern airliner and demonstrate 100 per cent regularity on the routes. If the decision on the supersonic airliner has to be made in the knowledge that we have insufficient money to do all these things thoroughly. I would defer the supersonic airliner and concentrate our technical and financial resources on making flying safer rather than faster and noisier. That is a particular project. But if you were Minister, how would you decide, as between the different firms and the different ideas, on how to invest the public money ? You can't go far wrong if you back good firms. There are firms with sound reputations and good records. The big groups are unlikely to spend money wastefully. Their technical people just would not want to go on with a project if it was unsound. But how would the application of that formula have cut out a project like, say, Blue Streak ? There we had a sound, reputable firm, with responsible and honest technicians, yet we still contrived to go on with a project which wasted millions of pounds. That example is open to question. The decision to start and to cancel Blue Streak was entirely a Government matter, and their decision to change their policy was not due in any way to short comings on the part of the manufacturers. At the time it was cancelled the technical programme was proceeding excellently. When Blue Streak goes into space its cost will still compare very favourably with what the Americans spend on their rockets. Then we come back to the old problem, how to give enough money to get things done without giving so much that the industry gets fat— and satisfied just to draw the money. There is not much danger of the industry getting too fat in the future. It's rather a question of making sure it does not suffer from anaemia caused by under-nourishmem. What about the development of the Trident ? There was a complaint about that in the debate. Is that to go ahead, and if so who will pay for it ? You mean the Trident IE and IF. The Minister stated that this development of the Trident will go ahead and it will be on a fifty-fifty basis. The complaint to which you refer was a plea for a decision to be taken without further delay. What about any return to the State. Is it fair to ask the basis on which the Ministry can expect to get a return ? Obviously I cannot give you the terms of an agreement which is still being negotiated. But if anyone thinks that the money is handed out on a plate, they are making a very big mistake. These are very tough negotiations indeed. There is every likelihood of the Ministry getting their money back—as they did with the Comet 4. And let me rub that lesson in, for it is not widely known. On the Comet 4 we recovered our money with the sixty-seventh aircraft but the Ministry had got theirs back before then and are still drawing payments. But if all these arrangements are, potentially, so satisfactory, what is the hold-up ? Is there a lack of ideas for new work ? The Minister has enough projects put before his advisors to keep the industry busy. There is no lack of ideas—only a lack of money. Apart from the list of new aircraft there are other things to do in research and development. As I said earlier, I am a great believer in getting aircraft to approach and land at much lower speeds. It isn't as though the industry didn't know what should be done to accomplish this. But we do need more money to accelerate the programme. The firms haven't got it. We don't make enough money to plough back for all these things. We have, as you know, invested huge sums, more than most realize, in building new civil aircraft—£23 million committed for the Trident, to which the Government contribution is about 20 per cent, on the D.H. 125 about £4 million, entirely private venture—that in itself is a big enough venture for any company to carry. How then can we ensure that the decisions are made—correctly and in time ? Is it a question of the personnel now charged with the task of deciding ? Maybe we are not convincing enough, though we try hard. Or maybe the Ministry is not receptive enough. But it is always this business of getting it through the Treasury which seems to eat up so much time. Maybe the Ministry and the industry together are not convincing enough. After all, the Treasury people are not technicians—they must trust us. Now the Treasury has been re organized. So has the industry—maybe it will be better in future! Do you think it would be feasible to have some high-level committee to examine the possibilities and make recommendations—a body with wider responsibilities than the TARC, independent of the industry, but authoritative enough to carry weight with the Treasury? I have not much faith in committees; the present machinery must be made to work. May I put a question about market research ? On the operating side 1 am quite certain that the operators have miscalculated, because they have not done enough grass roots research among potential customers. Now what about your side ? How did you assure yourself for example, that there was a market for the D.H. 125 ? We have sold about 530 Doves and 145 Herons. Many were sold to executive aircraft operators. We carried out a very thorough market research, and opinions came from all over the world that they wanted a replacement to fly faster, pressurized and with longer range without sacrificing anything of the capabilities of the Dove to use small aerodromes and so on. The D.H. 125 is a very versatile aircraft and there is a considerable military interest. Finally, what general comment would you make about the situation in the aircraft industry—the present position and the prospects ? There is too much capacity chasing too little work—that goes for the world at large, not only Britain. The greatest problem in this country, on the civil side, is to get enough on the order books in the early life of an aircraft to get production flowing. It is the initial slow rate of production, before the orders come in, which make the costs go up. The Americans have the advantage over us there, with initial orders of a hundred or more. If we could get a similar start we could get the costs down. As an example of what I mean about too much capacity, since we started the D.H. 125 there have been five similar projects begun elsewhere—not exactly the same, but near enough to be competitors. Can this problem be tackled? Some will lose a lot of money and go bust. But those getting government support, for prestige reasons, may last for a long time. Wouldn't rationalization on an international—or intergovernmental- level be worth trying ? Well, that is what we are now being asked to do. I have had experience only with one, comparatively small, consortium and they were all Englishmen working together. On the basis of that experience I would expect designing aeroplanes by international collaboration to be exceedingly difficult. You cannot design aeroplanes by committee. There must be one man in charge.
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