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Aviation History
1962
1962 - 2258.PDF
FLIGHT International, 4 October 1962 557 Colombo Airport Extension Plans to develop Colombo's Katuna- yake airport have been laid before the Ministry of Transport and Works on the grounds that the airfield requirements of modern equipment will soon relegate Colombo to a very minor traffic centre. The plan caters for a runway extension to 11,000ft, a new terminal building and an enlarged apron of 140,000 sq ft. The cost of improvements is put at over Rs24m, of which it is hoped 60 per cent will come from the United States Development Loan Fund. IN just over a year since the Cunard Eagle Viking accident at Stavanger, on August 9, 1961, the Ministry of Aviation have puolished the findings of the Royal Norwegian Investigating Com mission.* The report was completed by the Norwegians four months ago, and is published by the Ministry without comment. The cause of the accident is given in the report as "a deviation from the prescribed flight path for reasons unknown." However, the report mentions as significant that the heading oi the aircraft at the time of impact was one that would have been steered by a pilot who, for some reason, thought he was on the western side of the ILS localizer beam. After a routine flight from London Heathrow, G-AHPM, whilst overhead the Stavanger Consol LEC, was given descent clearance to 2,000ft at the ZO location beacon for an ILS approach to runway 18. Seven minutes later the Stavanger tower requested an ETA for the ZO beacon and the aircraft reported: "We estimate the Lima Indian beacon in approximately two minutes." To this the tower replied: "Understand you estimate Zulu Oscar in about two minutes." Emphasis was put on the "Zulu Oscar" in the form of a query. The aircraft simply answered "Roger" without indicating which of the two beacons it was actually estimating. From the evidence it appears likely that at about this time the aircraft was in the vicinity of the airport. Two minutes later, at 1620.09hr in response to an enquiry from the tower "Are you at 2,000ft?," the aircraft reported "Eagle Papa Mike passed the Zulu Oscar beacon, will call you on approach." In acknowledging this message, the tower requested "Check outer marker on final for landing runway 18," and this was acknowledged by the aircraft. During this transmission, the ATC officer noticed a QDM reading of 180° on the automatic VHF direction finder. The aircraft then requested a QFE, and the setting of 999 millibars was passed. At 1622.44hr a revised QFE of 1,000 millibars was passed, and the acknowledgment of this was the last radio contact with the aircraft. The wreckage was subsequently located on a hilltop about 18 n.m. NE of Stavanger Airport at an altitude of about 1,600ft. Although the 230° 50-60kt wind in the area was considerably greater than indicated by the meteorological information given to the pilot, the crew had an opportunity to assess the angle of drift during the flight from the LEC Consol beacon to the outer marker beacon. It was established that the aircraft passed the vicinity of the airport northbound and it is reasonable to assume that the captain was attempting to follow the prescribed ILS procedure. In view of the 1,600ft wind the maximum drift experienced by the aircraft on the procedure turn would have been about 26°, and during part of the turn the ground speed may have been as high as 195kt. If insufficient allowance was made for the drift, it can be shown that by the time the aircraft had completed the turn to rejoin the localizer beam the wind effect would have taken it close to or even through the centreline. However, if the aircraft had passed through the centreline whilst still making the turn, the crew ought to have been aware of this from the "fly right" indications even if they had missed the actual movement of the localizer needle. In addition, the radio compass indicator would have made this apparent if it was correctly tuned to the ZO locator. After completing the procedure turn there is little doubt the crew expected still to be on the western side of the localizer beam and they may have missed the movement of the localizer needle that resulted from crossing the beam. If the crew misinterpreted the indication of the localizer needle this would help to explain why the heading of 135°-140° M. was maintained to the position of the crash. How ever, if the ILS equipment in the aircraft was working satisfactorily the crew must, for at least four-five minutes, have had a continuous indication that they were on the eastern side o*" the localizer beam. * Ministry of Aviation, Civil Aircraft Accident CAP.182. HM Stationery Office, price 3s 6d. The US Flight Engineers' Union has handed the FAA a series of photographs purporting to show airline pilots sleeping or reading at the controls. Another apparently showed a stewardess at the controls. The union produced the photographs at the request of Mr Najeeb Halaby, administrator of the FAA. The engineers are at present involved in an argument as to who should be the third man in the cockpit when jet crews are reduced from four to three. Photographs: see Straight and Level, page 563. The Commission is unable to explain how the crew in a situation of this nature could continue on the heading indicated for the time stated unless they either did not note or were misinterpreting the 1LS indicator readings. The possibility of interference from the powerful Billum NDB (located in Western Denmark) affecting the indications of the air craft's radio compass cannot be discounted, particularly as the evidence indicates that the crew may have tuned in ZO while the aircraft was close to it. The effect of such interference would be to deflect the radio compass needle in such a way as to strengthen the crew's impression that they were on the western side of the localizer. In all important respects the aircraft was being correctly operated. The aircraft had a valid C of A and maintenance was in full accor dance with approved schedules. The crew were properly licensed and within the prescribed limits of maximum flying time and minimum rest period. The possibility of the crew being affected either by alcohol oi carbon monoxide has been excluded. Cunard Eagle regard Stavanger (Sola) Airport in Category A, and although Capt Watts had not been to Sola before, when determining whether he could be considered competent to carry out this flight in accordance with the Air Navigation Order, they took into account his experience with them as a Viking captain on European routes. This was very considerable and their records show that he had completed 21 instrument approaches in Europe during the preceding 12 months. The instrument approach pro cedures at Sola were similar to those with which the captain was familiar. Map showing the course of G-AHPM during the early part of the ILS procedure. Dashed line indicates probable course just prior to the crash B Stavanger Accident Report VOR VARHAUG 114,1 11 CON VARHAUG 319 LEC
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