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Aviation History
1962
1962 - 2320.PDF
FLIGHT International, II October 1962 593 Interception a la Russe FIGHTER SCHOOL ARTICLE SHEDS A LITTLE LIGHT ON SOVIET TECHNIQUES Fiddler is the Western code-name for this missile-armed long-range intercepter THIS is a translation of an article which recently appeared in the Moscow journal "Aviatsia i Cosmonavtika" (Aviation and Cosmonautics). Though its style is ingenuous it does provide clues to Soviet interception techniques, which—unless significant facts have been deliberately withheld—do not appear to differ greatly from those of Western air forces. FIRST sortie on this night to intercept the aerial target was made by Military Flier of the First Class Officer M. Divakov. After landing he was at once surrounded by pilots. Each was keen to hear their commander's report how the flight had gone, how he had succeeded in striking the "enemy" in cloud with the first attack. Divakov looked intently at the others. They had long ago set about mastering the interception programme technique, and today they were already real air fighters. Take Senior Lieutenant Poli- karpov. He could be relied on: he would carry out any complex assignment. And yet, only a few months ago, at the most crucial moment of interception he had been liable to lose the target indi cation ... Divakov remembered a day when the interception controller had repeatedly to lead Polikarpov on to the "enemy" aircraft. "How did it happen?" he had asked the younger pilot at the time. "It is difficult to say" answered Polikarpov dejectedly. "I lost the target... Why ? I don't know." "Let us try and set up the whole picture of the interception. Do you remember what you did—down to the last detail?" Polikarpov began to explain: He had accurately carried out the controller's commands. Having noted the trace of the target on the radar scope, he began to close in. As soon as the in-range marker appeared, he transferred his look to the visual-attack sight. "This was where the trouble started" the downcast young pilot said. "On the sight there was no artificial representation of the target. I looked back at the scope, but the target trace had gone." Divakov listened attentively, occasionally putting questions: "Did you pay attention to the character of the trace?" he asked. "Did you notice 'splashes' higher or lower than it?" The flier thought. "I don't precisely remember. But I think the splash appeared above the trace." "Then it's understandable. If the splash appeared higher than the trace, it means you were flying significantly lower than the enemy. And it's not surprising that, looking at the sight, you did not see the artificial representation of the target. From this there's only one deduction: to the moment of interception you must not allow the enemy aircraft to be very much above or below you." "But, after all, I held the height the controller gave me" replied Polikarpov. "True, he helps to find the target. From that moment the success of the attack depends on you. The pilot has every possibility of determining, from the target trace, his position relative to the enemy, the closing speed, and when to begin the attack." "Yes, you are right. The reason was that at the most critical stage I divided my attention." The pilot sighed with relief; for to find your mistake means you are half-way to eliminating it. Divakov appreciated that the chief object had been achieved— the pilot had not been discouraged by failure. However, during analysis of the sorties he again referred to the error, this time to ensure that the other pilots did not repeat it. The disoussion was very specific. Taking definite examples, the commander analysed another possible reason for the loss of the target trace. "At the moment of intercepting," he said, "never hurry in transferring your look to the sight; but never delay, because the consequences will be the same." Sometimes a pilot may encounter clouds with a strong electrical charge, and on the sight a false artificial representation of the target shines up. Divakov discussed in detail how to act in such conditions. "Believe your indicator," he explained. "Learn to distinguish genuine indications from false ones." At the end of the analysis Divakov observed: "And yet Poli karpov, even though significantly lower than his target, could have discovered its artificial representation in the sight. In what way? He had only to bend his head and look at the sight from below ..." The pilots noisily dispersed after the de-briefing. Each under stood that he himself could easily have made such a characteristic mistake. From flight to flight Polikarpov's combat mastery grew. He no longer lost his targets but attacked them skilfully, firing his camera-gun with good aim. Another mature pilot was added to the regiment. But, all the same, Divakov would not let Polikarpov right out of his sight. On the contrary, be became more demanding towards him; a pilot must never be satisfied with what he has achieved. Divakov was analysing schemes of interception carried out on the last flying day. Polikarpov's performance attracted his attention. The controller had led the pilot excellently on to the enemy aircraft up to the very turn on to the target. After that the picture sharply changed. For some reason the turn was too tight, and as a result the interceptor came out on a course parallel to the target. True, it still caught up with the enemy aircraft and, as the camera record showed, "destroyed" it. But it could have done it sooner... "Who was at fault? The pilot or the controller?" wondered the commander. It turned out that the miscalculation was Poli karpov's. He had been instructed to make the turn with a bank angle of 30°, but had held 45°. "Such actions can bring unpleasant consequences," Divakov pointed out. "You might even shoot across in front of the target. . . And the assignment would not be fulfilled." Divakov never excused even the least errors on the part of the interception controllers. Somehow Senior Lieutenant Kolobkov had hurried too much to vector a pilot on to the enemy aircraft. "To the target three kilo metres" he transmitted to the fighter. And suddenly over the air came: "I don't see the target." [Continued overleaf
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