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Aviation History
1962
1962 - 2388.PDF
FLIGHT International, 18 October 1962 629 AIR COMMERCE . . . On its way to Japan, where Nitto Airlines will operate it in and around Lusaka, this Sikorsky S-61 arrives at Bush Terminal, Brooklyn, for embarkation on the delivery ship. The order was handled by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd, Sikorsky's Japanese licensee BEA'S VANGUARD PROBLEM IN last week's issue a note appeared on page 592 about BEA's Vanguard problem. In particular it was suggested that the total number of Vanguard flying hours scheduled per week justify the existence of only about eleven of the fleet of 20 aircraft. More intensive utilization, it was suggested, is needed to reduce last year's heavy £2m loss on these aircraft. An obvious proposal is to dispose of some Vanguards; but the capacity of the aircraft is so large that the number of airline net works on which it can be deployed is limited, particularly with increasing acceptance of the jet. Thus the price that could be secured would involve an unacceptable capital loss. Viscounts, however, are commanding a good price and one solution might be for Vanguards to take over more Viscount routes. This means a complete revolution of scheduling thought, and the introduction of stopping services on the American pattern. BEA thinking seems often to have been biased towards the philosophy "if the route will not support a direct service, don't operate it." But surface operators, and other airlines, say to themselves: "Not enough traffic on the direct route A to C ? Right—let's stop en route at B, and collect extra traffic A to B, and B to C." This would mean introducing Vanguard routes such as London - Manchester - Belfast, or London - Manchester - Glasgow. Several of these sectors are at present operated wholly or partially by Viscounts. The recent domestic licensing decisions awarding non-stop licences to independent competitors on the trunk routes has made this plan less attractive, though American experience shows that it is still feasible. A likely Eagle response to frequency restric tions—the use of jet equipment on the domestic routes—will probably be contained by the ATLB imposing fare differentials; though no provision was made for this in the licences, which specify Tridents amongst others. As far as is known, BEA have not raised this issue yet. Another possibility is for BEA to acquire the high-potential routes London - Liverpool, London - Newcastle and possibly London - Leeds, accepting that some airport improvements would be needed. Though BEA are undoubtedly wise to slough off the highly seasonal routes to the Isle of Man, and the peak Channel Island traffic could be treated in the same way with advantage, the abandonment of Liverpool is a heavy price to pay. Presumably it springs from the dogma that Liverpool and Manchester are the same place; but Starways successful operations to London and Glasgow have high density potential. Even at the present stage of development, integration might yield a Vanguard operation London - Liverpool - Belfast - Glasgow. Finally, and most urgently, the corporation should "sell like hell"—40 per cent more, not just 10 per cent. It is almost unbelievable that the first national advertisement specifically counselling: "Fly to wherever your business takes you . . . Then drive out in a new Vauxhall or other fine Hertz car. .." should have been inserted not by the airline which has so much to gain from acceptance of this way of working, but by an American car-hire firm. Possibly with market research directed towards tourism, British slowness to exploit car hire has been overlooked. It is often the vital factor in air-rail or indeed air-road competition. BusinessmenV'Fly-drive" has been a deliberate Hertz selling policy in the UK and in America —the object being to keep £1,000 cars utilized all the year round. BEA has approached the "walk-on" service in a timid and over cautious way. Could a bold experiment conceivably lose so much more than will be squandered inevitably if the Vanguards are not put to work properly ? With a carefully designed tariff, and vigorous promotion, a proper walk-on scheme can hardly fail. As we noted last week, the corporation faces a crisis, which may extend over several years. One of the most important problems is how to absorb the huge capacity of the Vanguard—and Trident— fleets in the winter months. Such assets demand treatment different from DC-3s or even Viscounts. Bold new policies will be needed. US NO-SHOW PLAN WORKS THE 11 US domestic trunk airlines have announced agreement to extend, with one modification, the five-month-old passenger "no- show" penalty and airline "oversale" compensation plan until January 31. The plan, authorized by the Civil Aeronautics Board, requires that a no-show passenger shall be relieved of half the value of the ticket covering the first portion of his trip, with a minimum charge of $5 and a maximum of $40. By the same token, an "oversale," or overbooked, passenger is compensated by the airline on the same formula. In the UK, the ATLB is proposing a scheme for no-show passengers that does not include reciprocal overbooking penalties. Extension of the plan was supported by the CAB, which has noted relatively few public complaints and a significant reduction of the airline no-show problem since the plan was instituted last May 1. Mr Rex Brack, senior vice-president, Braniff Airways, and chair man of the no-show plan committee, said the airlines want to extend the effectiveness of the plan to test refinements and to gain industry-wide acceptance. He said the 11 participating airlines— American, Braniff, Continental, Delta, Eastern, National, North east, Northwest, TWA, United, Western—feel the plan should be adopted by all US scheduled airlines. The modification, which became effective on October 5, provides that unticketed passengers who hold reservations will be cancelled if they fail to purchase their tickets or claim their space in person not less than 30 minutes prior to flight departure. As in the past, a person making a reservation 48 hours or earlier before flight time must pick up his ticket no later than 24 hours before flight time. US Upper Air Control Within a year, says the FAA, all aircraft operating over practically all of the USA between 24,000ft and 60,000ft will be under positive control. This is already the case in the airspace controlled by the FAA's Chicago - Indianapolis- Cleveland - Detroit ATC centres; next steps will be to extend 24,000ft-plus control to part of the west coast (Oakland ATC centre), followed by the following centres: Memphis - Atlanta - Jacksonville; Minneapolis; Forth Worth - San Antonio - N. Orleans - Seattle; Denver - Kansas City - Los Angeles; Phoenix - Albu querque - El Paso - Washington DC; Salt Lake City - Boston - New York; and finally Miami (by September 1963).
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