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Aviation History
1963
1963 - 0587.PDF
I LIGHT International, 18 April 1963 565 /IcNamara on TFX THE US SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DEFENDS HIMSELF DURING the past month the US Senate Permanent Investi gations Subcommittee has thoroughly probed the controver sial background to the decision of the Department of Defense to award the "TFX" programme—estimated to be worth $6,500m (£2,330m) over the next ten years—to General Dynamics. GD are going ahead with the resulting F-111A for the US Air Force, assisted by Grumman in producing the F-111B for the US Navy. The extracts below are taken from testimony given before the committee by the Secretary of Defense himsslf, Mr Robert S. McNamara. This testimony was reproduced in full by our American contem porary Aviation Week and Space Technology, who also note that the row has reached such proportions that the aircraft is colloquially known in the Pentagon as "Groundbolt." In the most general terms, the investigation was prompted by the suggestion that the civilian experts in the Department of Defense four times over-ruled the findings of the military source selection boards, who had favoured the Boeing proposals. It should, in passing, be noted that the Boeing division responsible for the company's TFX submissions was that at Wichita, Kansas, and not the parent plant at Seattle, Washington. Mr McNamara's Testimony "When I became Secretary of Defense," said Mr McNamara, "I learned that the Air Force was developing plans for a tactical fighter that would ultimately replace the F-105. At the time, the Navy was designing a second tactical fighter to replace the F-4H in its fleet air defense role. These two planes would have many com mon missions and require many similar operational capabilities. After consultation with my military and civilian advisers, and independent study, I became convinced that one tactical fighter could be developed that would meet both the Navy and Air Force requirements. Accordingly, I directed that the Air Force re-orient its programme, with Navy participation, to achieve the goal of a common tactical fighter. "The concept of a major multi-Service weapon system is new. I would be less than candid with you if I did not admit that the majority of experts in the Navy and Air Force said it couldn't be done. As late as August 22, 1961, after the Navy and the Air Force had been working together for almost eight months, it was reported to me by both Services that development of a single TFX aircraft to fulfil stated requirements of both Services was not technically feasible . . . "Requests for proposals from aircraft manufacturers were issued in October 1961, and proposals were submitted by six firms two months thereafter . . . "Of the six proposals considered in December and January, those of Boeing Co and General Dynamics Corp were determined by the evaluation group to be significantly better. But it was recognized that each of these designs would require substantial changes before it would be acceptable. Although the Boeing design was given the higher rating in operational capability, and General Dynamics was given the higher rating in the technical area, the evaluation group recommended that study contracts be awarded to both Boeing and General Dynamics, in order to modify their designs to meet the military requirements. For example, Boeing's proposal had offered the General Electric engine, which was found to be unacceptable. The senior Navy member of the evaluation group stated that none of the designs was acceptable without very substantial change. "A different view was expressed by the source selection board, which recommended that further work to achieve a satisfactory design be conducted exclusively with Boeing. It recognized that substantial changes had to be made to the Boeing design: a different engine was required, the means of stowing missiles was unsatis factory, the radar equipment required revision, and feasibility of substituting capsules for ejection seats had to be explored. The Artist's impression of the GDIGrumman F-lll, with wings spread for take-off, mid-way for cruise and folded for supersonic dash source selection board proposed that a letter contract be issued to Boeing for the limited purpose of refining a design specification which would be acceptable to the Navy and the Air Force. The board's recommendation was concurred in by the Tactical Air Command, the Air Force Logistics Command and the Navy Bureau of Weapons. The Air Force Systems Command, however, which would have the overall responsibility for development of the aircraft, recommended against the selection of Boeing . . . "The two companies submitted new proposals on April 2, 1962, and the second evaluation was conducted in April and May. The evaluation group concluded that both contractors had done an excellent job in correcting identified deficiencies, but neither design was acceptable to the Navy from the standpoint of suitability for use on aircraft carriers and ability to remain on station for adequate periods of time . . . "Following the second and third evaluations of the TFX, it appeared to me not only that neither contractor was meeting Navy requirements, but also that my primary goal was not accepted or not fully understood by the contractors or the source selection board . . . "The two companies submitted their new proposals in September 1962. These proposals were reviewed by the evaluation group and the source selection board, which made its report on November 2 . . . The fourth evaluation report did not choose as between the contractors. When I reviewed the report, 1 could see why. The question was a very close one. "In the technical area, the report evaluated the General Dynamics design as having 'a better structural design, a simpler fuel system, a slight edge in the flight control area and better proposed pro grammes in the personnel subsystem, and aerospace ground equip ment areas. The General Dynamics design had an edge in super sonic dash capability and supersonic maneouvrability at altitude. It has a low radar cross-section and an integrated penetration-aids system. For deceleration, it uses dive brakes in the air and brakes on the ground, providing a conventional but limited deceleration capability. The Boeing design has the edge in ferry capability, conventional weapon carriage, loiter capability, and in landing performance. It has the advantage in low altitude manoeuvring capability. For deceleration it uses a thrust-reverser which offers an excellent deceleration capability, but will require additional development effort. . .' "When I reviewed the fourth evaluation report I was immediately struck by the difference in approach adopted by the two contractors. The report found that General Dynamics proposed an airframe design that has a very high degree of identical structure for the Navy and Air Force versions. On the other hand, the report estimated that in the two Boeing versions less than half of the structural components of the wing, fuselage and tail were the same. In fact the evaluation group concluded that Boeing is, in effect, proposing two different airplanes from a structures point of view . . . "There were aspects of the Boeing proposal which, on their face, complicated the development of the aircraft. Three problems in particular stood out in my mind. First was Boeing's proposed use B
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