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Aviation History
1963
1963 - 1493.PDF
FLIGHT International, 29 August 1963 307 MESSRS STACK AND SMITH ON SUPERSONICS TWO eminent American aviation professionals, one an engineer, the other an airline operator, have said what they think their country should do about the supersonic airliner. They are Mr John Stack, former director of aeronautical research, NASA; and Mr C. R. Smith, president of American Airlines. First, Mr C. R. Smith:— "We should not be content with a duplication of the British- French project. Our objective should be to build an airplane substantially better. It is probable that the British-French airplane will end up in the area of Mach 2.2. In making our specifications, it would be well to establish a minimum Mach number, probably on the order of Mach 2.4/2.5, with some potential 'stretch' from there. In that area, most of the engineers appear to agree that steel or, titanium must enter into the construction. "Not enough is known about the problems of supersonic aviation to warrant a conclusion that all of the problems of the future, which include design, construction, sale and operation, can now be solved. It would be better to find answers for many of these problems after experience has given us more knowledge. Further, because the prototype programme will take nearly three years, we have adequate time in which to make many of these decisions. For the present, we should concentrate on the immediate problem: get the prototype programme under way with a minimum delay. "There are varying estimates about how much a prototype programme would cost, one of the reasons being that there is variation in what different individuals believe should be included in the programme. But it should be possible to produce two flying prototypes (roughly duplicates of each other, to guard against the potentiality pf loss of a single prototype) at a total cost of less than $250m. There would be collateral costs and for the purpose of a rough calculation the programme might be described as a $300m programme. This would not include the cost of a new design powerplant, because the prototype would fly with some modification of existing engines. "Some have suggested development of two competitive proto types, each by a different manufacturer or manufacturing groups. This might approximately double the cost of the prototype pro gramme. It is probable that the design competition will provide sufficient detail to permit the selection of a single prototype. "There is a tendency in the existing US programme for the Government to specify too much detail. That, in the opinion of many, would tend to restrict the manufacturer and tend to give us a less-than-best prototype. It would be preferable for the manu facturer of the prototype to have reasonably wide latitude and, of course, the right of continuing discussions with the airlines. Possible Time Schedule "The prototype time schedule might go like this: (1) Potential contractors submit proposals in January 1964; (2) Government completes evaluation and awards prototype contract in March 1964; (3) Prototype makes its maiden flight by December 31, 1966; (4) Complete preliminary flight evaluation is completed in April 1967; (5) Final decision and source selection is made in June 1967; (6) FAA certification is awarded in December 1971; (7) Deliveries to the airlines would begin in 1971, probably with four to eight to be delivered during that year. Production and deliveries in 1972 should be on the order of 12 to 15. Subsequent deliveries could be at a more rapid rate if interest and orders justified. "What would be the risks assumed by the manufacturers and airlines ? "This is a matter which would need to be worked out through negotiation with the Government. The answer is not at this time obvious. A solution might be found in this general area:— "1. The Government would provide on the order of $300m; "2. A way would be found for the manufacturer or manufactur ing group to share in the risk to the extent of, say, $30m. Against this there might be credits for unreimbursed sums already spent by the manufacturer or group on the supersonic programme; "3. The general arrangement of the British-French "sale of delivery positions" (for the Concorde) might be adopted. If so, some $15m might be realized by sale of delivery positions to airline customers. You might assume that the first 30 airplanes would bring f500,000 each; or that the first 50 airplanes would bring $300,000 each, or there might be variations such as charging more for early delivery positions than for later positions. "If a programme of this kind could be developed, the assump tions of risk would approximate: (1) Government, $300m; (2) Manufacturers, $30m; (3) Airlines, $15m. If the total of ?345m was not needed, there could be a pro rata scaling down. "Under this programme the participation of the Government agency in the design of the airplane would be minimal; in effect, while staying within the guidelines of broad specifications, the successful competitor for the design of the airplane would be principally responsible. The designer would have a strong incentive to do his best, because an impractical or an unsuccessful airplane would produce no later date customers. Close co-operation bet ween the designing company and the ultimate user, the airlines, would, of course, be encouraged. "The Government would have to administer the prototype contract. Other than that it would have little to do with the detail of the project during the three years that the prototype development programme was under way. After the airplane had flown, the agency would come back in, with evaluations and subsequent award of the ultimate contract. "There remain many questions. For example, how and when will the Government get its money back? The Government may or may not get all of this money back; it could get none of it back if the venture is unsuccessful. Obviously, if the programme is successful, each airplane sold ought to pay some contribution to return of funds to the Government or, possibly, each airplane after the first 25 should pay a return. There are endless variations These can be worked out at a later date." The Operator's Viewpoint And now Mr John Stack:— "In the natural development of the long-range air transport, we can either sit back and be satisfied with no further performance improvement, or we can prepare ourselves to have a superior machine ready when the time is ripe. When the time is ripe can be determined by either of two factors: (a) when the existing fleet is worn out and needs replacement, or (b) achievement of such a significant performance improvement, with corresponding improve ments in economy of operation and safety, that replacing the present fleet before it is worn out is warranted. There are, of course, other important factors. Perhaps the most significant is the fact that the British and French Governments have now formed a consortium and have financed the construction of a British/French supersonic transport called the Concorde. Since the airlines of both of these countries are nationalized, you can be sure that anything that is built will be forced on their airlines. If at that point in time US industry does not have a superior product either ready or nearly so, US airlines will be forced to buy the British/ French product which cuts the market from US industry. This is an important market for the US in that at the end of the last decade, one-eighth of our manufactured exports were commercial aeronautical products. "It is conceivable that one company- could go it alone if it was financed as a sole source by the US Government. In the absence, however, of 100 per cent funding by the US Government, other factors enter. The airlines, for example, are very anxious to have a choice and not to have a sole source situation providing a trans port that they must use or else. When it comes to financing two or more companies competitively, this gets to be very expensive. One finds also that total capability seldom exists in one company. The principal transport builders have little supersonic experience. Necessary also to successful comercial operation is a world-wide service organization. Only two American transport builders have anything approaching this. So taking it all and all, the association of several companies has the advantage in pooled resources as to capital and manufacturing capability, transport builder experience, supersonic aircraft experience, automatic systems experience (which comes today only out of fighters like the Republic F-105), and world-wide servicing organizations. "It is hard to estimate the business dollar volume potential. Three years ago some people were giving estimates that 175 supersonic transports would fill the world's need. I never agreed with those
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