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Aviation History
1963
1963 - 2130.PDF
FLIGHT International, 5 December 1963 931 TALKING AIRLINE SAFETY . . . have a most effective part to play when under automatic control. The danger of accident during let-down has already been high lighted. Adequate warning of proximity to the ground is clearly lacking. Are we right in going on placing dependence solely on pressure altimeters in most aircraft for years to come? Admittedly a radio altimeter will not necessarily stop an aircraft from flying into a mountain-side, but it could provide a very much greater degree of protection than is currently available in most cockpits. Then we have all the problems brought on by the desire to operate to lower weather-minima, but in aircraft not equipped with the full treatment. In my opinion any attempt to operate to break- off heights significantly below those currently in use imposes the need to abandon the pressure altimeter as the primary reference. Recordings of manual landings made in big jet aircraft under line conditions have shown far too much scatter in the manoeuvre under visual control. Adjuncts to the bad-weather approach problem, such as automatic throttle control of airspeed, improved capability of extended glide-path holding, and so on, can do much to improve the safety and consistency of manual landings in good weather; they should be judged in this wider context and not related solely to bad-weather regularity. Next a word on flight recorders. I believe that we in the UK have been much too laggard in implementing the mandatory carriage of such devices. Now that we are at last getting a policy on this, let us make sure that we really get the best out of the equipment that we fit. In particular we want to make sure that the vast accumula tion of valuable service data which recorders can make available is not allowed to rot away unused and unanalysed. This is, I know, a formidable task, but one which must be faced. A proper policy on flight recording can play a most important part in the future maintenance of flight safety. Information for the Pilot As a concluding item I would like to say something somewh&t out of context on the vexed subject of in formation for the pilot. The book-case of literature which goes along for the ride on every flight does little credit to any of us. Stowages for essential documents are often difficult, and check-lists and let-down sheets, etc, find the oddest lodgements within the cockpit. Vast research programmes are carried through on all sorts of aspects of aviation. I have thought for years that a relatively modest programme of research on all aspects of the use of literature in the air could provide a return out of all proportion to its cost. I suppose that, as usual, it is nobody's particular responsibility to have a go at this one. Perhaps either the new Directorate of Flight Safety in the Ministry of Aviation, or the Flight Safety Committee itself, might like to ponder possibilities. Compared with so many of the tasks confronting us, this one at least could be handled on a relatively modest basis. COMMAND ON THE FLIGHT DECK By Captain E. Poole* THE responsibility for command cannot be left to the captain alone, because it extends beyond the flight deck and embraces a large number of others who are directly involved. The operator must retain the overall responsibility, so that when the captain exercises his command he is doing so in accordance with carefully planned Procedures which incorporate all available technical knowledge and experience. Time is a vital factor on the flight deck today, therefore procedures "Hist be concise and make best use of all the crew members on the flight deck. !Uniformity of operation is equally important, especially in a large airline employing many pilots. It must be possible for pilots to *°rk as a team even though they have not flown together before. There must be no ambiguity or unfamiliar practices which could lead to n^understanding or error. For this reason the procedures must Produce a common standard of operation. ly'any operators admit to this responsibility, but few could claiin that they have conducted any serious study into this subject. flight manager, BEA. Effects of Pilot Limitations on Operating Procedures We know where the accident black spots occur. We also know of the psycho logical and physiological limitations of the man who must operate the machine. Because these vulnerable areas do exist, we must question whether the traditional distribution of crew duties is still able to meet the difficulties that are generated in these situations. I shall consider only the let-down and approach situation. In BEA we freely admit that pilots are no less fallible than any humans and we believe that the fundamental basis of the problem is the heavy physical and mental load placed on the captain of an aircraft during the critical stage of the let-down and approach. If the let down and approach are being conducted in the traditional manner with the captain at the controls, then this man has too much work to do and cannot carry out his proper role as commander. We also recognize that the most dangerous phase in an instrument approach is when the pilot's attention is divided between the instrument panel and the visual references which are beginning to appear outside. When we consider that at this point the pilot must adjust his vision, assess the situation, make a correct decision and control the aircraft all at one time, it is clear that he has an almost impossible task. Considering how much pilot capacity is available on the flight deck, how do we justify letting the captain continue to carry this burden of work and responsibility? A study of the development of work distribution in a modern aircraft shows that although he still handles the controls he has become isolated from the rest of the crew. Because of the complexity of modern aircraft, flight control requires a high degree of concentration and attention; therefore the overburdened captain is seriously exposed to the possibility of an error. Because of his isolation, the serious aspect of this admission is that the error, once made, could pass undetected. We know that we cannot train our captains to be foolproof, so we recognize that they are vulnerable to the possibility of error; but during the high activity and stress of an approach in bad weather this vulnerability is magnified. If the error passes undetected, then there is exposure to real danger. To err is human; therefore the relationship between crew members must provide a system that will insure against this human frailty. A Solution In BEA we have accepted that operating procedures which are based on the assumption of individual infallibility are out of date and have no place in meeting the safety standards demanded today. We have developed a philosophy which under lines our crew procedures and we apply this to the problem of the overbu: dened captains during the let-down and the approach. The solution we have found reduces the load on the captain and produces a check and cross-check system of all vital actions. The co-pilot controls the aircraft on instruments throughout the let-down and approach right down to the critical height. The captain is relieved of the routine of instrument flying and is free to monitor drills, communications, weather reports and the progress of the approach. Just before reaching critical height the captain concentrates his entire attention on establishing visual contact. At the critical height, still not touching the controls, he makes the decision to continue the approach and land or whether to instruct his co-pilot to overshoot. If visual reference is possible and the captain is satisfied with the situation, he advises the co-pilot, takes over the controls and completes the landing. Compared with the atmosphere which attends an approach and landing in marginal weather conditions by traditional methods, the whole operation is relaxed and well within the limitations of both pilots. Accurate flight control is maintained by the co-pilot, and the captain is free to monitor the whole situation. He does not become so absorbed in the control of the aircraft that he loses sight of its progress in relation to time and space—a possible cause of so many aircraft letting down into high ground miles away from the facility in use. The relaxed mental attitude permits accurate flight control on the one part and intelligent, unharrassed assessment of the operational factors on the other. The captain is not drawn into the wood so far that he cannot see the trees. The Future The next generation of modern aircraft will also bring its problems. The new equipments, although producing a greater degree of accuracy, will add more items to the check list. This further increase in workload will magnify the difficulty of preserving the relationship between the flight deck and the environment, the three-dimensional airspace. In this respect we believe that the role of the third pilot will become more significant.
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