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Aviation History
1963
1963 - 2197.PDF
POLARIS A3 3 HAWK EYE I INTRUDERJ ORION | POLARIS All VIGILANTE! PHANTOM n( TRACER I 998 FLIGHT International, 19 December /$$ CRUSADER TIGER SKYHAWK TRACKER SKYWARRIOR Fig 6 Major types of operational aircraft and missiles of the US Navy. Here again there is an ordered progression through a surprising variety of types of equipment. Note the positions of the Crusader and Phantom II programmes: these are aircraft due for replacement by the F-llIB, but now under consideration as the next-generation equipment for the Royal Navy THE TEN-YEAR GAP As a pilot's aeroplane the Lightning is superb, and for its opera tional mission—the interception, examination and. if necessary, destruction of other aircraft—it is as good ?s any other fighter. But a deeper issue is that the Air Ministry have consistently held to the view that the Lightning must not be made to perform any mission other than that stated. The reason for this limpet-like adherence escapes the author, who for seven years has felt there was nothing about the Lightning that a little versatility would not cure. British Aircraft Corporation proposed to the Air Ministry equip ment installations for various attack and strike roles, photo recon naissance and other duties, but were unable to arouse interest. Few observers would be bold enough to claim that a multi-mission Lightning would have beaten the F-104G in Europe, or the CF-I01B and CF-104 in Canada, or the Mirage III in Australia, Switzerland, Israel or South Africa; but it would at least have been well worth considering. This insistence on the part of the Air Staff on a completely un inhibited, uncompromised Lightning appears to have had far- reaching consequences. It has knocked the ground from under the feet of all who have fought for greater versatility. It has given us what the Americans would call "less defence per dollar" ("defence" meaning military ability in its widest sense). It has created an atti tude of mind as ill-suited as possible to the "concept of common alty"—perhaps an Englishman would prefer "commonality"— which has clouded the next-generation programme, the P. 1154. And it has bred a generation of RAF pilots skilled at only one of several desirable professional accomplishments. Before turning to the P.I 154 it is essential to look at the manned bomber. The Avro 730, the supersonic bomber cancelled in the 1957 Statement, would today be a highly undesirable weapon sys tem, just as vulnerable as the V-bombeis yet having shorter range and higher costs. The Blue Streak, and the excellent Thor IRBM (what a lesson in rapid system development!), have both been wiped off the map by their fixed-site vulnerability, and the Skybolt ALBM has been eliminated by its own customer, Mr McNamara. This is the inevitable result of expediency: replacement yields to stop-gap and stop-gap gives way to replacement. Out of all this has come Polaris, a marvellous weapon for the US Navy but hardly the right answer for Britain (as suggested in this journal last February 14). In the ten years since 1954 the United Kingdom has produced only one "big league" weapon: TSR.2. As was outlined in this journal on October 31, TSR.2 is the result of dogged persistence. A decade of shilly-shallying has almost made us in Britain believe that the development of a modern military aircraft is beyond our capabilities. It comes as a surprise to appreciate the fact that we have actually created one, simply because nobody has succeeded in getting it cancelled. TSR.2 is to us an entire generation of aircraft development, and it has fulfilled three vital functions: it has kept in being a major design team skilled in the technology of modern military aircraft- it has resulted in the development of a range of techniques and skills rivalling those of any other nation ovet a broad spectrum of modem technologies: and it has given the British industry all manner of items of modern hardware which would otherwise have had to be developed from scratch for the P. 1154, Concorde and other types. TSR.2 has also given us a wonderfully flexible weapon. It can be deployed to the scene of any incident within 12 to 15hr, and can then operate for a period without outside assistance from 3,000ft of earth strip (anywhere a DC-3 can go). And it can hit with any degree of hardness, from the lightest precision jab to the biggest multi-megaton blow. It appears to be part of our national character that we should go to great lengths publicly to denigrate our most important weapons. It would not have happened here 25 years ago, and would not happen today in any other country. A general elimination of armaments is not assisted by a nation seeming to foul its own nest for party-political ends. Figs I and 3 emphasize graphically that, in general, the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy are equipped with old designs of air craft. The only exceptions to this incredible state of affairs are the Buccaneer and the various transport and trainer aircraft evolved for the RAF from existing off-the-shelf designs. The latest fighting aeroplanes of Her Majesty's flying squadrons are the Lightning and Sea Vixen. Both were on the drawing boards when some of their current pilots were too young to go to school. Since 1945 our policy of military-aircraft procurement has largely been one of calculated risk. We have tried to progress in giant sttides. because we could not afford the intermediate stages. The steps, Meteor-Hunter-Lightning, were large enough, but since the Lightning the gap has yawned so vast that whatever comes next is bound to be a high-risk programme. In 1957 an eminent American designer said to me, "If you people continue to duck the difficult problems, each succeeding project will be more difficult and even tually you will cease to have the capability of doing anything." Apart from TSR.2 we have done nothing basic for the offensive or defensive strength of the Royal Air Force for ten years. Throughout this time we have greatly improved the Vulcan and Victor, started and abandoned the fixed-base LRBM, deployed and run-down a fixed-base IRBM supplied by the USA, introduced surface-to-air and air-to-air guided weapons to defend the V- bombers against enemy bombers, and put into service a "stand-off" missile able to penetrate presumed enemy defences better than could the V-bombers which carry it. But the TSR.2 remains the solitary example of a new home-grown weapon system. Without it we should be in really desperate straits. And TSR.2, versatile as it is, is not meant to fulfil a defensive role. The hiatus which has existed in this field since the design of the Lightning cannot be allowed to continue much longer. Only one project could fill the gap, the Hawker Siddeley P.I 154. This is our newest fighting-aircraft programme. To an outside observer it appears to be the most block-stumbling programme in the history of aviation. Genesis of the P. 1154 was the P. 1127, the free-thinking, free- enterprise V/STOL aircraft created by M Michel Wibault, Dr Stanley Hooker and Sir Sydney Camm. Since they were not work ing for the Government they produced the first P.I 127 rapidly, and had it hovering in the autumn of I960. If the sponsor companies— and the US Government, who put money into the revolutionary Bristol Siddeley engine—had been left alone this aircraft would almost certainly be in full production by now. As it is, the Minister of Defence said in February 1961. "We believe that the P.l 127 «'» win acceptance by NATO as a replacement for the Fiat G.91"; a" the Minister of Aviation said last month (33 months later), "f16 P.I 127 has been put forward as a Fiat G.91 replacement." No useful purpose would I e served by yet again emphasizing fact that Britain cannot expect to sell armaments to her allies simp j by telling them that these armaments are what they really ougnt desire. Germany, Italy and other NATO partners are tired of in* and yet are still prepared to take part in any genuine co-opera" programme. What we have achieved in the V/STOL field 's r partite UK./US/German evaluation of the P.l 127 on a squadron basis, and tripartite UK_/French/German development and use the RB. 162 lift jet. . ^ We ourselves have shown no public official interest in using RB. 162, nor in the very efficient composite-powerplant type . V/STOL with which it is associated. The P.l 154 is designed aroun a single Bristol Siddeiey BS.IOO vectored-thrust turbofan witn
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