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Aviation History
1963
1963 - 2198.PDF
FLIGHT International, 19 December 1963 999 Fi| 7 As an indication of the rise in complexity of aircraft, this curve shows very approximately the variation in equipped first cost for weapon systems of the RAF and RN (total cost of operational aircraft bought divided by the total number of aircraft) thrust of more than 30,0001b. This suffices to lift a fighter/strike/ reconnaissance aeroplane carrying at least as much mission equip ment as an F-104G or Buccaneer, and to confer upon it a flight performance superior in everything apart from range to that of any other military aircraft known. Hawker Siddeley conceived the P.l 154 while scheming projects for the NATO BMR-3 competition. Three fat volumes were submitted from Kingston to the NATO Military Committee to meet the NBMR-3 deadline of November 1961, Since then the project has, in the words of a senior Hawker Siddeley spokesman, "Moved about one year forwards and nine months backwards." And another man—not from Hawker Sidde ley—states, "I think we are further from having an operational P.l 154 today than we were two years ago." These views were ex pressed in moments of particular frustration; but there is much truth in them. Most of the difficulty has stemmed from trying to develop the P. 1154 as a common type for both the RAF and Royal Navy. There have been occasions in the past when common types have been employed. There was not a great deal of difference between the Spitfire and Seafire, nor between the Venom NF.3 and Sea Venom 20-22. But the dramatic increase in complexity of modern aircraft (Fig 7) is making the achievement of commonality pro gressively more difficult to achieve, and the only true examples today are the Firestreak and Red Top air-to-air missiles. Since 1960 the US Air Force and Navy have gone through the whole agonizing process with the "TFX"—the most acrimonious aircraft programme in US history, but for purely political reasons (what Americans call "pork-barrel politics"). Out of the original technical evaluations have come the F-11IA, for the USAF, and the F-l HB for the USN. Statistics are difficult to interpret, but an official view is that, at the time of final submissions, the F-111A would have 14.8 per cent "peculiar parts" and the F-l 1 IB 18.4 per *Jit. This apparently excellent commonality may not be main tained as the two aircraft develop into the hardware stage, but it has at least got the programme going. In Britain we seem to have done less well with the P. 1154. To begin with, it is not necessarily the ideal aircraft; and since it is so important to us, and will take so long to develop, it should have started off as uncompromised as possible. A variable-geometry wing appears to be mandatory if any real degree of optimization is to be achieved in the face of the conflicting demands of the two Services. What is more important is the disgraceful amount of time which has been wasted already. It is, or was, envisaged as "a replacement for the Hunters of the RAF and possibly of the Sea Vixens of the Royal Navy." Broadly, the RAF want the P.l 154 as a tactical strike and reconnaissance aircraft, with interception capability, employed in a wide range of local conflicts and to support surface forces. In contrast, the Navy want it chiefly as an air-superiority intercepter to protect the fleet, with very high performance and manceuvi ability at extreme altitude. Some of the more obvious conflicts between the two sets of Service requirements are:— P. 1154 Parameters Number of crew Tyre pressure "Bicycle" landing gear Folding wing/nose/tail Primary radar mode Most common targets Catapult/arresting High altitude performano Marinized Long ferry range Ground equipment Carrier compatible Low-level dash Nuclear strike RAF One Low Acceptable No Air/surface On ground Unlikely Secondary No Essential Mm. /Mobile No Essential Essential RN Two High Inadmissible Yes Air/air In air Essential Vital Yes Secondary In carrier Yes Not essential Secondary Apparently the problem of reconciliation is too difficult. A similar situation appeared to be too difficult for the Americans in August 1961, but the problem was solved by horse-trading between skilled and experienced men who wanted to reach agreement. The result is the F-l 11A and B, the first of which will fly in just over a year. On the day of his death the late President Kennedy visited General Dynamics/Fort Worth and told the massive labour force working on the F-111 that, since the same basic aircraft can be used by the Navy and Air Force, the taxpayer will save "at least $ 1,000m." Each week the contents of this journal are the result of a com promise between numerous completely conflicting demands; and the compromise has to be agreed on time. But it is more difficult when, as the Minister of Defence said last month, "the problems are due to the law of gravity, w hich even the Lords of the Admiralty must obey." It would be a tragedy if the P. 1154 became a one- Service programme, and even worse if it became a no-Service pro gramme. Suggestions that the Navy should buy existing US air craft—Anglicized or not—are merely typical British expediency. The most important message to be drawn from Figs 1 and 3 is that we have done practically nothing to give the RN and RAF modern fighting aircraft (I haven't even touched on the ASW pic ture). We have a ten-year vacuum to make up, and this will not be achieved by cancelling the little we have and buying American. Abdication costs as much as good weapon-system management. Britain's V-bombers have been almost a 20-year programme, but one which has given us an effective striking force. Picture, taken last month at Edinburgh Field, Adelaide, shows a Vulcan 1.2 engaged in low-level Blue Steel trials This
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