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Aviation History
1964
1964 - 0206.PDF
fUGHT 139 International, 23 January 1964 Mr Harald Penrose (letter below) cites these aeroplanes as representative of the French trend prior to the first European appearance of the Wright machines. They are (above) Vuia's machine and Esnault-Pelterie's earliest monoplane; and (below) the Bleriot canard and the Voisin-Delagrange No I. The pictures are from the files of the Royal Aeronautical Society The Association also has very much in mind the reference by the Chancellor of the Exchequer of a number of recent wage agreements to the National Incomes Commission, and is currently considering whether to refer the whole question of independent pilots' conditions of service, including salaries and pensions, to the National Incomes Commission for public examination. The terms of reference include "the desirability of paying a fair reward for the work concerned," and the Association cannot conceive it to be against the national interest for inde- pendent pilots to receive comparable rates of pay to those obtaining in the corporations, where recent increases in salaries have not attracted the attention of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. A. F. SHERMAN, Hayes, Middx Acting General Secretary, British Airline Pilots'1 Association Historians and Pioneers SIR,—If Charles Gibbs-Smith interprets history in the auto- cratic manner with which he seems to misinterpret my letters, he is prejudicing a great deal of his own valuable research. I hope that those interested will re-read my previous letter and consider whether Charles has made proper reply. May I reiterate that the first point at issue is whether Voisin was right in protesting that the design of French machines was something quite independent of the Wright morgue and not that the Wrights stimulated the French to intensive effort? I adduced Chanute's evidence about their independent line of attack because I supposed that the view- point of the Wrights' great friend and encourager might be preferred to my own or Voisin's conclusion. It is also significant that it was not only Harald who came up with the "second absurdity" about touching the ground, but Wilbur himself. Could be that Charles has not studied his sources of information closely enough? I was careful to use the word "seems" in attributing this matter to the 59- second flight because I judged it was that one of the four from study of photographs and reports. However, Wilbur's actual words are: ". . .we were frequently on the point of touching the ground and once scratched it deeply but rose again and continued the flight." On the matter of "momentum" and the qualification of what constitutes a flight, Charles sidesteps the issue with mistaken comment of "third and even less excusable absurd- ity" arising from a printer's error and not a misquote (which I am sure the editor will confirm, and also that a sentence was eliminated, which would have warned Charles about the context). Nevertheless, the sense of my paragraph was quite clear. It is no good sheltering behind "the late Director of the RAE" as an unchallenged authority on what constitutes flight when an equally learned professor has mathematically demonstrated a different criterion. My own practical flight tests support the latter. So I revert to the fundamental issue which interested me after reading Voisin's original text—that is, the Wrights could not have flown unless a near gale had blown that December day. Dare I again quote Wilbur himself as supporting this heresy, instead of accepting Charles' kind invitation to consult him? The Maestro, in describing the flight preceding the momentous four which are accepted so uncritically by our historian, said: "... the wind was only two to three metres a second, thus making it necessary to use the hill for starting." Even with that gravity assistance to get airborne, the machine only made a 3 J-second hop and was structurally damaged in what was probably a stalled landing. Finally, readers must be well aware that in addition to the Gibbs-Smithsonian Consultancy Institute there are several splendid historians in this and other countries whose evidence and conclusions on various matters have been tested and found true. In saying that, I in no way denigrate Charles' own outstanding share of historical research, but many wish he would give his evidence with greater impartiality. Nether Compton, Dorset HARALD J. PENROSE [This correspondence must, for the present, cease. Mean- while, Mr Gibbs-Smith comments: "After the failure to fly on December 14 Wilbur wrote as follows to Chanute (December 28, 1903), 'Our next flights were on Thursday, December 17, on which occasion the flights were all made from a level spot about 200ft west of our buildings: "—Ed] "The Ten-year Gap"—an Economist's View SIR,—I would like to add some further views to those expressed in the Flight International article "The Ten-year Gap" (December 19, 1963). First, immediately after 1945 the UK aircraft industry benefited from its lead in jet engines. Unlike the post-1918 situation, the jet engine meant a technological revolution which stimulated the demand for modern jet fighter aircraft to replace the war-time surplus stocks of obsolete piston- engine fighters. The rise in international tension, the post- 1945 dollar shortage, and the British industry's technological lead, meant that European and Commonwealth air forces bought British jet aircraft—namely the Gloster Meteor, with its Rolls-Royce engine, and the de Havilland Vampire. The combined demand of the RAF, FAA and foreign air forces for jet aircraft assisted part of the aircraft industry in its transition from the Second World War to peace-time conditions. In other words, the peculiar circumstances of the 1945-51 period, followed by the US offshore orders, largely explain the fact that ". . . UK factories exported 56 types of aircraft to 70 countries." However, given Britain's lead in jet engine technology, together with these post-war "peculiar circumstances," the implication must be that this lead was lost either through mistaken policy decisions by the Government and/or by the small size of the airframe firms compared with their American counterparts. Continued on page Ml
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