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Aviation History
1964
1964 - 0487.PDF
298 FLIGHT International, 20 February (9&4 Fig 8 These views of the latest Concord nose mock-up show the new drooping nose cone found necessary to improve forward view. There is an intermediate setting between the approach and cruise conditions shown here—-one for subsonic flight with only the vizor lowered PROGRESS WITH THE CONCORD... 30min holding at 6,000ft at the alternate airport; and 1J per cent of the total aircraft tankage. Development It is consistent with the history of engine develop- ment that further increases in power over and above the figures on which the initial design payload range curves have been based will become available within a year or so of the initial operation of the Concord in airline service. We are now thinking how best to make use of this. It seems likely that a substantial improvement in the payload-range is achievable and that, contrary to our earlier thoughts, penetration into Europe deeper than Paris may well be possible. Operating Costs It is true that the Concord costs more per hour to operate than a subsonic jet—but it goes much further in that hour, and also in a year it does more work. Smaller fleets are required, with consequent saving of capital investment, even allowing for higher unit cost. A proper comparative yardstick, therefore, is aircraft mile costs, and here the Concord has a distinct advantage. True, it is only a 100-seater, but, on 100 per cent load factors, the seat-mile cost will come out in the same area as for the subsonic jets. The Concord, however, has the big advantage to the operator that it costs less per mile to fly when all the seats aren't sold—a condition which, from time to time, has been known to occur. Airframe Manufacture The programme includes the manufacture and testing of most airframe components. A complete airframe will be built by Sud for static tests due to start late in 1966, and a second airframe will be built by BAC for fatigue tests. Next will come two flying prototypes, the first being from Sud, the second from BAC. These two prototypes will be as near to production standard as possible. Actual metal-cutting began at the beginning of December 1963. The manufacturing cycle is expected to be 4.000 Fig 9 The changing ratio of Concord direct operating costs f>er mile compared with that of subsonic aircraft 34 months at the beginning of production, reducing to 28 months from mid-1971 onwards. The whole of this complex programme is being monitored by the PERT network analysis technique. Flight Test Programme Aircraft will fly alternatively from the two production centres. The first prototype (Sud) will begin deve- lopment flying in 1967 and will be joined about six months later by the second prototype (BAC). Two further preproduction aircraft will begin development flying in 1968. These four aircraft will carry the main burden of the certification flying programme. In addition, the first two production aircraft will undertake proving flying at a rate of lOOhr per month which in itself will form part of the overall certification programme. The six aircraft will, to com- plete this programme, fly between 4,500 and 5,000hr in all. The rate at which the production build-up will follow construction of the prototypes will obviously be influenced by the degree of risk which it is thought necessary to take, as large production commit- ments must be entered into before the results of the test flying are known if airline deliveries are to be effected before 1975. The production programme on which we are currently working is scheduled to produce deliveries to the airlines commencing in 1971. The Broader Picture Finally, I would like to turn away from technical detail to the broader picture. But, before I do, I would underline this, to me, key point. The proof that we are confident of our ability to make Concord a reliable practical and economical airliner is the fact that I have, tonight, been able to go into consider- able detail of its design, engineering performance and economics. Apart from its impact on world communications, on travel and on trade patterns—Concord also represents the first full collaboration on such a venture by two great European powers. It may possibly represent the first step to a world rationalization of civil aviation effort. In some ways Concord may go into the history books more on that account than because it is the world's first supersonic airliner. I have already dealt with technical criticism of the Concord. I will now try to deal with the critics of its philosophy—with the people who say that there is no demand for, or need for, supersonic travel and that we had far better set about reducing fares than halving journey times. I say to them that, in my view, they are wrong in the first part and that they postulate a non-valid and false "alternative" in the second part. The one thing air travel sells, and has always sold, is speed. There is the great unrelenting pressure of human progress always demanding reduction in journey times. I seem to remember the same sort of speches being made when new airliners reached 300 m.p.h. and they were all made again when the first jets came into service. It is the "walk in front with a red flag" mentality and it has had, and will always have, about the same success rate—especially with pioneer nations like Britain and France. Nobody, experience has shown us, will accept an Atlantic air trip of 12 or 14hr for the same kind of fare at which they can get the journey done in 6hr. Equally in the 1970s no one will accept a 6hr journey for the same order of fare as for a 3hr one. And when it is a question of getting to Australia in 13hr instead of taking over a full day—the argument is even more conclusive. Some years ago 1 gave a lecture in which I showed that travel volume increased as journey time decreased. Not a startling revelation, but study of it did throw up a key fact or two. It showed that there was historic- ally on all routes, and by all means of transport, a distinct "kick- up" of the travel figures once place A was brought within about 12hr or less journey time from place B. Another clear pattern was that business travel fell off very sharply beyond the 12hr journey circle—and this fall off appeared to be a factor, not of distance or of money, but of journey time. Businessmen were nothing like so willing to go on trips of say 18 to 20hr flying each way as on trips of 8 or 9hr. The North Atlantic is a classic example of this development. As soon as New York came within 12hr of London there was a heavy upsurge of business traffic and now there is an enormous pleasure trade which has followed in its wake. All this is very relevant to the Concord. I said, in February 1958, that such a Mach 2 supersonic airliner would stimulate world travel by bringing practically every- where within the magic 12hr journey circle of everywhere else--- and that, as a result, the North Atlantic travel pattern would be repeated all over the world. I also said then that the operating costs of such an aeroplane would be (and must be) within reasonable distance of those of the subsonic jets—and I produced a time-scale graph to show that an extrapolation of the curve of progress
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