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Aviation History
1964
1964 - 1004.PDF
FLIGHT International, 9 April (964 563 "Although expressing no specific preference among the American designs, Mr Littlewood made a strong case for variable geo- metry, the approach used by Boeing in their design entry" 80,0001b increase in payload, but there was no place to put it. In the US transports the available excess payload approached 150,0001b at medium ranges, but again there was no place in the aircraft to put more payload. The speaker said that he had urged the British to do something to get more room in the Concord for subsonic usage. This problem of payload capacity without a usage capa- bility also existed on the subsonic "Astrojets," which when re- engined with turbofan power allowed a 20,0001b increase in payload. But since the payload was unusable American Airlines used this margin for safety. Variable Geometry Although expressing no specific preference among the American designs, Mr Littlewood made a strong case for variable geometry, the approach used by Boeing in their design entry. The speaker noted that virtually every great advance in air transport was brought about as a result of the applications of some new technique in variable geometry. Citing retractable landing gear, flaps, slats, ailerons, variable pitch propellers, etc, as evidence of this contention, he said one had to ask himself "Can the supersonic transport do without variable geometry?" The variable-sweep wing deserved considerable attention. Titanium was now getting a big play in the US. Restrictions at present existed in terms of the kinds and sizes of material which were available, but he foresaw that this metal had a "tremendous future." Returning to safety, the speaker noted that the problem of thermal shock had been vastly under-rated. With skin temper- atures of 500°F during Mach 3 flight, one could imagine severe thermal shock conditions when the aircraft descended from cruise altitude and encountered a rain or hail storm. Everyone seemed to be proposing 4,0001b/sq in hydraulic systems, but it was to be remembered that every 5001b/sq in increase in the past had been realized only after substantial difficulties had been encountered. The rise from the current 3,0001b/sq in to a higher-pressure system would produce the same kind of problems which the B-70 faced when it was fitted with a 4,0O01b/sq in system. Many manufacturers claimed that their air-conditioning system would be designed not to fail. Mr Littlewood opined that he couldn't say where, when or how, but he was quite certain that some day a decompression would be encountered at high altitude (65,000ft) and that the air-conditioning system had to be designed to cope with the emergency. Unlike subsonic transports which can descend rapidly, a supersonic transport could not be expected to drop to low altitudes in a fast enough time to eliminate the need for an air-conditioning system which could protect the passengers. Com- pleting his comments on acceptability, the speaker noted that the US cockpits were marginal, and that operating and maintenance people also had to be mollified. The biggest question of acceptability, however, was that of community noise during take-off. Mr Littlewood had been fortunate enough to witness some controlled sonic-boom tests at Edwards Air Force Base and had come away with the personal conclusion that 1.51b/sq ft overpressure was the edge of toleration. Higher pressures would outrage the public; yet, all manufacturers talked glibly of 21b/sq ft being inevitable and that the public would just have to get used to the idea. As for profitability, the Concord had a guaranteed sales price of $10m, with the $450m development costs being written off by the British and French Governments. The sales price for the US designs ranged from $22m to $32m. Aside from purchase price, no one in the business had yet accepted responsibility for intro- ductory costs, and by this he referred to the cost of airline training flights after certification. The speaker noted that the Concord programme was underwriting 5,000hr of flight time while the Americans promised none. Even 5,000hr was far too small a figure for realistic introductory needs. Much improvement was needed in regard to operating costs. With virtually all aircraft systems having multiple redundancy in components, and with all systems being themselves redundant, there was a distinct need for automatic checkout equipments which could rapidly isolate faults and permit the speedy substitution of spares. Not enough thought had been given to "black box philosophy." Mr Littlewood foresaw the continued use 'of kerosine except at Mach 3, where the need for more exotic fuels would raise costs by 25 per cent or more. "Not a Replacement" Mr Littlewood then made a very significant comment—one which must have been of interest to builders of subsonic transports. He stated that, "the supersonic transport is not a replacement for anything we have." The need for supersonic transports was over and above present equipment programmes. New high-speed aircraft would not supplant subsonic jets, and would hence be "the cream on the coffee for some time to come." Returning to the question of costs, the speaker remarked that bankers regarded supersonic transports as v;ry high risk propositions, and would increase interest rates above current norms for borrowed capital. The insurance companies too were taking a cautious view of the new programmes and were "running scared." Mr Littlewood anticipated that the test insurance costs would be "ungodly high." Crew costs were also expected to rise. It is traditional for the builders of new aircraft to sell their new aircraft to prospective
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