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Aviation History
1964
1964 - 1005.PDF
564 AIR COMMERCE Concord Customer ... customers on the basis that with increasing speed the crews would be more productive for a given work day; however, the speaker believed, based on discussions with some pilots, that the air crews would expect a good deal more money for supersonic flight, and hence no cost savings were likely to be realized in this area. (A member of the audience inquired later whether or not the speaker thought that pilots for the supersonic types would be selected on seniority, as is customary today, rather than on inherent capability. In reply Mr Littlewood wished that competence were the only criterion, inasmuch as the supersonic transports would be more difficult to pilot, but he admitted that he was not a labour negotia- tor.) When all the factors tending to increase costs were taken into account, it appeared to the speaker that fares for supersonic flights would have to be at least 30 per cent in excess of current rates. Turning to the question of the speed of the supersonic transports Mr Littlewood recalled that Sir George Edwards, in his acceptance speech for the Daniel Guggenheim Medal some years earlier (Flight, April 22, 1960), had suggested that a Mach 1.6 transport would be appropriate. Sir George, however, the speaker noted, was now convinced that the Mach 2.2 speed of the Concord was the correct value. The American programme had been based on the require- ment that the speed for the US transport had to be 10 per cent better than the Concord for competitive reasons, but above that value further speed was deemed inconsequential, and in any event to be made secondary to the prime requirement for economy. It was America's original intention to have the final Mach number be the result of the studies, not the objective. Mr Littlewood, and apparently a good segment of the airline industry, fully expected the manufacturers to come up with a Mach 2.4 design, and were hence somewhat surprised when Lockheed proposed a Mach 3 aeroplane while Boeing and North American talked of approximately Mach 2.7. In the speaker's eyes, "one could not entirely justify Mach 3." It was imperative for the US transport to have a minimum efficiency range of 1,500 miles and it would be better yet if a useful 1,000 mile range were possible. This would facilitate application on such routes as New York - Chicago. FLIGHT International, 9 April 1964 financing of the project. It was the US Government's present position that the Government pay 75 per cent of the costs while the manufacturers underwrite the remainder. Mr Littlewood expressed the opinion that the programme was a "taxpayer's gamble" and that the US should pay for all costs up until the point that the I aircraft was proven. From that point on private industry and the | airlines could finance the remainder. The speaker thought that ' Senator Monroney's suggestion that the industry should pay for 100 per cent of all cost overruns was "absurd." Such a move might break the largest of manufacturers in America. A member of the audience inquired as to why, if the speaker had so many reservations about the Concord, US airlines had ordered both the Concord and the US transport. Mr Littlewood quickly clarified this point by emphasizing that American had "ordered" nothing. What they had done was reserved positions for both aircraft as a hedge against one or the other being a failure. Sitting on the Fence? It was not so much the words that were used in response to the question, but it was the emphasis on the words which prompted this writer to inquire whether American Airlines expected to operate both the Concord and the US aircraft, or whether they had reserved positions on both delivery lines as a means of "fence sitting" so that they could choose a single superior aircraft at some later date. Mr Littlewood answered that, in all sincerity, the costs of reserving positions were quite nominal and it made common sense to protect the airline's interests by hedging one's bets. "We and others are fence sitting," and although the speaker did not . explicitly so state, it might be inferred from his answer that it would . be the better aircraft which received all of the "orders." In closing, and perhaps to prevent the attachment of too much emphasis to his personal views, Mr Littlewood observed that there were many in the industry who, like the speaker, lacked vision. He recalled that when American Airlines moved into LaGuardia in the late 1930s there was not a single person in the industry who did not share his opinion about the "atrocious" size of the airport. Every single one of them thought that the hangars and other facilities were grossly oversized. Within a few years they were, of course, proved quite wrong, so that many statements by people in the aircraft business should be taken with a grain of salt. Powerplants to Set the Pace Mr Littlewood's final remarks centred on powerplants. After- burning turbojets were the simplest solution, but were wasteful of fuel. Variable stators had real promise for the future. Large improvements were needed in engine technology, and he noted that whereas today's engines had turbine inlet temperatures of l,600°F, the supersonic transport would require temperatures of 2,000° to 2,200°. He felt that engines would pace the overall programme, and suggested that the development efforts be paced such that the engine be proven first. This recommendation was made with the know- ledge that the development of successful engines required some eight to ten years from preliminary design to airline use. In summary Mr Littlewood stated that he expected that the Concord would be in service in 1971 at the earliest, while the US transport should not be expected on the scene before 1975. This figure was "a realistic entry date." In the discussion Mr Littlewood was asked for his views on If the above comments seem unduly harsh on the Concord and ' ; overlook needed specific criticism of the US programme, it is to be remembered that the speech was delivered in America to a small American audience at a time when the airlines were in the midst of officially evaluating the US designs. It would have been quite inappropriate, if indeed not unethical, for the speaker to express criticism or a preference in the competition, since such action would not have been helpful towards selecting a winning design. Had such views been expressed, other airlines would have felt compelled to offer contrary opinions, if they had any. The manufacturers too would have leaped to the defence of their designs and the already confused situation would have become further muddled. Nevertheless, if there is a single characteristic which is common to all successful firms in the US it is that they believe that the customer is sacred. The customer's desires and preferences, however contradictory they might be to the seller's beliefs, are not to be lightly dismissed. And they should especially not be ignored in deference to popular political pressures. QANTAS' AND TWA's CONCORD ORDERS ALWAYS an enthusiatic airline for the idea of SSTs, Qantas has now backed its recent deposit for six American SSTs with a firm deposit on four Concords. Qantas has made a substantial down- payment against the four aircraft, and BAC and Sud-Aviation have emphasized that the agreement represents a firm undertaking to purchase, which becomes invalid only if the aircraft fails to meet the criteria laid down for payload, range, and price. Provided the aircraft meets these criteria, the airline must proceed with the contract or pay a specified penalty. In other words, they must meet the same conditions that apply to all other Concord orders. The Qantas aircraft will be delivered from the British assembly line at Filton, and the airline is being given delivery positions 15, 18, 20, and 21 (30, 36, 40, and 42 in the overall Concord assembly programme). Together with TWA's repeat order for two more Concords, Qantas was the eighth airline to order the Anglo-French aircraft. The others are: BOAC, 8; Air France, 8; Pan American, 6; Con- tinental, 3; American Airlines, 6; TWA, 6; and MEA, 2.
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