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Aviation History
1964
1964 - 2071.PDF
92 FLIGHT International, 16 July 1964 AIR COMMERCE... seriously interfered in design. To insist that one's requirements are fully fulfilled is not interference. To demand that they are fulfilled in a certain way is interference. To say that there shall be three engines in certain positions is interference, not in respect of the number of engines but in respect to their positions. If the airline asks that aft engines be considered, that is not interference, because the designer is free to decide whether he likes the proposals and is willing to produce a design with engines in this position. On the other hand, if the designer does something which the airline does not like, it is not interference for the airline to say, "I won't have that." It is interference if it says, "I won't have it that way, but I will have it this way." This will clearly indicate that it is not always easy to avoid interference and have one's requirements fulfilled. When an airline buys an aircraft, particularly if it is the first buyer, the question arises, when the specification has been drawn up to the satisfaction of the airline and the contract signed, to what extent should the airline interest itself in the detailed progress of the design and construction ? Theoretically the detail specification can be left in the hands of the manufacturer and the aircraft will either fulfil or not fulfil it and the airline can choose in the latter case whether or not to take the aircraft. At the other end of the scale, the airline may treat the detail specification as a result to be achieved and might wish to be kept informed of every step taken towards achieving that result. This would almost inevitably result in interference in design and, as I have already indicated, this should be avoided. The proper way to deal with the designer and manufacturer is, as you can guess, a compromise between the two extremes. No matter how carefully a detailed specification is drawn up, no matter how thick the book, lots of things will be found as the design pro- gresses which are not covered in the specification. Therefore, an airline should station a senior project engineer with the aircraft design team. He must keep in close touch with the progress of the design and at all times be in a position to be asked by the design team which of various design alternatives are preferable, and he will be in close contact with his airline colleagues. The result will be an aircraft which closely approximates towards the airline's wishes and the detailed specification will have a great many amendments incorporated before the aircraft is completed. How the airline treats the designer and manufacturer has quite a marked effect on the product and on the designer and manufacturer. If an airline does not take a personal interest in a new type of aircraft, it is almost bound to slip up on the specification. If the airline interferes with the design, then it can be held responsible for the result of the interference. The manufacturer feels imposed on and there can be general ill-feeling between airline and manufacturer. If, however, a proper interest is shown by the airline in the project from the beginning until acceptance, a very good attitude can be inspired in the manufacturer and he will realize that what he is doing is something worth doing and the result will be improved by this attitude. It is generally the case that when airlines order new aircraft, their initial order is usually quite small. Anybody in the business can tell that they should have ordered more. This under-ordering is not, however, stupidity on the part of the airlines. All airlines know that they cannot absorb a large number of aircraft in a short time. They know that if they order in small batches the later batches will be improved. In addition, airlines must always be looking over their shoulder at other people and there is danger that if they make a sudden large commitment, they might well find themselves at some disadvantage vis-d-vis their competitors. Therefore, the wise airline does the following: It never orders aircraft until it simply must order them, and it never orders more than it can absorb easily. This is always difficult for the manu- facturer, who, unless he has orders from many different operators, does not know how many aircraft he should lay down, nor can he he know over how many aircraft he must spread his development costs. The manufacturer can break even on any number of aircraft. If he breaks even on ten aircraft, that will be so costly that nobody can afford to buy them. A confident firm may decide to break even on 200 airliners. However, the more different operators order a given type, each with the airline's own variations, the further in the future is the break-even point. The history of the Caravelle is of considerable interest here. In 1955 the estimated break-even number was 80; in 1958, 150; and in 1959, 250, the price having risen from £450,000 to £1,000,000 each. This marked retreat of the unattainability of the break-even point is due not only to the changes for various airlines, but also because of the general inflationary tendencies now rampant. For the airline has another difficult problem here. If an airline can order 40 aircraft at a fixed price, will it be better off than ordering in batches of ten, each batch being more expensive than the last ? In the later case, production will be spread over a longer time and almost assuredly the later aircraft would be of a higher modification standard than the earlier and the airline would end with a better and more expen- sive frame than it would in the first case. As I have mentioned, in the old days each airline could and did have designs of their own which nobody else used or wanted to use. That was considered to be a good and desirable state of affairs. Nowadays, when an airline finds itself with an aircraft type which nobody else uses, it is a matter for weeping and wailing, because there is little (if any) development, limited and costly spares production, and other disadvantages. So nowadays the operators want what others have got and in many cases are forced to have it. What of their identity ? They are still proud of their traditions and unique service, even if they started operations only the day before yesterday. So each airline demands its own interior decor, seating and other arrangements. This apparently arbitrary and senseless cost increase is very unpopular with manufacturers, but is vastly important to all operators, for otherwise the passenger would never know which line he was flying with. Even with this drive for identity, passengers still sometimes direct their complaint to the wrong operator, which causes some sniggering. Air transport development is a fascinating and chaotic business for the operator. You cannot see very far ahead, not even as far as you think you can. To modify my metaphor of the R and D stream, you can also imagine it as a river down which the operator is floating on a raft. He can see ahead as far as the next bend. He doesn't know what is around the bend nor what sort of tributary may add itself to the river. One tributary, such as the jet engine or the unexpected virtues of sweep, may change the whole nature of the stream. So we are swept along to new achievements and new dangers and we shall never reach the sea. There is no end to this, our river. Malaysian Airways' five Friendships oper- ate between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur and principal points in the Borneo terri- tories
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