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Aviation History
1964
1964 - 2185.PDF
202 FLIGHT International, 6 August 1964 AIR CO E R C E BOAC Engineering Replies By Charles Abell, Chief Engineer, BOAC BOAC's engineering department has had to suffer in silence all the slings and arrows that have been shot at it in the last few months. Now Mr Abell, one of the most respected engineers in the business, writes as follows in a letter to his staif:— SO much has been written and so much debate has taken placein the last few weeks, months and even years on this andallied subjects, that it seems there can be nothing left to write about. However, during all this time BOAC and all its staff have re- mained remarkably silent for the very good reason that any state- ment coming from them might be prejudicial to the many official enquiries, investigations or Ministry decisions that were in process. Now that there appears to be a temporary lull in these processes I feel it necessary to clear up one or two matters, particularly in the interest of the staff who have worked so conscientiously for many years in running one of the world's finest airlines. Let us take the VC10 issue first. There have been various articles and interviews, including Mr Masefield's article in The Daily Telegraph of July 16, implying that BOAC engineering staff are pro-American and that they have not got as strong a Project and Development team as have BEA. Let me say right away that we have close contact with BEA's P & D team and we admire the work they do; however, BOAC has an equally good P & D team and I would certainly support them in competition (if that were possible) with their opposite numbers in any airline in the world. Let us not forget their achievements. The whole Comet series starting with the Comet 1, up to and including the Comet 4, was sponsored and developed entirely by BOAC. It should not be forgotten, but it seems never to be mentioned, that when BOAC ordered Boeing 707s it insisted on Rolls-Royce engines. This specification was directly responsible for Boeing's competitor Douglas also offering the DC-8 with Rolls-Royce engines. The result of this was that this country exported engines to the airlines of six countries. If BOAC had been able to continue to order Boeings Rolls-Royce would have been able to supply engines for the later models. As it is now all these countries are re-ordering the later models of Boeing 707s and DC-8s with American engines and the export business is lost. And now the VC10. BOAC has done more development work on this aircraft and all its components than any other. The seats which have been particularly praised were entirely a BOAC sponsored development with Aircraft Furnishings Ltd. The VC10 is a thoroughly sound, reliable and good flying machine. As a result of all this development, including a programme of l,000hr flying on one aircraft prior to the Certificate of Airworthiness, all done by BOAC, the aircraft went into service three days after delivery of the first aircraft to BOAC. Since that time, April 29 this year, each VC10, and we now have seven, has averaged over 8hr per day in the air. The technical delays en route have been exceptionally low. This is an achievement that few new airliners, let alone a new type of airliner, has ever achieved before. Now to consider the vexed question of economics. The proper evaluation of an aircraft is a complicated process and depends on many factors, all of which interact on each other. The Super VC10 has a volumetric capacity and a passenger seat capacity which is slightly less than the Boeing 707. Its gross weight, however, and its empty weight are significantly higher than the Boeing 707. On the assumption that there are no compensating factors and also on the assumption that there are no adverse factors such as fuel consump- tion, aerodynamic drag, etc, it is therefore obvious that it must cost more to fly the VC10 one mile or one hour than it does to fly the Boeing 707. Furthermore, during that distance or time it produces less ton-miles or passenger-miles than the Boeing. This has nothing to do with introductory costs or maintenance costs and one is left with the conclusion that this extra cost is a permanent feature. Now, as I said at the outset, this is a complicated business and many and varied hues of herring can be paraded. Nevertheless, these simple facts are, I believe, the nub of the economic problem. I would refer to the Report of the Select Committee on National- ized Industries dated June 9, 1964. This states that in spite of a report by the Royal Aircraft Establishment "BOAC engineering department were still not convinced" and further on "In the event the doubts of the engineering department proved to be well founded." Surely all this is not evidence of the lack of a P & D team in BOAC; in fact it is the very reverse. As to being pro-American, this is just plain nonsense. We are pro-BOAC and we wish to continue to have an airline which will be able to compete on even terms with all our major competitors, and there are many. There is a sort of general feeling that because BOAC is a nationalized undertaking it is therefore a monopoly and therefore does not have commercial competition. This, of course, is just not true. BOAC is subjected to the most fierce and unrelent- ing competition by all the foreign airlines on its routes. It therefore must have competitive equipment with which to meet this competition. The British aircraft industry must not be surprised if we evaluate all available aircraft and demand that the British industry should produce an aircraft at least as good as we can obtain from other sources. It is an old trick that when the truth is not palatable then throw doubt and suspicion on the integrity and the capability of those conveying it. This trick does not, however, serve the industry well. If they themselves will not realize what .their competitors can and do produce, how can they compete in world markets ? One last point needs to be clarified. It has been said that the VC10 was tailor-made to BOAC's specification, implying that if it is no good it is BOAC's fault. The facts are that the VC10 was designed by Vickers (later BAC) to meet a requirement outlined by BOAC for its Eastern and Southern routes. BOAC did not design the aircraft nor did it specify where the engines should be placed or what shape the wing should be made. BOAC certainly did not specify that it should be less economic than its competitors. In order to try and improve the economics BOAC agreed to take a larger aircraft than it required and later modified the order to reduce the number of Standard aircraft and increase the number of Super aircraft. How can it now be said that the aircraft was tailor- made for BOAC? Finally let no one be in any doubt—the VC10 is a thoroughly fine aircraft with which BOAC is proud to be associated and keen to make an operating success. Everything about it is an advance on the present jet aircraft operating today, as indeed it should be. The one question remaining is its economics in airline operation. There are many things that can be done about this, particularly in future models of the VC10, and we in BOAC will continue to work closely with the industry, as we have done in the past. At the working levels there is no lack of the will to make this fine aircraft a success and there is a degree of understanding and mutual respect which is not reflected in the correspondence in the Press on this controversy. Now let's have some peace so that we can all get on with our jobs.
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