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Aviation History
1964
1964 - 2265.PDF
282 FLIGHT International, 20 August 1964 MILITARY AIRCRAFT . . . of the political influence wielded by the US aerospace industry. In Europe aircraft manufacturers are less powerful at the political level, and, although they have not lacked courageous and eloquent leaders, they have traditionally accepted even the most unpalatable decisions provided the decisions could be seen to be correct. In fact, most major European airframe makers have been forced through lack of orders to reduce their rate of output to such a small fraction of their potential capacity that any greedy pride has been knocked out of them, and today very few companies remain reluc- tant to take part in international programmes. This sincere belief in co-operation is an obvious prerequisite to success. Time after time representatives of Governments, Services and manufacturers have been unable to overcome quite petty feelings of pride and pique which have made it impossible for them to accept the concessions which must be made before a joint pro- gramme can be agreed. These concessions are almost always considerable. Many result from the fact that countries are located in different places, so that mission ranges, topography, climate and relationship to potential enemies are different in every case. Other concessions stem from the different time-scales of previous weapon programmes, so that the various national requirements are invar- iably out of phase. Altogether, the difficulties standing in the way of a major inter- national weapon programme are usually so great that success proves elusive. In all history there have been only four real attempts by several nations to produce a common military-aircraft design, and all have stemmed from specifications agreed by the members of NATO. The first, in 1957, was for a light ground-attack aircraft; the Italian winning design was bought by only two of the 15 nations and has since been supplied to two more. The second competition, in 1958, was for a maritime-patrol aircraft; although 25 designs were submitted from many countries, the winning French design has been adopted by only two of the 15 nations. The third competition, in 1961-62, was for a V/STOL tactical strike fighter; agreement proved impossible, and the sole outcome is a British aeroplane for the RAF, a French one for the Armee de l'Air and bitter experience for everyone. The final attempt at commonality, in 1962, was for a V/STOL tactical transport; when a British design appeared to be on the verge of winning the contest, several countries suddenly realized how much the programme might cost and the project was abandoned. In the past, therefore, the concept of international co-operation in military-aircraft development has achieved tangible results which are disappointing in relation to the amount of lip-service paid to the idea. It has often seemed that the chief factor governing a country's participation in a co-operative programme has been whether or not their own design has been chosen. In fact, in the past it has frequently proved impossible even to achieve common equipment for similar roles between different armed forces in a single country. But the use of common equipment continues to be regarded as highly desirable. There exists machinery for ensuring that the for- ward thinking of friendly nations may be correlated and discussed at the earliest possible stage, and among most of the NATO nations these arrangements work well. In the United Kingdom it is the duty of the staffs of the various Ministry of Aviation research establishments to maintain a two-way traffic in information between Britain, Europe, the USA and the Commonwealth, and in the latter countries there are similar officials who keep information flowing in the reverse direction. Again the United States appears to be the odd man out; there is practically no flow of really valuable infor- mation from the USA to her allies unless one of the latter assumes the role of a customer, in which case all doors are immediately opened. In Britain, as soon as a military-aircraft idea shows promise the RAE calls a symposium at Farnborough at which experts from the Ministry, the user Services and almost certainly the industry are gathered for informal discussions. When user interest has hardened, the appropriate Service writes a Staff Target. This is a preliminary assessment of the military situation anticipated at a given time in the future, considered in relation to the particular type of weapon system(s) which ought to be planned to meet it. The Staff Target sets forth the nature of the customer's interest, and thus guides the MoA and industry in seeking further knowledge. A Target may also be debated by the Operational Requirements Committee, which is composed of representatives of the user Services of the Ministry of Defence, together with chosen representatives from the MoA. The MoA may be asked to comment on the feasibility, cost/ effectiveness and other aspects of the proposed weapon system, and bring to light any critical interplays between two or more variables (for example, take-off run, mission load and aircraft cost) in an attempt to effect an overall improvement. Ultimately the concept is either abandoned or else the customer draws up an Operational Requirement, which sets forth precisely what the Service wants in terms of mission capability, and probably also outlines the type of aircraft which it has in mind. The OR is at once debated formally by the Operational Requirements Committee to make certain that it fits into the national and international defence pattern, that it will not give rise to friction between one Service and another, and also that the possibility of a co-operative international programme has been fully explored. As soon as the Treasury makes the required money available the industry can be invited to tender, and today in Britain the company who will perform the work is in most cases a foregone conclusion, although surprises may result from political considerations. From this point onwards, the industrial contractor manages the weapon-system development in partnership with the MoA and user Service. Development in the hardware stage requires little further explanation, although it should be noted that the Zuckermar report (Sir Solly Zuckerman is Chief Scientific adviser to the Defence Minister) has in recent months enabled tighter control to be exercised by the Government—in particular, by the progressive release of money in stages matched to the tempo of development, The aim is not to hinder the programme, but to ensure that fund< are committed only to sound projects by minimizing the inescap- able element of risk at each development stage. Nevertheless, the microscopic scrutiny of pence and shillings does inhibit the develop- ment of British weapon systems in comparison with the mors liberal procedures adopted in the USA. Once an American weapot system has been shown to be necessary it is costed as accurately ai possible throughout its entire active life and the required monej made available step by step with relatively little reluctance. Thii enables the US industry to do more rig testing at an earlier date and helps to explain why American military-aircraft programme typically run at roughly twice the pace of our own. Fighters Our eight-page feature illustrating current types of militar; aeroplane opens with 42 types grouped under this general heading The term "fighter" has long since ceased to have any precis meaning, if indeed it ever had one. It is generally used to descriix relatively small, high-performance machines, some of which an designed specifically to intercept and destroy other aeroplanes whili others are used primarily to launch weapons against surface targets An important mission of the "fighter" may be to reconnoitre enenr environments, usually at low altitude. A small number of aircraf in this category manage to combine several functions, and t( perform them at night or in bad weather. The modern multi mission aeroplane has become practically an entire air force in itself and the price tag of $1.6m (£570,000) on an F-1O5D/105I represents real value for money. Such prices are possible only whci "The price tag of $/.6m (£570,000) on an F-I05DII05F represents res value for money" . . . Some of the carefully packaged systems corri* by the all-weather, multi-mission Republic F-IOSD are here reveute
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