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Aviation History
1965
1965 - 0069.PDF
International Official Organ of the Royal Aero Club First Aeronautical Weekly in the World Founded in 1808 THURSDAY 14 JANUARY 1965 Number 2914 Volume 87 Editor-in-Chief MAURICE A. SMITH DFC Editor J. M. RAMSDEN Assistant Editors MARK LAMBERT BA KEN NETH OWEN BSC DCAe AFRAeS Air Transport Editor H. A. TAYLOR Production Editor ROY CA8EY Managing Director H. N. PRIAULX MBE In this issue World News 40 Air Transport 43 Survey Season 4 9 Airline Profile 51 Convair's Charger 54 PEANZ—Area of Opportunity 56 Europe's Comsat Plans 5 7 Airport Administration: Pt 2 59 ; Ghana's Long-haul Jet 60a .;. Future for Medium-haul Jet 60b Letters 61 Sport and Business 63 Lake LA-4 Amphibian in the Air 65 Industry International 69 Space-flight 71 Defence 7 6 Straight and Level 7 8 Iliffe Transport Publications Ltd., DorsetHouse, Stamford Street, London, SE1; telephone Waterloo 3333 (STD.01).Telegrams/Telex: Flight Iliffepres, 25137 London. Annual subscriptions: Home£415s. Overseas £5 5s. Canada and USA $15.00. Second Class Mail privilegesauthorized at New York, NY. Branch Offices: Coventry, 8-10 Corpora-tion Street; telephone Coventry 25210. Birmingham, King Edward House, NewStreet, Birmingham 2; telephone Mid- land 7191. Manchester, 260 Deansgate,Manchester 3; telephone lilackfriars 4412 or Deansgate 3595. Glasgow, 123 HopeStreet, Glasgow C2: telephone Central 1265-6. Bristol, 11 Marsh Street, Bristol1: telephone Bristol 21491/2. New York, NY: Thomas Skinner & Co(Publishers) Ltd, 111 Broadway 6; telephone Digby 9-1197.© Diffe Transport Publications Ltd, 1965. Permission to reproduce illustra-tions and letterpress can be granted only under written agreement. Brief extractsor comments may be made with due acknowledgement. A Business Decision ...A DECISION on TSR.2 will be made by the Government shortly— probably before the end of this month. Let us look at the two big questions the decision-makers have been asking, and try to provide the answers. The questions are easy; the answers are difficult, because so few of the essential facts are available. The questions are these: if TSR.2 is cancelled, what will be the advantage to the national economy, and what will be the effect on the national defence ? In round terms, about £190 million has been spent on research and development and on the construction of nine pre-production aircraft. As far as can be ascertained, a further £50m has been committed to sub- contractors and suppliers and to the purchase of materials and tooling for 30 production aircraft. Cancellation will therefore involve the writing- off of perhaps £250m, including compensation to contractors. The saving will amount to the cost of 140 aircraft—the RAF requirement—at £2£m each, or £3m each including introductory costs, spares and equipment such as automatic check-out systems and training simulators—a total of £420m over four years, or £105m a year. This is a big saving. But what would be the cost of importing F-l 11 As to meet the requirements of the national defence? Unit cost to the Australians is £2.2m, including spares. The cost of 140 at this price would therefore be £308m, plus at least £20m for equipment and more for any modifications from USAF standard. This total could easily reach £340m, compared with the £420m for TSR.2. The figure could be reduced, or at least the balance of payments problem eased, by licence production in Britain, or if the Americans would be prepared to sell for less to the RAF than to the RAAF—customer discrimination that would not please the Australians. Re-engining with Rolls-Royce Speys would not reduce the cost to the taxpayer, even if General Dynamics were willing (which seems unlikely) to do the conversion engineering for nothing. . . . and its Effects As an exercise in straightforward economics, the cost-saving is relatively small; and four other items must be put in the balance. First would be the effect of cancellation on main and sub-contracting manufacturers, on both design and production staff. BAC might well dissolve into its original constituent parts. Second would be the loss to British technology as a whole of the "spearhead" electronics and systems work that TSR.2 has initiated. Third, and most important, the F-l 11 does not meet the operational requirements that TSR.2 will fulfil. The F-l 11 is a terrain- avoidance weapon, not a terrain-following one—and a few hundred feet in attack height above ground level can be decisive in terms of vulnera- bility. Lastly, the reconnaissance function that TSR.2 is designed to perform in addition to credible nuclear strikes is not provided by the F-l 11. There is no R in TFX as there is in TSR.2. The balance of decision could well be tipped if the cost of the programme appears likely to exceed the above estimates, which total £670m. There are sceptics in the Government who are convinced that the total cost will escalate to £ 1,000m. If the contractors can minimize or cover escalation it is hard to see how, if £250m is already committed, cancellation of TSR.2 can significantly benefit the national economy; certainly it would curtail our defence capability.
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